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Preface
This thesis is comprised of four stand-alone research papers in four chapters that can
be read independently and stand in no particular order. In the first chapter, I develop
a bargaining model of fertility and empirically test the model using preference data.
In the second chapter, I empirically investigate the effects of family non-intactness
during childhood on young adults’ civic engagement. In the third chapter, I analyze
labeling effects of child benefits on expenditure and savings. In the fourth chapter,
I empirically investigate the effects of child care availability on fertility. In what
follows I provide non-technical summaries and outlooks of the four chapters.
Chapter 1: “Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence
Based on Child Preference Data”
The first chapter is concerned with couples’ decisions over having children. I develop
a bargaining model which allows for individual child preference heterogeneity to
describe fertility decisions theoretically and I test the model’s predictions with survey
data. More specifically, I test the bargaining model against the unitary framework,
which treats households as single decision makers and neglects any consequences of
discordant preferences. The following paragraphs give a short overview of the model
and the results.
In the beginning, I describe a theoretical framework which incorporates indi-
vidual child preferences and bargaining power into a couple’s maximization problem.
The rationale is that decisions are outcomes of cooperative bargaining between
partners. A sharing rule which weighs individual utility functions is assumed to
reflect relative bargaining power. The more bargaining power an individual has,
the more say she has in household decisions. In the model, relative wages are
assumed to be the key determinant of bargaining power and fertility is defined
as a household public good. If child preferences are discordant within couples,
bargaining power influences the decision outcome. In particular, if an individual
has stronger child preferences than her partner, her bargaining power positively
influences birth probability. Conversely, the effect of bargaining power is negative
if her child preferences are weaker than her partner’s. The model also captures
negative opportunity cost effects of wages on fertility.
I test the theoretical predictions in reduced form with individual survey data.
I use rare child preference data to identify couples with concordant and discordant
child preferences. With relative wages as a proxy for bargaining power, I estimate
whether the theoretical predictions are supported by the data.
The results are interesting. An increase in the relative wage of women with
stronger child preferences than their partner increases fertility. This is consistent
with the predictions of the bargaining model for fertility decisions. Results are robust
x
to a number of specification checks and the inclusion of control variables. They also
hold with relative education as a more exogenous determinant of bargaining power
and a number of different specifications. I conclude that a bargaining framework is
better suited to describe couples’ fertility decisions than the unitary model.
The most prominent contribution to the literature is the novel approach to test
a bargaining model using intra-household preferences. Most previous work relies on
assignable private goods to identify bargaining power effects. Here, I can test the
predictions for a household public good, which opens up the opportunity to test more
general classes of household decisions. The critical precondition is the applicability
of individual preference data.
Chapter 2: “Political Socialization in Flux? Linking Family
Non-Intactness during Childhood to Adult Civic Disengage-
ment”
In the second chapter, my coauthors, Helmut Rainer and Thomas Siedler, and I
investigate the consequences of growing up in a non-intact family for young adults’
civic engagement.
In recent decades, many developed countries have witnessed a disengagement
of their citizens from public affairs (e.g., voting, union membership, partisan at-
tachment, and interest in politics). These are worrisome trends for societies as civic
disengagement can hurt responsiveness of the political elite and government as well
as social capital and aggregate economic activity. The decline in civic engagement
has not yet been connected to the breakdown of traditional family structures. In
this chapter, we formalize the sociological idea that non-intact family environments
deprive children of important parental resources that shape their political character
and social capital. We analyze the effect of family non-intactness on different mea-
sures of civic engagement using individual survey data. The following paragraphs
provide a short overview of the analysis and results.
In a theoretical model, we formalize the concept by Coleman (1988) that social
capital within the family is generated through the time and effort parents devote to
their children. The model’s main result shows that growing up in a non-intact family
impairs the creation of social capital. Moreover, the longer the spell of non-intactness
lasts, the more severe are the consequences.
In the empirical part, we compare young adults, who grew up in a non-intact
family, with young adults, who grew up in an intact family, using individual survey
data. Family non-intactness is comprised of births outside marriage and divorces
during childhood. The dependent variable is a civic engagement index combining
data on political interest, party identification, organizational involvement, and indi-
vidual voluntarism. We find from analysis of repeated cross-sections and of sibling
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differences that growing up in a non-intact family has severe negative consequences
for young adults’ civic engagement. Results are robust to the inclusion of control
variables and a number of specification checks. We argue that the effect is causal,
because the assumptions underlying the sibling differences approach are rather weak
and assessments of bias suggest that confounding unobserved factors are unlikely to
explain the entire effect.
First of all, this chapter fills a void in the economic literature linking family
structure during childhood and civic disengagement. With democracies in need of an
active electorate and societies as a whole benefiting in many ways from high social
capital, one should be concerned about the negative effect of family non-intactness
during childhood. Direct implications of our research for policy makers cannot
be justified. However, it seems straightforward to consider emphasizing political
socialization and related fields in school curricula to counteract the rising prevalence
of non-intact families.
Chapter 3: “Labeling Effects – How Child Benefits Affect
Consumption and Savings”
In the third chapter, I empirically investigate labeling effects of child benefits on
families’ consumption and saving decisions, exploiting a policy reform in Germany
in the late 1970s. I assess whether expenditure patterns are influenced in favor
of child goods by the mere labeling of child benefits. The following paragraphs
summarize methods and findings.
In textbook economics all income is fungible, i.e. the source and type of income
cannot affect expenditure. Yet, it has long been recognized that human beings are
not always behaving that rationally. Thaler (1990) suggests that individuals form
mental accounts which cause them to use certain income disproportionately for
a certain purpose. If an individual receives a beverage voucher at a restaurant,
she would spend disproportionately more on beverages compared to food. To
transfer this mechanism to child benefits would imply that the recipient spends
disproportionately more on child goods.
In the empirical analysis, I exploit a policy reform which increased child
benefits for a treatment group (families with three children) and did not affect a
control group (families with one child). The idea is, abstracting away an income
effect, that increased child benefits change the composition of income. Holding total
disposable income constant, an increase in benefits can only affect consumption
through a labeling effect. The difference-in-differences setup allows to eliminate
expenditure changes over time as confounding factors.
I find no robust evidence of labeling effects on child good consumption, but
significant positive effects on building loan savings. I argue that most of these
xii
savings can be assigned to children and robustness checks with tenant status and
flat size support this assumption. Furthermore, I run tests with placebo expenditure
and relative trend assumptions which all confirm the baseline results. The effects
seem not to be confounded by intra-household bargaining either which I test with
a peculiar payment scheme for civil servants. Disentangling the effect reveals that
the result for building loan savings is largely driven by better-off households.
This chapter is not the first research to show behavioral response to labeling.
There is also some literature that shows effects of child benefits on assignable
child goods. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, the finding for savings is unique.
With respect to long-term well-being, savings might be even more important than
child-specific consumption. For policy makers the growing body of literature showing
labeling effects opens promising and cost-effective opportunities for all kinds of
welfare programs.
Chapter 4: “Does Expanding Public Child Care Encourage
Fertility? County-Level Evidence from Germany”
In the fourth chapter, my coauthors, Stefan Bauernschuster and Helmut Rainer,
and I investigate the fertility promoting effects of public child care supply for very
young children. The rationale is that women with career prospects would be more
likely to have a child if they can get child care arrangements a year or two after
giving birth. The fear of human capital depreciation and trouble with continuing
work after prolonged maternity leave might otherwise hold women back from having
a child.
In recent decades, Germany’s demography was characterized by below re-
placement fertility and population started to contract. This development has been
connected to a lack of progressive family policies. In particular, availability of public
child care for children under three has been much lower than demand. Starting in
2005, a set of reforms was implemented to increase the supply of public child care
and to provide every third child under three with a child care slot by 2013. In this
chapter, we investigate whether the increase in public child care supply has an effect
on fertility. The following paragraphs give a short overview of the methods and
results.
For the identification of a child care supply effect on fertility, we exploit that
municipalities are responsible for the creation and maintenance of child care facilities
and are thus executing the expansion. We use the widely differing pace of expansion
between counties for identification using two approaches. First, we compare counties
that expanded child care more than the median county with counties that expanded
child care less between 2002 and 2009. We find that a 10 percentage point expansion
in public child care coverage increases births per 1,000 women by 1.2 (corresponds to
an increase of 2.8 percent). Second, we use a county fixed-effects model to eliminate
xiii
county-specific characteristics that may affect fertility and child care expansion.
Then, we find that a 10 percentage point expansion in public child care coverage
increases births per 1,000 women by 1.4. Effects are heterogenous with respect to
age, indicating that women between 30 and 34 are most responsive to the child
care expansion. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control
variables on the county level, to different specifications of the lag structure for
fertility responses, to detailed age compositions in county populations and, finally,
to selective migration.
Only few studies have investigated the effect of child care on fertility using
public policy reforms for identification. As the unprecedented increase in child
care availability over a short period of time with regional variation allows us to
exclude much of the possible confounding variation, we contribute results that can
be understood as causal under relatively weak assumptions. Moreover, our results
are important for the debate on family policy as the estimated effects are substantial.
The intended increase in child care of 30 percentage points would, under the strong
assumption of linearity, yield an increase in the fertility rate of about 0.13 children
per woman.
This chapter fills a void in the literature: most of the existing evidence is based
on data from Scandinavian medium- to high-fertility countries, whereas the context
of our study is Germany – a country struggling with the ramifications of sustained
low fertility. The take-home message for policy makers would be that reconciling
work with family life by increasing public child care supply can be an effective way
to escape the low fertility trap.
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Chapter 1
Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?
Evidence Based on Child
Preference Data
1
2 CHAPTER1: Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?
1.1 Introduction
Knowing how households make decisions is crucial for predicting the effects of policy
interventions like fertility promoting instruments, but there is no clear consensus on
this subject. The neoclassical model of household behavior treats families as single
decision units that maximize their utility (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1973). This
model aggregates ad hoc individual preferences into one predetermined household
utility function and makes analysis easy and convenient as results from the microe-
conomics of consumption can be applied to family decision making. However, there
are drawbacks—the unitary model ignores effects of heterogeneity in preferences
and resources within families. Bargaining and collective models (Manser and Brown,
1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori, 1992) shed some light on the black box
of family decisions and allow for endogenous aggregation of individual preferences.
In this class of models, household distribution factors determine the allocation of
resources and the weighting of individual preferences. In short, the preferences of
family members with high bargaining power receive more weight in decision making.
The question of whether family decisions are bargaining outcomes is important
because non-unitary models can yield very different conclusions. The effectiveness
of policy instruments then hinges on the interaction of household decision processes
and the policy’s effects on resource distributions.
There is a great deal of evidence in the empirical literature that bargaining
plays a role in household decision making. All major contributions in this field rely
on assignability assumptions, i.e., they assume that a good is preferred more by
one person in the household than by another. If that person’s bargaining power
increases, consumption of her preferred good should increase. The literature uses
sex-specific clothes (Browning et al., 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997) and child support
by remarried fathers (Ermisch and Pronzato, 2008) to find bargaining mechanisms
in household consumption decisions. Other work uses sex-specific preferences as
an explanation for effects of exogenous variation in female income (Duflo, 2003;
Qian, 2008) and for the association of child height and parental education (Thomas,
1994). In sum, there is a vast body of evidence showing that household decisions
about private goods are bargaining outcomes. However, very little is known about
household public goods and in particular about fertility decisions (for one study
about commitment in household decisions using preference data, see Rasul (2008)).
Knowing how families arrive at their decisions about having children is important
to policy makers struggling with the low birth rates prevalent in most developed
countries.
So, the question is: Do couples bargain over fertility? Suppose a couple,
consisting of a female and a male person, needs to make a decision about the
consumption level of a household public good. One partner prefers this good more
than the other. This partner’s bargaining power will then be positively associated
with the level of consumption of the household public good. If both partners have
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concordant preferences for the household public good, there will be no bargaining
power effects because there is no need for bargaining. In contrast, for example,
suppose the household public good the couple is deciding about is children and
assume that the woman has stronger child preferences than her partner—the number
of children should be positively affected by her bargaining power. If she had weaker
preferences, her bargaining power should lower fertility. In a theoretical model, we
derive predictions of a differential bargaining power effect on fertility depending on
whether couples have concordant or discordant child preferences.
The predictions are then investigated in an empirical analysis. We use rare
child preference data to distinguish between couples with concordant and discordant
preferences and test whether bargaining power has differential effects on the prob-
ability of having a child. In the bargaining framework, we expect a different effect
of her bargaining power on fertility if the couple has discordant child preferences
compared to couples with concordant child preferences. Specifically, if her child
preferences are stronger than her partner’s, her bargaining power should have a
positive effect on fertility. Conversely, if her child preferences are weaker than
her partner’s, her bargaining power should have a negative effect on fertility. The
comparison group is comprised of couples with concordant child preferences. In
the analysis, we account for a possible negative opportunity cost effect that may go
along with relative wages. With preference data and different measures of bargaining
power we are able to test the prediction of a bargaining model for a household public
good. Our results suggest that bargaining does occur in the context of fertility
decisions. We explore some potential biases and find the results to be largely robust.
That couples do, indeed, bargain over fertility, which is one of the most
important decisions a family will ever make, has potentially large implications for
policy makers. Targeted benefits have an effect on the resource distribution and
the bargaining power relation within couples. Instruments like child benefits that,
among other things, are aimed at increasing fertility could be more effective if they
could be targeted at people who are actually interested in having children. Given
there is knowledge about intra-household relative preferences, the idea of altering
bargaining power by targeting benefits could be carried over to any policy concerned
with household decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We lay out the theoretical
background of bargaining over fertility in Section 1.2 and describe the empirical
strategy and the data in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4. We show estimation results in
Section 1.5 and conclude in Section 1.6.
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1.2 Theoretical Considerations
We use a simple model of household decision making about the number of children
to illustrate the expected effects of bargaining power. In our model, which is based
on Iyigun and Walsh (2007), each household is comprised of one woman (f) and
one man (m). Throughout we use the notation i ∈ {f,m} to refer to either of the
two. Individual i’s preferences are represented by a strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave utility function defined over private consumption (ci), leisure (li) and
the number of children (n). Since our aim is to provide a model that is tractable
and, at the same time, shows how fertility choices are influenced by the relative
bargaining power within the household, we consider an additively separable and
homothetic utility representation of preferences:
(1.1) U i(ci, li, n) = ln ci + ln li + αi lnn; i = f,m.
where αi > 0 represents the child preferences of person i. Each individual can
earn a wage in the labor market equal to wi, and is endowed with one unit of
time which has to be allocated between leisure and market work. In addition, each
child requires child-rearing time τ , which is borne by the woman alone. The couple
decides the optimal number of children n, so that τn is total child-rearing time.
The woman’s time endowment then becomes (1 − τn); that of the male partner is
1. The assumption can be relaxed to allow the man to spend time on child rearing,
but the extreme case of the woman being solely responsible is chosen to illustrate
that even though an increase in her wage has a negative opportunity cost effect on
fertility, there can be offsetting positive effects which operate over an increase in her
bargaining power if αf > αm.
Household decisions are made by means of collective bargaining between the
partners with θ being the woman’s bargaining power, and (1 − θ) the man’s bar-
gaining power. We assume that the woman’s bargaining depends positively on her
relative wage φ ≡
wf
wm
. Formally, θ = θ(φ) with θ′ > 0. Couples maximize
(1.2) max
cf ,cm,lf ,lm,n
Ω = θ(φ)U i(cf , lf , n) + [1− θ(φ)]U
i(cm, lm, n),
subject to
(1.3) cf + cm + wf lf + wmlm = wf (1− τn) + wm.
As we mentioned above, the woman’s potential time available for market work is
reduced by the time spent child rearing τn, while the man’s time endowment is
unity. In general, the household allocation of resources satisfies the following three
criteria:
(1.4)
U f1 (cf , lf , n)
U f2 (cf , lf , n)
= wf
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(1.5)
Um1 (cm, lm, n)
Um2 (cm, lm, n)
= wm
(1.6)
U f3 (cf , lf , n)
U f1 (cf , lf , n)
+
Um3 (cm, lm, n)
Um1 (cm, lm, n)
= τwf
where U ik(ci, li, n) denotes the first-order partial derivative of U
i
k with respect to its
k-th argument (k = 1, 2, 3). For each individual, the marginal rate of substitution
between private consumption and leisure must be equal to the marginal rate of
transformation, given by the respective market wage [equations (4) and (5)]. The
optimal number of children is governed by the Samuelson condition for the optimal
provision of a public good [equation (1.6)]. Stated in words, it implies that the sum
of the partners’ marginal rates of substitution between having children and private
consumption must be equal to the private opportunity cost of an extra child, τwf ,
relative to an extra unit of private consumption.
If we employ the additively separable and homothetic utility representation
assumed above, the optimal number of children is given by:
(1.7) n∗ =
(φ+ 1)[αfθ(φ) + αm(1− θ(φ))]
τφ[2 + αfθ(φ) + αm(1− θ(φ))]
,
where φ =
wf
wm
> 0. In the empirical work, we examine how fertility choices vary
with the wage of women relative to that of their male partners. It is therefore useful
to compute:
(⋆)
∂n∗
∂φ
= −
[
αfθ(φ) + αm(1− θ(φ))
τφ2[2 + αfθ(φ) + αm(1− θ(φ))]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost effect
+
[
2θ′(φ)(φ+ 1)(αf − αm)
τφ[2 + αfθ(φ) + αm(1− θ(φ))]2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bargaining power effect
Consider each element of (⋆). The first term captures the marginal change in the
optimal number of children due to the opportunity cost effect of rising relative female
wages; its sign is negative. The second term captures a “bargaining power effect”.
Indeed, while rising relative wages tend to increase women’s labor supply and, due to
higher opportunity costs, lower fertility, they also lead to a reallocation of bargaining
power from men to women. If women have stronger preferences for children than
their male partners (αf > αm), then the reallocation of bargaining power from men
to women induced by rising relative wages works to increase fertility. Conversely,
when women have weaker preferences for children than their male partners (αf <
αm), the bargaining power effect is negative. Finally, for couples with identical
child preferences (αf = αm), there exists no conflict over the optimal number of
children, and hence fertility is unaffected by a reallocation of bargaining power.
In the empirical analysis, we will therefore identify bargaining power effects by
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Figure 1.1: Areas of fertility response to increases in the woman’s relative wage
φ =
wf
wm
αf
αm
I: Always
negative
IIa: Negative opportunity
cost effect dominates
IIb: Positive bargaining
power effect dominates
Notes: To draw the graph we assume for simplification a linear bargaining power function such that θ(φ) =
wf
wm
.
The graph shows areas of positive and negative fertility response to the woman’s relative wage and relative child
preferences. The man’s child preferences are fixed at αm and the woman’s child preferences αf vary on the
horizontal axis. In area I, fertility reacts unambiguously negative, as the opportunity cost effect and the bargaining
power effect work in the same direction. In area II the opportunity cost effect is negative whereas the bargaining
power effect is positive. In area IIa the opportunity cost effect dominates the bargaining power effect, in area IIb
the bargaining power effect dominates the opportunity cost effect.
comparing how the fertility choices of couples with discordant and concordant child
preferences vary with the relative female wage within the household.
Overall, the bargaining power effect of rising relative wages could undo the
corresponding negative opportunity cost effect and result in an increase in fertil-
ity. This is depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates the conditions under which an
increase in φ yields positive and negative fertility responses, respectively. With
identical child preferences (αm = αf ), the bargaining power effect is zero and
so the opportunity cost effect results in a smaller number of children. In area I,
the woman’s child preferences are weaker than her male partner’s (αf < αm) and
hence, the opportunity cost effect and the bargaining power effect both work to
reduce fertility. In area II, the negative opportunity cost effect is counteracted by a
positive bargaining power effect (αf > αm). In area IIa, the opportunity cost effect
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dominates the bargaining power effect, and so rising female wages reduce fertility.
In area IIb, however, the negative opportunity cost effect is more than offset by the
positive bargaining power effect, and so couples will choose to have more children
as the relative female wage increases. Motivated by these observations, the primary
objective of empirical analysis to follow is to disentangle the total effect of rising
relative wages into an opportunity cost and a bargaining power effect.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
From the theoretical model we obtain the following main predictions as a basis of
our empirical strategy:
1. There is a negative opportunity cost effect from relative wages of females
on births.
2. There is a bargaining power effect from relative wages of females on births,
which is
• zero if αf = αm,
• positive if αf > αm,
• and negative if αf < αm.
In essence, it means that female relative wage has a differential effect depending
on relative child preferences within a couple additionally to its own opportunity
cost effect on births. The bargaining power effect from female relative wage is
positive if αf > αm and negative if αf < αm. The net effect of female relative
wage is ambiguous. These different effects can be captured by interactions between
preference differences and relative wages in the following estimation equation:
Birthi,12−23months =α+ β1φi,t + β2I(αf > αm)i,t + β3I(αf < αm)i,t
+ γ1(φ× I(αf > αm))i,t
+ γ2(φ× I(αf < αm))i,t
+X ′i,tδ + ǫi,t,
(1.8)
with variables of couple i in period t. The dependent variable indicates a birth 12 to
23 months after the interview month. φ is a measure between zero and one. Here,
it denotes relative wage. In the theoretical section φ is a determinant of bargaining
power θ. Yet, we cannot directly measure bargaining power. Therefore, we use φ as a
proxy for bargaining power in the empirical analysis. Thus, β1 is the estimate of the
opportunity cost effect. The bargaining power effects are captured by interactions
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of φ. I(.) is an indicator function taking the value of one if true and zero if false. It
divides the sample in three groups. I(αf > αm) takes on a value of one if the female’s
child preferences are stronger than the male partner’s. I(αf < αm) takes on a value
of one if the female’s child preferences are weaker than the male partner’s. Both
are zero if the couple has concordant child preferences, reflecting the comparison
group. The interactions (φ × I(αf > αm))i,t and (φ × I(αf < αm))i,t capture the
differential bargaining power effects. Hence, γ1 and γ2 are estimates of bargaining
power effects. Essentially, we estimate whether relative female wage has different
effects between the groups denoted by I(.). Estimates of the interaction effects are
our primary target to identify bargaining over fertility. According to theory, we
expect the estimates to have the properties γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0.
To control primarily for different compositions of the groups denoted by I(.),
we include a vector of control variables X. These include the age and age squared of
both partners, household income, as well as indicator variables for being a student,
for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, for federal states, and for
the number of children, and year fixed effects. In different specifications we also
control for the sum of both partners’ child preferences and for the female wage rate.
ǫ is an i.i.d. error term.
In a second attempt, we use an additional specification to exploit the extent of
differences in child preferences between partners. The estimation equation is slightly
changed to
Birthi,12−23months =α+ β1φi,t + β2(αf − αm)i,t
+ ζ(φ× (αf − αm))i,t
+X ′i,tδ + ǫi,t,
(1.9)
where (αf − αm) can take on negative and positive values. Here, the interaction
(φ × (αf − αm))i,t picks up the differential bargaining power effect, which varies
with preference differences. This is consistent with the theoretical result shown in
Equation (⋆). If αf > αm, the difference takes on a positive value, and hence, her
bargaining power effect on fertility is positive. Accordingly, if αf < αm, the differ-
ence takes on a negative value, and hence, her bargaining power effect on fertility is
negative. We assume linearity of the preference difference in the bargaining power
effect. Thus, we expect that the larger the difference in child preferences is, the
larger is the bargaining power effect. This implies for the expected sign that ζ > 0,
denoting both positive and negative bargaining power effects. All other parameters
from the estimation equation are unchanged.
In further specifications we use alternative bargaining power proxies. In order
to do that, we substitute relative wages in φ for relative income or relative education.
Predictions for bargaining power effects are unchanged, although the opportunity
cost effect may be less severe.
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Estimation bias At foremost, we show correlations of the theoretically relevant
estimates and do not attempt to establish causality. However, it is informative for
the interpretation to discuss some issues of endogeneity first. Estimations of the
bargaining power effect in γ1, γ2, and ζ may suffer from endogeneity. The most
probable reason may be omitted variable bias. It arises if unobserved factors both
influence the dependent variable births and the interaction of relative wages with
the preference indicators. There may be unobserved factors that affect births and
relative wages. Then, for our coefficients of interest γ1 and γ2, we would worry if
there were additionally systematic differences between the couples with concordant
and discordant child preferences. Can we say anything about the direction of
estimation bias? Unobserved heterogeneity will most likely be of the sort that
individuals with strong child preferences have higher fertility and lower wages, which
induces a downward bias for γ1. As we expect a positive estimate, the downward
bias is no threat to identification. Vice versa, individuals with weak child preferences
may have lower fertility and higher wages, which induces a downward bias for γ2.
In this case, the variation would be confounding. We keep that in mind, when
interpreting our results. The same arguments apply for ζ. As a robustness check
we use an individual fixed-effects model that eliminates all time-constant individual
heterogeneity. This model is identified by changes in relative wages over time within
couples. However, less variation reduces precision of the estimates.
Another source of confounding variation may stem from selective mating. To
induce confounding variation, we would need for example women with high child
preferences to choose partners with lower wages. If men may also prefer to have
higher bargaining power within their partnership, it becomes a zero sum game.
Therefore, mating is a rather unlikely source of bias. A similar reasoning applies for
strategic adjustment of bargaining power. In the face of discordant child preferences,
individuals could have an incentive to increase bargaining power in order to gain say
in the decision. As both partners have the same incentive, this can only confound
results if either males or females were more able to do that kind of adjustment.
As a robustness check, we use relative education as a more plausibly exogenous
determinant of bargaining power.
1.4 Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) in Version 27 for our
estimations.1 We apply waves from 1990 onwards. Data include information on
the socioeconomic background of individuals and households, and on intra-family
relations. Partners, cohabiting or married, are matched by partner identifiers to
obtain a comprehensive couple data set. We include only couples in which the
woman is of reproductive age (between 18 and 49 years old). The anchoring person
1See Wagner et al. (2007) for further information on the data.
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in our data set is the woman. Her characteristics along with matched partner
characteristics are used in the empirical analysis. Given the setup, we have two
variables of interest: child preferences and proxies for bargaining power.
Child preferences For child preferences we use proxy data from a question, which
asks about the importance of having children. The precise question is: “Are the
following things (“Have children”) currently ... very important (4), important (3),
not very important (2) or totally unimportant (1) ... for you?”2 The question is
only included in waves 1990, 1992, 1995, 2004, and 2008; this restricts our sample
period.
As our preference variable is in fact a proxy of child preferences, we make
a simple attempt to verify its validity. Our child preferences are not fertility
preferences in the sense of a desired number of children, but self-reported valua-
tion of how important having children is. This variable may reflect a variety of
underlying preferences and valuations of current situations. In part, the variable
can be understood as the parents’ evaluations of being a family with children, how
satisfied they are with their family or how much they care about their offsprings. The
number of current children will thus be correlated with stated child preferences. For
our purpose, we need at least in some sense a connection of the preference variable to
the real preference for having another child. We show in Figure 1.2 how the stated
preferences of childless couples translate into completed fertility in later waves.
The assumption is that childless couples cannot evaluate their current situation with
their offsprings when answering the survey question and therefore state a preference
for a family with children. Completed fertility can be measured by following the
same couples over time in the panel. In Figure 1.2 we depict the average number
of children at the latest observation on the ordinate, reflecting average completed
fertility, and the answer to the preference question on the abscissa. We see a
clear positive correlation of stated preferences when childless and average completed
fertility, both for males and females. In general, our stated child preferences have
predictive power for completed fertility. Hence, our child preference variable seems
to be a good proxy for actual child preferences.
In Table 1.1 we cross-tabulate the number of answers to the child preference
question from women in rows and from their male partners in columns. The two
highest categories contain by far the most answers, although males are less likely
to answer in the highest category than females. We define all observations on the
diagonal as couples with concordant child preferences. Couples with stronger child
preferences of females are found to the northeast of the diagonal, such that I(αf >
αm) takes on the value of one and is zero otherwise. Accordingly, observations to
the southwest of the diagonal denote couples with weaker female child preferences,
2This coding is in reversed order compared to the original data. Hence, for our analysis larger
numbers correspond to stronger preferences.
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Figure 1.2: Completed fertility and initial child preferences
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Male stated child preferences when childless
Notes: The figure in the left panel depicts a scatter plot with the average, latest observed number of children on the
ordinate for each female child preference answer while childless. The figure in the right panel depicts a scatter plot
with the average, latest observed number of children on the ordinate for each male child preference answer while
childless.
such that I(αf < αm) takes on the value of one and is zero otherwise. Thus, we have
8,755 observations of couples with concordant child preferences, 3,099 observations
of couples with higher female child preferences and 1,513 observations of couples
with lower female child preferences.
Table 1.1: Child preference combinations
Male partner: Very Important Not very Totally Total
Woman: important important unimportant
Very important 6,037 2,207 278 47 8,569
Important 962 2,027 402 52 3,443
Not very important 70 319 510 113 1,012
Totally unimportant 11 48 103 201 363
Total 7,080 4,601 1,293 413 13,387
Notes: The table shows numbers of observations in as a cross-tabular table with female child preferences
in rows and male child preferences in columns.
We report some general descriptive statistics of the data in Table 1.2. The
sample is restricted to non-missing values for the dependent and all control variables
which are used later on. 23 percent of couples show stronger female child preferences
and thus are subsumed under the indicator variable I(αf > αm). 11 percent of
couples belong to the other group with discordant child preferences, in which I(αf <
αm) equals one. 64 percent of couples have concordant child preferences.
In another specification we exploit the extent of the difference in child prefer-
ences between partners. We define the difference in preferences as αf − αm. The
variable can take on values between -3 and +3, with negative values indicating
lower female child preferences and positive values indicating higher female child
preferences. The variable is zero for couples with concordant child preferences. We
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Birth12−23months 11553 4.16 19.98 0 100
Variables of interest
I(αf > αm) 11553 0.23 0.42 0 1
I(αf < αm) 11553 0.11 0.31 0 1
(αf − αm) 11553 0.14 0.68 -3 3
φ : Relative wage 11352 0.35 0.26 0 1
φ : Relative labor income 11386 0.29 0.26 0 1
φ : Relative years of schooling 11231 0.50 0.05 0.33 0.72
φ : Relative ISCED score 11331 0.49 0.10 0 1
φ : Relative non-wage income 3353 0.66 0.44 0 1
φ : Relative full individual income 11527 0.30 0.22 0 1
Control variables
Sum of child preferences 11553 6.89 1.36 2 8
Wage 11553 8.32 9.10 0 241
Household income (monthly) 11553 3179.57 1608.27 42 56759
Age 11553 36.75 7.55 18 49
Partner’s age 11553 39.74 8.55 19 87
In education 11553 0.06 0.25 0 1
Non-German 11553 0.10 0.30 0 1
Second gen. migrant 11553 0.02 0.16 0 1
Number of children 11553 1.58 1.11 0 11
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the sample including: number of observations (N),
mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max). All
variables are defined from the perspective of women with male partners.
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see in Table 1.2 that on average the variable is 0.14, which corresponds to slightly
stronger female child preferences.
Proxies for bargaining power Our second variable of interest is the proxy for
bargaining power. We apply a number of different definitions in order to make most
robust statements. Following the theoretical model, in our baseline estimates we use
relative wages φ as the bargaining power determinant. Wage rates are measured as
labor income in the preceding year over total hours worked in the preceding year.
Relative wage is defined as female wage over the sum of the female and the male
partner’s wage (
wf
wf+wm
). According to Table 1.2, female wage rates are on average
35 percent of the total wage rate within couples. Deviating from theory, we also
define φ using alternative proxies for bargaining power.
As a second proxy for bargaining power we define φ as relative labor income,
despite the fact that this measure is less closely connected to the theory. We apply
relative labor income, because one could argue that bargaining power is not reflected
by earnings potential but rather by how much one actually earns. The variable is
defined as female income over the sum of both partner’s income. Women in the
sample earn on average 29 percent of total labor income. This percentage is a bit
lower than for the wage rate, which indicates that women on average work fewer
hours.
As a robustness check we additionally use non-wage income and total individ-
ual income as proxies for bargaining power. Non-wage income has the advantage
that it is less affected by individual decisions. On the contrary, there is much less
variation to exploit. Total individual income combines non-wage and labor income.
Definitions of the relative measures follow the same principle as above. Females have
about 66 percent of total couples’ non-wage incomes. Observations are restricted to
couples with positive total non-wage income, because shares are otherwise infeasible.
Usability of non-wage income alone is questionable due to very few observations.
Summing up non-wage income and labor earnings to full individual income reveals
that the female share within couples is about 30 percent on average.
Our last proxy for bargaining power draws on relative education. The rationale
is that education can more plausibly be considered as an exogenous measure. We use
two specifications for relative education, first using years of schooling, second using
highest educational attainment reflected in ISCED codes from zero to six. Again,
definitions of the relative measures follow the same principle as above, dividing the
female measure by the sum of both partners’ measures. Relative years of schooling is
at parity between females and males. The variable is less volatile due to compulsory
schooling laws which virtually excludes individual years of schooling to be less than
nine. Therefore, the range of values is restricted. The relative ISCED score is an
ad hoc measure and cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way. Yet, it relates the
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standard educational attainment scores of two partners and therefore should reflect
bargaining power. On average the relative female ISCED score is 0.49 in our sample.
Births Our dependent variable throughout the empirical analysis is births. A
birth is defined as having a child 12 to 23 months after the interview. We employ
a conception and gestation lag of at least 12 months because we are interested
in the decision about having a child and the conditions at the time the decision
was probably made. Clearly, our fertility variable is a rather noisy measure of
the intention to have a child. The variable is an indicator variable taking on a
value of one if the woman gives birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and zero
otherwise. We observe 506 births, of which 327 are from couples with concordant
child preferences, and 179 from couples with discordant child preferences. The
majority of 131 fall into the group with higher female child preferences, 48 into
the group with lower female child preferences. The dependent variable as depicted
in Table 1.2 is an indicator for a birth 12 to 23 months after the interview. The
measure is multiplied by 100 as it is used in the estimations to get more convenient
coefficients. Hence, there are on average 0.0416 births per year and woman.
Control variables In our sample, as depicted by the control variables in Ta-
ble 1.2, the sum of couples’ child preferences (sum of the categorical child preference
variable with values from 1 to 4) is on average 6.89, corresponding to the mostly
strong child preferences seen earlier. Female hourly wage rate is 8.32 Euro. House-
hold net income averages at about 3200 Euro monthly. Women are on average
36.75 years old, which comes about technically by restricting to the reproductive
age from 18 to 49 years. Their male partners are on average 3 years older. About 6
percent participate in some kind of education or training. 10 percent have or had a
non-German citizenship. 2 percent are second generation immigrants. The average
number of children is 1.58.
1.5 Empirical Results
In the results section we first show baseline estimates and continue with a robustness
analysis.
Baseline estimates: Relative wage and preference indicators We report
baseline estimates from linear probability regressions in Table 1.3 using the model
as in equation (1.8). In columns (1) to (4), the proxy φ for bargaining power is
defined as relative female wage. Again, following theory, we expect a negative
opportunity cost effect and differential bargaining power effects on birth probability
depending on preferences within couples. Bargaining power effects are denoted by
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the estimates of φ × I(αf > αm) and φ × I(αf < αm). We see in the first row
of column (1) by the coefficient of the interaction effect that relative wage has a
differential positive association with birth probability if female child preferences are
stronger (αf > αm). The estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level,
implying that the association of relative wage with birth probability is significantly
different from couples with concordant child preferences. This is consistent with
a bargaining power effect on fertility. Excluding the negative opportunity cost
effect, the estimate suggests that an increase in relative wage of 10 percentage points
increases birth probability of couples with stronger female child preferences by 0.4
percentage points, as denoted by the estimate of the interaction φ × I(αf > αm).
In the second row, the interaction effect of relative wage with lower female child
preferences is expected to be negative. In fact, it shows a negative sign, but it is
insignificantly different from couples with concordant child preferences, as denoted
by the estimate of the interaction φ × I(αf < αm). The lower precision of this
estimate could be due to the smaller incidence of births in that group. In the third
row, we see that relative female wage is negatively associated with birth probability.
Confirming theory, the opportunity cost effect of wages denoted by φ decreases birth
probability. An increase in relative female wage of 10 percentage points decreases
birth probability by 0.23 percentage points. However, regarding the total effect
of relative wage, we see that for the group with stronger female child preferences
the positive bargaining power effect dominates the negative opportunity cost effect.
Combining the opportunity cost effect and the interaction effect, a 10 percentage
point increase in relative wage increases birth probability by 0.20 percentage points
for couples with stronger female child preferences. For couples with weaker female
child preferences the opportunity cost effect and the bargaining power effect would
both be negative. In the fourth and the fifth row, we show estimates for the child
preference indicators I(αf > αm) and I(αf < αm). As we would expect, birth
probability is generally lower for couples with discordant child preferences compared
to couples with concordant child preferences. A significant difference is found for
couples with stronger female child preferences.
In column (2), we add control variables to the estimation equation to account
for individual differences. We see that the differential bargaining power effects are
only marginally affected by the inclusion of additional control variables. Results are
still consistent with the predictions from theory and yield the same level of statistical
significance. Household income shows a plausible positive correlation with birth
probability, reflecting the normality of the household public good. In column (3), we
add the sum of couples’ child preferences to the estimation equation. Controlling for
it would eliminate variation that may be caused by generally weaker child preferences
for couples with discordant child preferences. The estimate turns out positive and
significant. Our main results for the differential bargaining power effects from row
one and two are robust to the inclusion of the sum of child preferences. The estimate
in the first row for the interaction of relative wage with the stronger female child
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Table 1.3: Baseline–Bargaining power effects for wage and income with preference indicators
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× I(αf > αm) 4.3439** 4.1462** 3.8058** 3.8000** 5.0421*** 4.4684** 3.9242** 3.9257**
(1.8422) (1.8143) (1.8100) (1.8105) (1.8711) (1.8475) (1.8364) (1.8353)
φ× I(αf < αm) -2.8125 -2.1185 -2.4234 -2.4298 -2.5953 -2.6750 -3.0836* -3.0818*
(2.0359) (1.9897) (1.9950) (2.0021) (1.8577) (1.8633) (1.8684) (1.8713)
φ -2.3261** -0.6278 -0.3161 -0.2692 -3.2042*** -0.9909 -0.4564 -0.4696
(0.9428) (0.9844) (0.9867) (1.1356) (0.9579) (1.0092) (1.0121) (1.0939)
I(αf > αm) -1.5439** -1.4552* -0.3127 -0.3113 -1.4820** -1.3001** -0.1099 -0.1101
(0.7455) (0.7425) (0.7438) (0.7434) (0.6582) (0.6568) (0.6585) (0.6581)
I(αf < αm) -0.7482 -0.8446 0.2801 0.2821 -0.9797 -0.7983 0.3455 0.3450
(1.0051) (0.9731) (0.9787) (0.9794) (0.8622) (0.8472) (0.8545) (0.8544)
Household income 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.6754*** 1.6755*** 1.6969*** 1.6968***
(0.1847) (0.1848) (0.1850) (0.1851)
Wage -0.0022 0.0008
(0.0210) (0.0204)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,709 11,352 11,352 11,352 11,744 11,386 11,386 11,386
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100.
The estimate of φ× I(αf > αm) denotes the positive bargaining power effect and the estimate of φ× I(αf < αm) the negative bargaining power effect.
φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,***
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional
control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship
and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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preference indicator decreases slightly to 3.8, but remains statistically significant. In
column (4), we furthermore add female wage rates to the estimation equation. The
inclusion may be problematic due to collinearity with relative wage and household
income. However, our main result in the first and second row is not affected by the
inclusion of female wage rates at all.
In sum, the theoretical prediction of a differential bargaining power effect
depending on discordance of child preferences can be found in the data. We find
significant effects for couples with stronger female child preferences and insignificant
effects for couples with weaker female child preferences. Estimates are robust to
the inclusion of a number of additional control variables. Given that some of the
associations found for control variables are not robust over different specifications,
we may argue that the included control variables are relevant in the estimation
equation.
Baseline estimates: Relative income and preference indicators In column
(5) to (8) of Table 1.3 we replace relative wage in φ by relative labor income. The
rationale is that it could be more important in practice how much an individual
can purchase [income] rather than what her earnings potential is [wage]. In column
(5) with no control variables, we see that the theoretical prediction of differential
bargaining power effects also holds for relative income. The coefficient for the
interaction of φ with stronger female child preferences is 5.0 and thus close to
the estimate in column (1). Although, results cannot be compared over different
definitions of φ, as different estimates could also be due to different relations of φ
with actual bargaining power. The interaction coefficient of relative income with
weaker female child preferences is negative but again not statistically significant.
The bargaining power proxy φ again shows a negative opportunity cost effect of
-3.2 in the third row. The overall effect of relative income on birth probability is
positive for couples with stronger female child preferences, as can be seen by adding
up the two coefficients. In column (6) we see that the inclusion of control variables
decreases the interaction coefficient for couples with stronger female child preferences
by 0.5. Though, the overall picture is unchanged. In column (7), we add the sum of
couples’ child preferences to the estimation equation. The interaction effect of φ with
stronger female child preferences reduces to 3.9, but is still statistically significant.
In this specification, the interaction with lower female child preferences increases in
value to -3.1 and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In column (8),
the inclusion of female wage rates in the estimation has no effect whatsoever on the
coefficients of interest.
Our baseline results suggest a generally negative opportunity cost effect on
birth probability, which is inherent in wage and income bargaining power measures
for females. Yet, the association is not statistically significant in all specifications.
The most important result is that we find a differential bargaining power effect
depending on intra-couple differences in child preferences. If female child preferences
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are stronger than her partner’s, her bargaining power is positively associated with
births.3
To increase the female’s say within a couple thus enables decisions more in favor
of her preferences. This result is robust to adding a number of control variables and
to applying relative wages and income as bargaining power proxies. Results also
seem reliable, as unobserved heterogeneity would arguably lead to a downward bias
in this coefficient (see discussion in the section on the empirical strategy). The
equivalent prediction for couples with weaker female child preferences is a negative
bargaining power effect. We see interaction coefficients with a negative sign, but
the estimates turn out to be only marginally significant in few specifications. Fewer
events in the dependent variable births may explain the weak associations. As a
downward bias here could imply confounding variation, we do not put too much
emphasis on the result for lower female child preferences. To say the least, the
overall pattern of the results does not contradict the theoretical predictions.
Baseline estimates: Continuous preference differences In a second attempt,
we exploit the extent of the differences in child preferences between partners. In-
stead of an indicator variable for discordant child preferences, we use a continuous
measure of the difference between two partners. Specifically, the male partner’s child
preference is subtracted from the female’s child preference, so formally the variable is
defined as αf −αm. Regarding the predictions, the difference measure combines the
predicted negative interaction effect of the bargaining power proxy φ with weaker
female child preferences and the positive interaction effect with stronger female
child preferences into one prediction: The bargaining power effect is increasing in
the preference difference αf − αm. In contrast to the specification with preference
indicators, it is implicitly assumed that the bargaining power effect is of the same
magnitude for weaker and stronger female child preferences and is linear in the
difference measure. We apply an estimation model as shown in equation (1.9). The
bargaining power effect is denoted by the estimate of the interaction φ× (αf −αm).
In the first row of Table 1.4, the estimates of the interaction effect of relative
wage φ with the difference in child preferences (αf − αm) show a positive sign
and are statistically significant. Again, this result is consistent with our theory.
In column (1), estimates with no control variables suggest that a 10 percentage
point increase in female relative wage is associated with a 0.21 percentage point
reduction in birth probability for couples with concordant child preferences. The
0.26 percentage points are multiplied by the difference in child preferences ranging
from -3 to +3. Hence, for each point of difference between the female and her
3We also estimated probit models with the binary dependent variable birth. The interaction
effects in odds ratios as well as average marginal coefficients of changes in the preference indicator
evaluated at different values for bargaining power yield qualitatively comparable results, i.e., we
find the coefficients of interest to be of the same sign and to be statistically significant. We prefer
the linear probability estimates for their more readily interpretable interaction coefficients.
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Table 1.4: Baseline—Bargaining power effects for wage and income with preference differences
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× (αf − αm) 2.5522** 2.3876** 2.2320** 2.2304** 2.8402*** 2.6912*** 2.4215** 2.4218**
(1.1180) (1.0775) (1.0829) (1.0819) (1.0501) (1.0298) (1.0297) (1.0290)
φ -2.0569*** -0.2992 -0.0387 0.0147 -2.7876*** -0.6951 -0.2443 -0.2564
(0.7542) (0.7907) (0.7928) (0.9410) (0.7424) (0.7886) (0.7918) (0.8823)
(αf − αm) 0.3512 0.3673 0.0372 0.0369 0.2996 0.3318 -0.0323 -0.0322
(0.5259) (0.5014) (0.5064) (0.5063) (0.4525) (0.4360) (0.4395) (0.4395)
Household income 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.6659*** 1.6660*** 1.6876*** 1.6875***
(0.1801) (0.1801) (0.1805) (0.1806)
Wage -0.0026 0.0008
(0.0208) (0.0203)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,709 11,352 11,352 11,352 11,744 11,386 11,386 11,386
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100. The
estimate of φ × (αf − αm) denotes the bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust
standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable
for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being
a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data
source: SOEP.
20 CHAPTER1: Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?
partner’s child preference (-3 to +3), a 10 percentage point increase in relative
wage has an additional positive or negative effect of 0.26 percentage points on birth
probability, depending on the sign of (αf − αm). Thus, consistent with the theory,
the bargaining power effect is positive if female child preferences are stronger and
negative if female child preferences are weaker. Furthermore, with a difference in
preferences of just +1, the negative opportunity cost effect of relative wages can
be overcompensated by the bargaining power effect. In column (4) of Table 1.4,
with the full model specification, the opportunity cost effect of relative wage is zero.
The additional effect for each point in child preference difference is 0.22 percentage
points per 10 percentage point increase in relative wage. The estimate is statistically
significant. Thus, our result is very robust to controlling for additional variables,
including the sum of partners’ child preferences, wage rates and household income.
Moreover, positive and statistically significant bargaining power effects are found
in columns (5) to (8), with relative labor income in φ as a proxy for bargaining
power. Results are equally robust to the inclusion of control variables and similar in
size. Using continuous preference differences yields more robust results compared to
estimations with indicators of discordant child preferences. We may conclude, that
the results presented here strongly support the above findings of bargaining power
effects in the fertility decision.
1.5.1 Robustness Analysis
Relative education as bargaining power proxy As a robustness check, we
again alter the definition of our bargaining power proxy φ and include relative
education as a more plausibly exogenous determinant of bargaining power. We
use two education measures: relative years of schooling and relative educational
attainment in ISCED codes. Education has an advantage over wages and income
as it cannot be changed easily. When fertility decisions are about to be made most
people have finished their education. Thus, education and, in our analysis, relative
education are rather exogenous measures. Apart from selective mating there is
not too much adults can do about it. Moreover, mating as a means to improve
own bargaining power is basically a zero sum game for two potential partners.
Furthermore, if in couples with discordant preferences one partner attempts to
strategically improve earnings to have larger say in an upcoming fertility decision,
education levels are practically immune against this sort of strategic adjustment. In
this regard, estimations with relative education as a proxy for bargaining power can
be understood as a reduced form of an instrumented regression with endogenous
relative wages. Relative education is indeed highly correlated with relative wages.4
However, relative education may have many channels to affect birth probability
4Auxiliary regressions of relative wages and its interaction on relative years of schooling and its
interactions confirm a high correlation. Illustrative results can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in
the appendix.
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other than relative wage. It covers a broader set of bargaining power aspects such
as intelligence, eloquence, negotiation skills or knowledge that all can affect fertility
decision outcomes. All these possible channels are welcome to be at work. As long
as they represent bargaining power effects of some kind, we are willing to include
them and to abstract from specific mechanisms.
We show results for relative education as the bargaining power proxy φ in
Table 1.5. In columns (1) to (4) we define φ as relative years of schooling and in
columns (5) to (8) as relative educational attainment in ISCED codes. In contrast
to the baseline results, in the first row the interaction effect of years of schooling as
in φ with stronger female child preferences shows very imprecise estimates not even
close to statistical significance. Whereas in the second row, the interaction effect
of φ with weaker female child preferences is negative and statistically significant in
all eight specifications. With the full set of control variables for years of schooling
in column (4) the result suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in φ reduces
birth probability by 4.2 percentage points if female child preferences are weaker,
abstracting from a direct effect of φ. It implies that more say in the household
for the person with lower preferences decreases birth probability, which is in line
with the theoretical predictions for bargaining power effects. Effect sizes are much
larger here, because the range of relative years of schooling is much lower than for
relative wage due to compulsory schooling laws. It implies that a 10 percentage
points change in relative years of schooling entails a much greater deal in bargaining
power than an equal percentage points change in relative wages. For the relative
ISCED scores the coefficient is about one quarter the size, implying a 1.1 percentage
points reduction in birth probability following a 10 percentage point increase in φ.
In columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.5, we find a strong positive association of
birth probability and the indicator variable for weaker female child preferences. The
coefficient must be interpreted in combination with the interaction effect, implying
that the effect comes about if φ = 0. However, this would be implausible. If relative
years of schooling are about 0.5 the two effects cancel out. The same is true for the
marginally significant associations in column (7) and (8). Some of the coefficients
for φ which should pick up opportunity cost effects are positive and statistically
significant. This is at odds with the theory. However, using relative education as a
bargaining power proxy does not necessarily yield a negative opportunity cost effect
as in the case of wages. Relative education should here be considered as a robustness
test and an auxiliary variable in the bargaining framework. Other control variables
behave comparable to the baseline estimates. In particular, we find a very similar
association of birth probability with the sum of preferences of 1.6.
In Table 1.6, we use the continuous variable for differences in child preferences
instead of the indicator variables and interact it with φ defined as relative education.
In columns (1) to (4) with relative years of schooling as the bargaining power proxy,
the interaction denoting the bargaining power effect is positive and statistically
significant throughout all specifications. Effect size is quite stable, suggesting that
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Table 1.5: Education–Bargaining power effects for education with preference indicators
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative years of schooling Relative ISCED scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× I(αf > αm) -5.1622 -3.8059 -4.9364 -4.9370 1.9905 2.2884 1.7810 1.7793
(8.5678) (8.5795) (8.5253) (8.5283) (4.4792) (4.4831) (4.4488) (4.4500)
φ× I(αf < αm) -43.4329*** -41.1270*** -42.4736*** -42.4737*** -11.8025** -10.7521** -10.9696** -10.9686**
(11.5001) (11.0543) (11.0899) (11.0901) (5.3321) (5.2723) (5.2312) (5.2314)
φ 11.3158** 7.9510 8.3230* 8.3260* 2.7099 1.3466 1.4478 1.4648
(4.9456) (4.9003) (4.8999) (4.9017) (2.4616) (2.4029) (2.3999) (2.4082)
I(αf > αm) 2.3370 1.7384 3.2857 3.2860 -1.0572 -1.1428 0.0933 0.0939
(4.2177) (4.2283) (4.2028) (4.2039) (2.1777) (2.1857) (2.1680) (2.1684)
I(αf < αm) 19.8404*** 18.9652*** 20.6113*** 20.6113*** 3.9413 3.7075 4.8032* 4.8029*
(5.8560) (5.6081) (5.6320) (5.6321) (2.7099) (2.6678) (2.6485) (2.6486)
Household income 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.6273*** 1.6273*** 1.6326*** 1.6324***
(0.1835) (0.1835) (0.1846) (0.1846)
Wage -0.0002 -0.0020
(0.0178) (0.0178)
Number of children fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,579 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,682 11,331 11,331 11,331
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100. The estimate
of φ × I(αf > αm) denotes the positive bargaining power effect and the estimate of φ × I(αf < αm) the negative bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the
female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared
of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for
federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table 1.6: Education–Bargaining power effects for education with preference differences
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative years of schooling Relative ISCED scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× (αf − αm) 11.5378** 11.1838** 11.4028** 11.4029** 4.3537* 4.3268* 4.3976* 4.3959*
(5.3879) (5.2559) (5.2392) (5.2406) (2.6438) (2.6284) (2.6003) (2.6012)
φ 3.1704 0.3714 0.2801 0.2790 1.2107 -0.0027 -0.0653 -0.0489
(3.9625) (3.9102) (3.9008) (3.9029) (1.9729) (1.9412) (1.9333) (1.9388)
(αf − αm) 5.3209** 5.2208** 5.0638* 5.0638* 1.5786 1.6463 1.4150 1.4143
(2.7034) (2.6399) (2.6336) (2.6342) (1.3164) (1.3091) (1.2966) (1.2969)
Household income 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.6079*** 1.6079*** 1.6215*** 1.6213***
(0.1790) (0.1790) (0.1798) (0.1799)
Wage 0.0001 -0.0019
(0.0178) (0.0178)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,579 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,682 11,331 11,331 11,331
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100.
The estimate of φ × (αf − αm) denotes the bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures.
Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator
variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable
for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed
effects. Data source: SOEP.
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a 10 percentage point increase in female relative years of schooling increases birth
probability by 1.1 percentage points per value in preference differences. This again
meets the theoretical prediction for bargaining power effects. In column (5) to (8)
with relative ISCED codes defining φ, interaction effects are positive and marginally
statistically significant in all specifications. The coefficients of about 4.4 are virtually
unaffected by the inclusion of various control variables. Also, associations of the
control variables themselves with birth probability are very similar to the baseline
results. It suggests that we use a well-defined model specification. Overall, using
the full range of preference differences stabilizes the estimates. As before, results
are more robust than with indicators for discordant child preferences. If we believe
that education is less prone to estimation bias, these results are strongly supportive
of bargaining power effects in fertility decisions.
First child fertility The decision about having a first child may be very different
from the decision about having a second or third child. For example, intra-family
allocations and specialization may have changed since birth of the first child. How-
ever, an important difference between the two decisions is probably knowledge and
experience. After having the first child, a couple learns about child rearing, the time
costs involved, and the true utility from having children. Experience then will play
a role in the decision about whether to have another child. To account for possible
heterogeneity we restrict the sample to couples without children in the following
robustness test.
Results with the dependent variable being the decision on first births are shown
in Table 1.7. In column (1) to (4) we again use the standard definition of φ defined as
relative female wage. We see that the interaction of φ with the indicator of stronger
female child preference I(αf > αm) is positively associated with the probability of a
first birth. However, the estimates are not statistically significant. The interaction
effect in the second row for couples with weaker female child preferences is even
more imprecisely measured and changes sign. In column (5) to (8) we use income
as the bargaining power proxy in φ. In the first row, coefficients for the interaction
of φ with stronger female child preferences are positive and statistically significant.
Results suggest larger associations than in the baseline specification, which included
all couples with and without children. In the second row, interaction effects are
again not statistically significant. Less precise estimates for childless couples may
be partly explained by the smaller sample.
In Table 1.8, we use preference differences instead of the indicator variables
for stronger and weaker female child preferences, again in the sample with childless
couples. We now find positive estimates for the interaction of φ with preference
differences in all specifications. Although only two of the estimates are marginally
statistically significant, signs are consistent with the theoretical prediction. Overall,
the bargaining power effect for first child fertility seems to be a bit larger than
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Table 1.7: First births only–Bargaining power effects with preference indicators
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× I(αf > αm) 9.9171 9.9409 8.3690 8.5208 13.8141** 15.4170** 14.1456** 14.2043**
(6.2729) (6.2896) (6.2890) (6.2867) (6.1459) (6.2291) (6.2022) (6.2010)
φ× I(αf < αm) -0.7101 2.1814 2.5544 2.7943 -1.1767 1.5031 1.9789 2.0794
(5.1775) (4.6929) (4.6950) (4.7119) (4.5420) (4.2630) (4.2735) (4.2741)
φ -2.7927 -3.1190 -2.2520 -3.5868 -2.8353 -4.1430 -3.0998 -3.8439
(3.1100) (3.1508) (3.1658) (3.4473) (2.8475) (2.9307) (2.9442) (3.0799)
I(αf > αm) -0.1924 -1.7547 -1.0745 -1.1115 -1.6396 -3.8671 -3.3694 -3.3633
(3.0528) (3.0654) (3.0674) (3.0638) (2.8635) (2.9227) (2.9150) (2.9163)
I(αf < αm) -1.2626 -2.7908 -2.7332 -2.8021 -1.0976 -2.4955 -2.5023 -2.5081
(2.8569) (2.6101) (2.5940) (2.5947) (2.5772) (2.4154) (2.4020) (2.4004)
Household income 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Sum of preferences 2.8261*** 2.8398*** 2.8601*** 2.8687***
(0.3622) (0.3631) (0.3617) (0.3625)
Wage 0.0720 0.0508
(0.0576) (0.0549)
Number of children fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,237 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,251 2,180 2,180 2,180
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100.
The estimate of φ× I(αf > αm) denotes the positive bargaining power effect and the estimate of φ× I(αf < αm) the negative bargaining power effect.
φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,***
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional
control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship
and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table 1.8: First births only–Bargaining power effects with preference differences
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× (αf − αm) 3.6525 2.7957 2.0954 2.0908 5.1425* 5.0709* 4.4286 4.4290
(2.8131) (2.7441) (2.7493) (2.7450) (2.7134) (2.7152) (2.7008) (2.6984)
φ -0.7405 -0.4266 0.1744 -0.9951 0.1487 -0.2447 0.6274 -0.0296
(2.2880) (2.3087) (2.3073) (2.5960) (2.1482) (2.2390) (2.2330) (2.4264)
(αf − αm) -0.7804 -0.5020 -0.7600 -0.7622 -0.2336 0.3832 0.1628 0.1624
(1.3807) (1.3554) (1.3537) (1.3507) (1.2957) (1.3010) (1.2928) (1.2912)
Household income 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Sum of preferences 2.8414*** 2.8542*** 2.8789*** 2.8869***
(0.3626) (0.3636) (0.3621) (0.3629)
Wage 0.0674 0.0472
(0.0578) (0.0557)
Number of children fixed effects
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,237 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,251 2,180 2,180 2,180
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by
100. The estimate of φ × (αf − αm) denotes the bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’
measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects
include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both
partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables
for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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for overall fertility. However, low precision of the estimates advises caution when
drawing rigorous conclusions from this exercise.
Further robustness tests So far we used relative wage, relative individual in-
come and relative education as proxies for bargaining power. As a robustness test
we also apply relative individual non-wage income, which is not affected by labor
market decisions. As individual non-wage income is zero for many individuals,
the sample reduces to couples with at least one partner having positive non-wage
income. If none of two partners has any non-wage income, relative non-wage income
is undefined. In addition, we define a more comprehensive variable for full individual
income, which includes both non-wage income and labor income as used in the
baseline estimation. Results can be found in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix for
the preference indicator variable and the continuous preference difference variable.
Estimated interaction effects with relative non-wage income are very imprecise in
both specification and far from being statistically significant. Estimates of the
bargaining power effects with relative full individual income are comparable to
the baseline estimates for relative labor income and consistent with the theoretical
predictions.
As another robustness test and in order to account for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity, we apply a fixed-effects model which adds a couple fixed
effect to the estimation equation. In this approach, estimates are only identified by
within-couple variation over time, i.e., only changes in bargaining power and child
preferences over time contribute to the identification. This also means that only
couples with at least each an observation without and an observation with a birth
are used in the identification. With five observations over time at maximum the
variation left is arguably little. However, we report some results in the appendix for
the preference indicator in Table A.5 and for the continuous preference difference
in Table A.6. In columns (1) to (4) in both tables, we apply relative wages as the
proxy φ. The interaction effects we are interested in have the expected signs but
are statistically insignificant. In columns (5) to (8), φ is defined as relative years of
schooling instead. Now, we find some statistically significant interaction effects of φ
with weaker female child preferences that correspond to the theoretical prediction.
However, the other estimates are imprecisely estimated. By and large, fixed-effects
estimates do not contradict our findings, but are too weak to release concerns about
unobserved confounding variation.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we derive a simple model of fertility decisions with heterogenous
partners that has two main conclusions: female relative wage as a bargaining power
determinant can have a negative opportunity cost effect and an ambiguous bar-
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gaining power effect on fertility. If her child preferences are stronger than her
partner’s, the bargaining power effect is positive. If her child preferences are weaker
than her partner’s, the bargaining power effect is negative. With concordant child
preferences, the bargaining power effect is zero. We take this prediction to the
data and find a differential bargaining power effect dependent on relative child
preferences. The finding is robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables
and different model specifications. Furthermore, we test the predictions using other
bargaining power determinants, among them education as well as individual labor
and non-wage income, and come up with consistent bargaining power effects. Even
if endogeneity cannot be ruled out completely as an alternative explanation, we have
vast descriptive evidence in support of the theoretical predictions.
For further research, using concordant and discordant preferences within cou-
ples is a new and alternative way of investigating bargaining in decision making
about household public goods in general. Here, we have demonstrated the case
of fertility, which is an important issue for policymakers. Taking into account
relative preferences and bargaining power could be valuable especially when thinking
about targeted transfers. If they change bargaining power within couples, they also
affect the decision about household public goods according to relative individual
preferences.
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Appendix A
A.1 Supplementary Tables
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Table A.1: Auxiliary regression–Relative wage and relative years of schooling with
preference indicators
Dependent: Relative wage Relative wage Relative wage
×I(αf > αm) ×I(αf < αm)
Relative education 0.7818*** -0.0250*** -0.0187***
(0.0738) (0.0078) (0.0054)
Relative education ×I(αf > αm) -0.3147** 0.6111*** -0.0015
(0.1231) (0.1110) (0.0070)
Relative education ×I(αf < αm) -0.0245 -0.0043 0.8771***
(0.1620) (0.0151) (0.1647)
Control variables Y Y Y
F statistics 44.32 13.04 14.11
(All three auxiliary variables)
F statistics 112.3 30.33 28.35
(Relevant auxiliary variable)
Observations 11048 11048 11048
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations. Robust standard errors from clustering on
individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include
an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables
include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator
variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal
states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.2: Auxiliary regression–Relative wage and relative years of schooling with
preference differences
Dependent: Relative wage Relative wage
×I(αf − αm)
Relative education 0.7010*** -0.0700*
(0.0624) (0.0414)
Relative education ×I(αf − αm) 0.0301 0.7895***
(0.0226) (0.0529)
Control variables Y Y
F statistics 66.04 111.7
(All three auxiliary variables)
F statistics 126.2 222.7
(Relevant auxiliary variable)
Observations 11048 11048
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations. Robust standard
errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,*
p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each
contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age
and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student,
indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants,
indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.3: Non-wage income–Bargaining power effects with preference indicators
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative non-wage income Relative full individual income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× I(αf > αm) -1.8106 -2.2028 -2.1106 -2.1183 5.0814** 3.9055* 3.3179 3.3128
(1.9435) (1.9388) (1.9303) (1.9316) (2.1468) (2.1087) (2.0978) (2.0956)
φ× I(αf < αm) 0.2759 1.1519 1.3414 1.3388 -3.7979 -4.0631* -4.5427* -4.5470*
(2.1877) (2.3144) (2.3084) (2.3106) (2.3429) (2.3152) (2.3199) (2.3213)
φ 3.4432*** 1.4365 1.2810 1.1726 -2.6819** -0.6763 -0.0031 0.0389
(1.0897) (1.1133) (1.1100) (1.1169) (1.0426) (1.1313) (1.1335) (1.2369)
I(αf > αm) -0.3202 0.2275 1.0878 1.0749 -1.5789** -1.1979* -0.0083 -0.0075
(1.4295) (1.4192) (1.4647) (1.4643) (0.7264) (0.7197) (0.7203) (0.7196)
I(αf < αm) -3.9955*** -4.1387*** -3.4186*** -3.4424*** -0.6131 -0.3140 0.8406 0.8418
(1.2180) (1.2897) (1.3015) (1.3047) (0.9519) (0.9242) (0.9324) (0.9322)
Household income 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.1997*** 1.1975*** 1.6692*** 1.6695***
(0.3221) (0.3220) (0.1831) (0.1832)
Wage -0.0403 -0.0021
(0.0347) (0.0204)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,411 3,353 3,353 3,353 11,886 11,527 11,527 11,527
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100. The
estimate of φ × I(αf > αm) denotes the positive bargaining power effect and the estimate of φ × I(αf < αm) the negative bargaining power effect. φ
is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,***
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control
variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-
generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.4: Non-wage income–Bargaining power effects with preference differences
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative non-wage income Relative full individual income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× (αf − αm) -0.8888 -1.3769 -1.2099 -1.2172 3.2777** 2.9465** 2.7029** 2.7016**
(1.1099) (1.1114) (1.1032) (1.1042) (1.2882) (1.2470) (1.2499) (1.2488)
φ 3.3620*** 1.3713 1.1484 1.0452 -2.4636*** -0.7247 -0.1497 -0.1133
(0.8327) (0.8856) (0.8836) (0.8963) (0.8481) (0.9305) (0.9347) (1.0513)
(αf − αm) -1.0553 -1.3690* -1.6506** -1.6522** 0.4685 0.4532 0.1045 0.1044
(0.6924) (0.7067) (0.7054) (0.7058) (0.5109) (0.4859) (0.4900) (0.4900)
Household income 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of preferences 1.4118*** 1.4120*** 1.6566*** 1.6568***
(0.3157) (0.3155) (0.1786) (0.1788)
Wage -0.0384 -0.0019
(0.0345) (0.0204)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,411 3,353 3,353 3,353 11,886 11,527 11,527 11,527
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability estimations with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and multiplied by 100.
The estimate of φ × (αf − αm) denotes the bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures.
Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator
variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable
for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed
effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.5: Fixed-effects estimation–Bargaining power effects with preference indicators for wage and schooling
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative years of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× I(αf > αm) 0.7392 1.6152 1.4885 1.5419 -0.9398 -8.8997 -9.0802 -9.6888
(2.6850) (2.6864) (2.6778) (2.6820) (16.1552) (15.8416) (15.7638) (15.7613)
φ× I(αf < αm) -3.1517 -2.5290 -2.3995 -2.1907 -43.7635** -40.8197* -40.5735* -41.2356**
(2.8725) (2.8639) (2.8616) (2.8650) (20.9732) (20.9266) (20.9729) (20.8300)
φ 2.5662 1.7820 1.8095 0.6888 -21.0111 -23.5139 -24.1252 -25.2299
(1.8547) (1.9458) (1.9450) (2.1522) (20.5634) (20.3668) (20.2522) (20.2397)
I(αf > αm) 0.3138 -0.0430 0.5356 0.5281 0.5163 4.5296 5.1461 5.4668
(1.1716) (1.1786) (1.1713) (1.1716) (7.9224) (7.7753) (7.7275) (7.7276)
I(αf < αm) -0.0345 -0.2087 0.3149 0.2938 20.6030** 19.2276* 19.6466* 20.0691*
(1.4263) (1.4105) (1.4138) (1.4131) (10.5036) (10.4672) (10.5009) (10.4268)
Household income 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Sum of preferences 1.1463*** 1.1360*** 1.1294*** 1.1154***
(0.3440) (0.3430) (0.3396) (0.3390)
Wage 0.0526 0.0786**
(0.0431) (0.0383)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,709 11,352 11,352 11,352 11,579 11,231 11,231 11,231
Couples 6,207 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,118 5,973 5,973 5,973
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effect within-estimations at individual level with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and
multiplied by 100. The estimate of φ × I(αf > αm) denotes the positive bargaining power effect and the estimate of φ × I(αf < αm) the negative
bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on
individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number
of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both partners, an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for
foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.6: Fixed-effects estimation–Bargaining power effects with preference differences for wage and schooling
Bargaining power proxy φ: Relative wage Relative years of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
φ× (αf − αm) 0.8720 1.2106 1.0732 1.0363 12.8148 7.2111 7.0674 7.0887
(1.6774) (1.6284) (1.6274) (1.6258) (11.0970) (11.1543) (11.1277) (11.0702)
φ 2.2868 1.7242 1.7389 0.6786 -30.4213 -33.9248* -34.1774* -35.4842*
(1.5967) (1.6796) (1.6797) (1.8806) (19.9559) (19.7836) (19.6827) (19.6472)
(αf − αm) -0.4721 -0.2669 -0.4289 -0.4256 5.9825 3.2404 3.0458 3.0886
(0.7961) (0.7807) (0.7817) (0.7809) (5.4890) (5.5194) (5.5048) (5.4747)
Household income 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Sum of preferences 1.1231*** 1.1080*** 1.1161*** 1.0941***
(0.3397) (0.3385) (0.3376) (0.3368)
Wage 0.0515 0.0763**
(0.0428) (0.0380)
Number of children fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,709 11,352 11,352 11,352 11,579 11,231 11,231 11,231
Couples 6,207 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,118 5,973 5,973 5,973
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effect within-estimations at individual level with the dependent variable birth 12 to 23 months after the interview and
multiplied by 100. The estimate of φ × (αf − αm) denotes the bargaining power effect. φ is defined as the female’s measure over the sum of both
partners’ measures. Robust standard errors from clustering on individuals in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Number of child fixed effects
include an indicator variable for each contemporaneous number of children. Additional control variables include age and age squared of both partners,
an indicator variable for being a student, indicator variables for foreign citizenship and second-generation immigrants, indicator variables for federal
states, and year fixed effects. Data source: SOEP.
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Chapter 2
Political Socialization in Flux?
Linking Family Non-Intactness
during Childhood to Adult Civic
Disengagement1
1Joint with Helmut Rainer and Thomas Siedler
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2.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, economic and social changes in western societies have resulted in
families that are more complex in their structure. Family breakdown through sep-
aration or divorce has become common, and non-marital birth rates have increased
dramatically and appear to be continuing to rise.2 Since most divorces involve
children, there is now a substantially higher probability that children will have a lone
parent than was once the case.3 Projections of future changes in family structures
indicate that the number of single-parent families is likely to further substantially
increase over the next two decades in most OECD countries (see Figure 2.1).
An extensive body of research across a range of disciplines has identified child-
hood family structure as a key determinant of children’s later-life socio-economic
outcomes, emphasizing that children who grow up in a non-intact family: (i) tend to
perform less well in school and to gain lower educational qualifications than children
from intact families (Case et al., 2001; Ermisch et al., 2004; Gruber, 2004); (ii) are
more likely to leave home when young and to become sexually active or pregnant
at an early age (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994); (iii) tend to report higher levels
of smoking (Francesconi et al., 2010). However, one aspect of childhood family
structure has remained largely neglected in the literature: its impact on children’s
later-life civic engagement.4 The primary contribution of this paper is to fill that
void.
In discussions on children’s socialization into politics and civic affairs, it has
long been recognized that the family reproduces interest in the public domain
(Hyman, 1959). This idea is based not only on evidence of a transmission of
basic civic responsibilities and political orientations from parents to their offspring
(Giuliano and Alesina, 2011), but also on findings in the area of partisan commit-
ment and electoral behavior indicating high intergenerational agreement
(Jennings et al., 2009). However, the research has also shown that the success of
parental socialization of beliefs and values may differ systematically with family
structure. It has been suggested in particular that growing up in a non-intact family
frequently deprives children of important parental and community resources, in turn
leaving them with a lack of knowledge and skills to operate effectively in society. One
hypothesis, therefore, is that non-intact family structures during childhood have a
negative causal effect on adult children’s civic engagement, since they undermine and
in some cases prevent the processes and activities through which parents shape their
2Across the OECD, the average divorce rate has doubled from 1.2 divorcees per 1000 people in
1970 to 2.4 in 2009, while the average proportion of births outside marriage has tripled from 11
percent in 1980 to 33 percent in 2007 (OECD, 2011a).
3On average, in developed countries, almost 1 out of 6 children today live with one parent only
(Iacovou and Skew, 2010; OECD, 2010).
4Civic engagement can take many forms, from volunteer work at an individual level to
involvement in larger organizations or political parties. In the present paper, we use civic
engagement as an umbrella term to refer to these various types of civic engagement.
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Figure 2.1: Projected percentage increase in the number of sole-parent families in
selected OECD countries
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Source: OECD (2012b). The periods over which changes are projected are as follows:
Australia (2000 to 2026), Austria (2007 to 2030), France (2005 to 2030), Germany (2000 to
2025), Japan (2000 to 2030), the Netherlands (2009 to 2030), New Zealand (2006 to 2031),
Norway (2002 to 2031), United Kingdom (2006 to 2031) and United States (2005 to 2030).
children’s political orientations (causation hypothesis). The opposite hypothesis is
that factors which increase the risk of family breakdown are also linked to children’s
civic and political engagement, implying that at least part of the relationship has
to be seen as selective (selection hypothesis).
To gain a deeper understanding of these issues, we use data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel on about 6,000 adult children with matched parental marital
histories and family characteristics. We derive measures of family non-intactness
during childhood by exploiting extramarital births and parental divorces, and per-
form both cross-sectional and sibling difference analyses of different indicators of
civic engagement. The latter estimation method allows us to compare adult chil-
dren to their own siblings and to control for time-invariant fixed effects of family
background that may influence both childhood family structure and young adults’
political behavior. Both exercises reveal a significant negative relationship between
growing up in a non-intact family and children’s civic, social and political engage-
ment as adults. For example, sibling difference estimates suggest that adult children
who lived in a non-intact family during childhood have a 10 percentage points lower
likelihood of being interested in politics. This is a sizeable effect, given that 24
percent of adult children report being interested in politics. This means that we
can reject the selection hypothesis in favor of a causal explanation for the negative
link between growing up in a non-intact family and children’s later involvement in
public affairs.
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Our results are robust to a number of specification and sensitivity checks
including heterogeneity to gender, mother’s education, and residential area, as well
as an alternative measure of family non-intactness. Moreover, we also calculate
the ratio of the impact of omitted variables relative to the explanatory variables
needed to fully explain away the effect of family non-intactness on adult civic engage-
ment. In line with the sibling difference estimates, the results of the “observables-
unobservables” estimator support the causation hypothesis.
2.2 Civic Engagement: Trends, Relevance and
Theories
In the last few decades, the developed world has seen not only radical changes
in family structures, but also another significant social development: the increasing
disengagement of citizens from public affairs. Established democracies are managing
to motivate an ever smaller proportion of the electorate to exercise the right to vote.
The broad pattern of reduced civic engagement is confirmed by evidence in other
domains as well: union membership, partisan attachment, political interest, and
church attendance (see Figure 2.2). Indeed, Putnam (2002) argues that waning
participation in political parties, unions and churches is almost universal. While
the decrease in civic engagement is prevalent throughout the population, additional
evidence shows that declines in voting, political interest and association member-
ship are much more pronounced among younger cohorts than among older cohorts
(Putnam, 2000).
These trends are a matter of concern for at least two important reasons. First,
it is well understood that civic engagement strengthens civic values among the
population and enhances the responsiveness of government and political elites to
citizens’ concerns (Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2002). Second, higher levels of civic
engagement tend to go hand in hand with higher levels of social capital. This not
only enhances democratic representation by facilitating interest aggregation and
articulation (Putnam, 1993), but also promotes collective and collaborative action
(Arrow, 1974). Moreover, a growing body of research suggests that social capital
also has a positive impact on a wide range of macroeconomic and microeconomic
outcomes. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) provide strong evidence that
norms of civic cooperation have significant impacts on aggregate economic activity.
The importance of civic engagement has made it a major focus of analysis and
commentary in the social sciences. Explanations for the contemporary phenomenon
of growing civic disengagement can be broken down into three main theories.5
The “social capital” thesis (Putnam, 2000) associates declining civic engagement
5A comprehensive exposition and discussion of the key theories of contemporary civic
disengagement can be found in Hay (2007).
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Figure 2.2: Trends in different forms of civic engagement in selected OECD countries
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Change in Union Membership Rates (1970 to 1996)
Change in Voting Rates (1980 to mid 2000s)
Change in Party Identification Rates (1960s to mid-1990s)
Change in Political Interest (early-1990s to mid-2000s)
Change in Church Attendance Rates (early-1980s to late-1990s)
Source: Figure 2.2 draws upon data from a variety of sources: (a) union membership: change in
the percentage of employees who are union members, 1970 to 1996 (Source: OECD, 2012a, own
calculations); (b) voting : change in voting rates in parliamentary elections, 1980 to most recent
election (Source: OECD, 2011b, own calculations); the latest available year is 2005 for Germany,
Japan, Norway and United Kingdom; 2006 for the Netherlands and the United States; and 2007 for
Australia and France; (c) party identification: change in the percentage of people who identify with
a democratic party in the long term (Source: Dalton, 2002, 25-26, own calculations); the period
over which changes are computed are as follows: Australia (1967 to 1998), France (1975 to 1996),
Germany (1972 to 1998), Japan (1962 to 1995), the Netherlands (1971 to 1998), Norway (1965
to 1993), United Kingdom (1964 to 1997) and United States (1952 to 1996); (d) political interest :
change in the percentage of respondents who are “very or somewhat interested in politics” (Source:
World Value Survey, own calculations); the period over which changes are computed is as follows:
France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States (1990 to 2006), Japan
(1990 to 2005), Norway (1990 to 2008), Australia (1995-2005); (e) church attendance: change in
the percentage of respondents who“attend church at least once a month” (Source: World Value
Survey, own calculations); the period over which changes are computed are as follows: France,
Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States (1981 to 1999), Japan (1981 to
2000), Norway (1982 to 1996), Australia (1981-1995).
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with an accelerated tendency towards individualism, leading to a disintegration
in the community bonds that once held society together. The “critical citizens”
thesis (Norris, 2002) suggests that younger cohorts of voters are more difficult to
please than their parents’ or grandparents’ generations, and that they tend more
to express dissatisfaction through abstention from political affairs. Finally, the
“voting age” thesis (Franklin, 2004) argues that the lowering of the voting age in
most advanced democracies can account almost entirely for recent declines in voter
turnout. Of these explanations, the social capital hypothesis is the most pertinent
to the study at hand. For Putnam (2000), lack of civic engagement and declining
respect for the obligations of citizens in democracies are the result of the pervasive
individualism that accompanies the disintegration of communities. Our findings add
a new dimension to this view by showing that the family disintegration may also
be a root cause of civic disengagement.
2.3 Why Does Family Structure Matter?
As we have seen above, the decline in civic engagement over recent decades coincided
with a breakdown in traditional family structures. Despite this, Putnam (2000)
dismisses the decline in the traditional family as a possible explanatory factor for
the erosion of civic engagement:
“... apart from youth- and church-related engagement, none of the
major declines in social capital and civic engagement that we need to
explain can be accounted for by the decline in the traditional family
structure. In my view, there are important reasons for concern about
the erosion of traditional family values, but I can find no evidence that
civic disengagement is among them.” Putnam (2000, p. 279)
It is important to note that Putnam’s (2000) argument not only lacks a
systematic empirical foundation but is also theoretically problematic in a number
of ways. In this paper, we seek to contribute a more comprehensive understanding
of how childhood family structure affects civic engagement in young adults.
As recently shown by Jennings et al. (2009), parents can have an enormous
influence on their children’s political learning in pre-adulthood. On the one hand,
this finding coincides with childhood socialization theory, which emphasizes the role
of the family in maintaining continuity in social ideologies over time (Glass et al.,
1986, and references therein). More generally, however, it is also compatible with the
idea that social capital within the family is of key importance for a child’s intellectual
development. In this regard, Coleman (1988, 109–113) argues that: (i) social capital
within the family depends on the physical presence of adults and the time and effort
spent by the adults with a child on intellectual matters; (ii) the physical absence
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of adults can be described as a structural deficiency in family social capital; and
(iii) the most prominent element of structural deficiency in modern families is the
single-parent family. Given these arguments, one might expect that the decision of
parents to live separately—e.g., as a result of a divorce—damages the social capital
that might have been available to the child had it been raised jointly by both parents.
We now present a simple theoretical framework that formalizes this idea.
2.3.1 Social Capital Investments and Family Structure
Consider a family that is comprised of two parents, f and m, with one child. Since
social capital is an important resource for individuals and may positively affect their
ability to operate in society and their perceived quality of life, the adult child’s level
of social capital is assumed to be a public good to the parents. In other words, the
parents are altruistic towards their child. Following Coleman (1988), we view the
child’s social capital as determined by the attention given by the parents to the child
during childhood. Examples of the “attention” that we have in mind is the time
spent by the parents with the child on intellectual matters, which we consider to
positively influence the process of political learning through which the child acquires
a clear picture of civic responsibility.
We assume that the parents can make time investments in their child’s social
capital during two distinct periods of childhood. In one of these periods (call it a),
social capital investment takes place in an intact family environment, and we assume
that parental decision-making can be characterized as cooperative in this case. In the
other period (call it b), social capital investment takes place in a non-intact family
environment, and we assume that parental decision-making is better characterized
as non-cooperative in this case. We will be specific about this below.
We normalize the duration of the entire childhood to unity, and denote by
πb ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of the childhood characterized by a non-intact family
environment. Thus, πa = 1 − πb is the fraction of the childhood spent in an intact
family environment. In each period k (k = a, b), the parents can devote their time
endowment, πk, either to producing social capital, to working outside the home, or
to leisure. When working outside the home, each parent can earn a wage w. In
addition, each parent has non-labor income y. Social capital in period k is produced
according to
S = f(ℓkf , ℓ
k
m),
where ℓki is the time input of parent i (i = f,m). Each parent’s preferences are
represented by the additively separable utility function
U i = v(xai ) + v(x
b
i) + g(h
a
i ) + g(h
b
i) + z(S
a) + z(Sb),
where xki and h
k
i denote personal consumption and personal leisure in period k,
respectively. We assume that v(·) and g(·) are strictly increasing and concave
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functions. For simplicity, we let the composition of the utility function z(·) with
the social capital function f(·) be given by
z(f(ℓkf , ℓ
k
m) = ξµ(ℓ
k
f ) + (1− ξ)µ(ℓ
k
m),
where µ(·) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The parameter ξ captures
parent f ’s productivity in social capital investment relative to parent m.
Intact Family Suppose first that the entire childhood period is characterized by
an intact family environment (πa = 1). In this case, our approach to modeling social
capital investments entails characterizing parental decision-making as cooperative.
In adopting this approach, we follow the dominant premise in the economic theory
of the family that intact households are able to reach efficient outcomes (Becker,
1991). One good reason for assuming this is that affective relationships among family
members provide a foundation for low transaction costs, which are a prerequisite for
the successful implementation of cooperative agreements (Pollak, 1985).
There are several ways to characterize an efficient allocation of family resources.
Our approach is to maximize the utility of one parent subject to the other achieving
a given utility and to the resource and social capital production constraints.6 An
interior solution implies that the social capital investment chosen by the two parents
must satisfy
(2.1)
1
v′(xaf )
+
1
v′(xam)
=
1
µ′(ℓaf )
w
ξ
and
1
v′(xaf )
+
1
v′(xam)
=
1
µ′(ℓam)
w
1− ξ
,
respectively. This is the Samuelson condition for the efficient provision of a public
good. Stated in words, it implies that the sum of the parents’ marginal rates of
substitution between the child’s social capital and private consumption must equal
the private cost of an extra unit of social capital relative to an extra unit of private
consumption. For illustration, let U i = ln(xai )+ln(h
a
i )+ln(S
a) and S = (ℓaf )
ξ(ℓam)
1−ξ.
In this case, optimal parental decision-taking implies a social capital level of
(2.2) S¯a = Ka
[
1 +
y
w
]
where Ka =
[
ξ
1− ξ
]ξ [
2(1− ξ)
3
]
.
Non-Intact Family Suppose next that the entire childhood period is charac-
terized by a non-intact family environment (πb = 1). In this case, we assume
that the parents cannot cooperate because they cannot communicate effectively
with each other. Thus, we view them as behaving non-cooperatively.7 Thus,
6Formally, the efficient outcome must maximize v(xaf ) + g(h
a
f ) + z(S
a) subject to (a) v(xam) +
g(ham) + z(S
a) > u, (b) (1 − haf − ℓ
a
f )w + (1 − h
a
m − ℓ
a
m)w + 2y = xf + xm and (c) z(S
a) =
ξµ(ℓaf ) + (1− ξ)µ(ℓ
a
m).
7In making this assumption, we follow the seminal contributions of Weiss and Willis (1985)
and Del Boca and Flinn (1995), who provide formal analyses of the non-cooperative behavior of
divorced parents in terms of child support transfers and expenditures on children.
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each parent i maximizes v(xbi) + g(h
b
i) + z(S
b) subject to (1 − hbi − ℓ
b
i)w + y = xi
and z(Sb) = ξµ(ℓbf ) + (1 − ξ)µ(ℓ
b
m). In an interior equilibrium, the social capital
investment chosen by the two parents solve:
(2.3)
1
v′(xbf )
=
1
µ′(ℓbf )
w
ξ
and
1
v′(xbm)
=
1
µ′(ℓbm)
w
1− ξ
,
respectively. This says that, for each parent, the marginal rate of substitution
between the child’s social capital and private consumption must be equal to the
marginal cost of socializing the child relative to that of the private good. If we
employ the particular form of the parents’ utility functions and the social capital
production function used above, the equilibrium level of social capital is given by:
(2.4) S¯b = Kb
[
1 +
y
w
]
where Kb =
[
ξ
2 + ξ
]ξ [
1− ξ
3− ξ
]1−ξ
.
2.3.2 Implications
Underinvestment in Social Capital The key implication of the above analysis
is that family non-intactness disrupts the production process through which social
capital within the family is created. Indeed, as with most privately provided public
goods, the social capital available to the child will be underprovided when parents
live apart and fail to coordinate their choices. To demonstrate this, we use equations
(2) and (4) to compute:
S¯b
S¯a
=
Kb
Ka
=
3
2
[
1
(2 + ξ)ξ(3− ξ)1−ξ
]
< 1.
Figure 2.3 shows that Sˆb/Sˆa < 1 for all ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the non-cooperative
equilibrium produces too little social capital. Moreover, the degree of underprovision
is particularly high when the productivity in social capital investment differs between
the parents (i.e., as ξ → 0 or ξ → 1). The intuition for underprovision is simple
and follows from the public goods character of family social capital: if parents
fail to cooperate, the actions that create social capital suffer from bidirectional
externalities, and so it is not in each parent’s interest to choose the socially efficient
actions. Thus, an analogy can be drawn here to Coleman’s (1988) idea that family
non-intactness constitutes a structural deficiency in family social capital.
Duration of Family Non-Intactness So far, we have assumed that the entire
childhood period is characterized either by an intact (πa = 1) or by a non-intact
(πb = 1) family environment. Now suppose that the parents make investments in
their child’s social capital in two periods: one period of intact and one period of non-
intact family environment. Let πb ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of childhood characterized
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Figure 2.3: Family Non-Intactness and Underinvestment in Social Capital
by a non-intact family environment, while 1 − πb is the fraction of the childhood
spent in an intact family environment. With the particular utility and production
functions assumed above, family social capital created over both periods is
S˜ ≡ S˜a + S˜b = Ka
[
1− πb +
y
w
]
+Kb
[
πb +
y
w
]
.
It now follows directly that
∂S˜
∂πb
= −Ka
[
1−
Kb
Ka
]
< 0.
Stated in words, the social capital created during the entire childhood period de-
creases with the duration of family non-intactness.
Summary In the empirical analysis, we focus on two related family structure
measures that the analysis above suggests are important for young adults’ social
capital, including their civic engagement. The first measure of childhood family
structure is whether a child spent any time living in a non-intact family. We would
expect that young adults who experience family non-intactness as children are less
likely to be civically engaged than those from intact families. The second measure
does not indicate the mere occurrence of family non-intactness during childhood,
but expresses the number of years a young adult experienced a non-intact family
environment as a child. Our hypothesis is that adult civic engagement decreases
with the duration of family non-intactness during childhood.
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2.4 Data
Our data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)8, a representative
longitudinal survey of private households in Germany. We combine information
from the first 26 annual interview waves (1984-2009). In the SOEP, individuals are
re-interviewed each successive year. If children move out of their parents’ home to
form a new household, they are followed and all adults living in the new household
are invited to become SOEP respondents as well. Moreover, children living in SOEP
households become adult respondents in their own right the year they turn 17.
The SOEP also collects retrospective lifetime marital, fertility and employment
histories.9 We combine retrospective information provided by mothers with their
annual interview data. By using mother-child identifiers, we match all maternal
characteristics to adult children. We then reconstruct a respondent’s childhood
family structure by combining his or her birth date and the mother’s marital history.
The data is therefore particularly well suited for the analysis of childhood family
structure and its effects on young adults’ outcomes.
For the pooled cross-sectional analysis (individual sample) in which we study
repeated observations of civic outcomes in relation to childhood family structure,
we select individuals who: (i) were 18 or younger in their first year as SOEP
respondents; (ii) were living with their biological mother for at least one year
during the panel; and (iii) have complete information on their mother’s family
history. We impose condition (i) to ensure an age structure that captures young
adults in particular. Condition (ii) is necessary to match mothers’ characteristics
to young adults, as both generations had to be interviewed as adults. Condition
(iii) ensures that childhood family structure can be consistently reconstructed for
all young adults.
In a second step, we estimate sibling difference models (sibling sample), which
requires us to impose further conditions: (iv) an individual must have at least one
sibling; (v) civic outcome measures of the siblings must be observed in the same
year. Conditions (i) through (v) are used to construct the sibling sample. For
similar sample selection approaches and discussions, see Ermisch et al. (2004) and
Francesconi et al. (2010).
2.4.1 Civic Engagement
As the main dependent variable in our empirical analysis, we use an index of civic
engagement that averages together four component measures of civic engagement:
(i) political interest; (ii) party identification; (iii) organizational involvement; and
8We use SOEP distribution v26.
9Note that, for many respondents, the retrospective information spans the pre-panel period,
i.e., years before 1984.
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(iv) individual voluntarism. In order to come to as broad a conclusion as possible,
we not only present findings for the summary index, but also report results for its
components. We start by providing a description of our outcome variables.
Political Interest In line with recent research suggesting that citizens with a
greater interest in politics are more likely to be involved in public affairs (Bekkers,
2005), we view political interest as one precondition for civic engagement. In the
empirical work, we make use of a survey question which reads: “Generally speaking,
how much are you interested in politics?”. We create an indicator variable which
equals one if an individual reports being interested in politics (“very much” or
“much”), and is zero for those who declare that they are not interested (“not so
much” or “not at all”).
Party Identification In the past few decades, the concept of party identification
has reached an important position in electoral research because public attachment
to political parties is seen as a key determinant of many different aspects of political
behavior (Dalton, 2002). For example, partisan ties motivate people to participate
in parties, elections, and the processes of representative government. One survey
question asks: “Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term,
even if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you lean towards a particular
party?”. We construct an indicator variable that equals one if a respondent reports
a long-term identification with a democratic party,10 and zero otherwise.
Organizational Involvement While official membership in formal organizations
is only one aspect of civic engagement, it is regarded as a useful indicator of
community involvement (Putnam, 2000). To construct a measure of organizational
involvement, we use a question that reads: “Which of the following activities do you
take part in during your free time? Please check off how often you do each activity:
at least once a week, at least once a month, less often, never.” We construct a dummy
variable that equals one for individuals who report some kind of “involvement in
a citizens’ group, political party, or local government”, and is zero for respondents
who report no involvement at all.
Individual Voluntarism For Putnam (2000, 132–133), volunteering—i.e., the
readiness to help others—is an important aspect of good citizenship and political
involvement. He argues, for example, that volunteers are more interested in politics
and less cynical about political leaders than non-volunteers are. To quantify individ-
ual voluntarism, we create an indicator variable that equals one for respondents who
10The right-wing extremist parties NPD, Republikaner, and DVU are not considered democratic
parties.
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report doing “voluntary work in clubs or social services” (“at least once a week”,
“at least once a month”, “less often”), and is zero for individuals who report doing
no volunteer work (“never”).
For this outcome variable and for the outcomes organizational involvement,
and individual voluntarism, we will also use the ordinal nature of the original survey
question by estimating ordered probit models.
Index of Civic Engagement Our main variable of interest is an index of civic
engagement that aggregates the four component measures described above. We
derive our index of civic engagement from all survey years in which each of the four
component measures is collected. Our information about political interest and party
identification is derived from questions asked in the SOEP survey in the years 1985-
2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involvement and individual
voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey in 1985,
1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
The aggregation improves the statistical power by identifying effects that point
in the same direction as different outcome measures with identical domains. As
suggested by Kling et al. (2007), the summary index of civic engagement is an
equally weighted average of its components’ z-scores. The component measures used
are such that higher scores reflect higher civic engagement. To compute the z-scores
of each component, we subtract the mean in the estimation sample, in which none of
the other components and none of the control variables has missing information, and
divide it by the standard deviation. Thus, each standardized component has a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one. The index then aggregates the components
with equal weights. Estimated coefficients on dichotomous explanatory variables
can therefore be interpreted as percentage point changes in standard deviations of
each component.
2.4.2 Childhood Family Structure
In terms of explanatory variables, the analysis that follows focuses on two measures
of childhood family structure.
Our first measure, ever lived in a non-intact family, is derived using the self-
reported marital histories of biological mothers. The sample is restricted to individ-
uals whose mothers have complete marital histories spanning the individual’s entire
childhood. An individual is defined as having experienced family non-intactness
during childhood if the child’s mother was ever unmarried before he or she reached
the age of 16, either because the parents ended their marriage (divorced parents), or
because the mother was unmarried when she gave birth and did not marry within
the next year (born outside marriage).
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The variable divorced parents captures individuals who lived with divorced
parents for at least one year of their childhood (ages 0-16). In light of Coleman
(1988) and our simple theory, we would expect children of divorced parents to
suffer from a structural deficiency in family social capital, and therefore be civi-
cally less engaged than children from intact families. The variable born outside
marriage captures individuals either born to lone mothers or to cohabiting parents.
It is important to note that children born outside marriage have not necessarily
experienced family non-intactness, since cohabiting parents may have provided an
intact family environment throughout the entire childhood period. However, it
is well understood that mothers who were not in a relationship at the birth of
their child are more likely to continue living as a lone parent than those in a
serious relationship (Kiernan and Mensah, 2010). Moreover, a greater fragility of
cohabiting unions compared with marital ones has been observed in most developed
nations (Bumpass and Hu, 2000; Andersson, 2002). Since our data do not allow
us to identify cohabitation history, we use the variable born outside marriage as a
proxy for the family disruptions that affect children born into cohabitation or other
unions than marriage.11
Our second measure of childhood family structure, duration of family non-
intactness, is based on the first measure. However, instead of indicating the mere
occurrence of family non-intactness during childhood, it expresses the number of
years a child had lived with a divorced or unmarried mother. Given our theory, our
expectation is that adult civic engagement decreases with the duration of family
non-intactness during childhood.
2.4.3 Control Variables
Cross-sectional relationships between childhood family structure and adult civic
engagement could be driven solely by selection, i.e., factors that increase the risk
of family non-intactness may also be linked to children’s civic engagement. We
therefore choose potential observable confounders as control variables.
Bedard and Deschenes (2005) show that the gender of the first child is related to
parents’ propensity to divorce. Gender is also likely to affect the political participa-
tion and civic engagement of adult children. Therefore, gender is among our control
variables in the cross-sectional estimation.
Maternal education is also likely to affect both the probability of family non-
intactness and the political behavior of children. While the classical Beckerian
prediction for the effect of education on divorce is ambiguous (Becker et al., 1977),
11Because the variable born outside marriage captures not only children who experience family
non-intactness at some time during their childhood, but also those who experience an intact family
environment with long-term cohabiting parents, the estimates for it represent a conservative lower
bound for the effect of family non-intactness on civic engagement.
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we would expect parental education to go hand in hand with political and civic par-
ticipation. We control for mothers’ education by including three mutually exclusive
indicator variables that equal one if they have completed intermediate secondary
school (Realschule), advanced secondary school (Abitur), or a university degree,
and zero otherwise.12
Closely related to the educational attainment of mothers is their labor market
attachment. To control for a correlation between labor market participation and
non-intactness and possible adverse effects on children’s development (Ruhm, 2004),
we add the number of years a mother worked part-time and the number of years she
worked full-time during the individual’s childhood.13
To complete our set of control variables we add usual socio-demographic mea-
sures, which may cause selection bias if not adjusted for. Among these are the
mother’s age at birth, a maximum set of age dummy variables, federal state dummy
variables (“Bundesla¨nder”), year of interview dummy variables, an only child indi-
cator, and dummy variables for children’s birth order. We also control for the SOEP
respondent samples to account for peculiarities in survey-specific selection.
We deliberately do not control for household income during childhood. It
should be noted that, as stated in Adda et al. (2011), reduced income is one channel
through which family dissolution affects life outcomes, and this is not what we are
interested in. Household income during childhood after departure of the father is
likely to consist mainly of mother’s income and is probably not a good measure of
financial constraints affecting children if the children also benefit from an absent
father’s income.14
2.4.4 Summary Statistics
We present means and standard deviations for the individual sample and the sibling
sample in Table 2.1, measured in the last survey year adult children are observed in
the sample. It is evident that a large percentage of young adults are interested in
politics, identify with a democratic party, and do volunteer work in clubs or social
organizations. Organizational involvement is less common, with only 7 percent of
young adults reporting volunteer work in a citizen’s group, political party, or local
government.
12Paternal education is not included, because we rarely observe fathers’ educational attainment
after a divorce or in extramarital birth circumstances.
13Note that paternal labor market history is missing too often in the case of non-intact families
to ensure a non-selective sample when included.
14Moreover, household income is almost inevitably lower for lone mothers than for couples, such
that controlling for income may lead to strong multicollinearity which might pick up most variation
in non-intactness.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics, by sample
Basic Sibling
sample sample
Means
Standard
Means
Standard
deviation deviation
Dependent variablesa
Political interest 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43
Party identification 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
Organizational involvement 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
Individual voluntarism 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48
Explanatory variables
Ever lived in a non-intact family 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38
Parents divorced 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32
Born outside marriage 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.22
Duration of family non-intactness 1.57 3.75 1.09 3.02
Duration: parents divorced 1.02 2.91 0.77 2.46
Duration: born outside marriage 0.55 2.48 0.32 1.79
Control variables
Age 24.19 6.33 24.61 5.76
Female 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50
Mother’s age at birth 26.65 5.09 26.36 4.78
Only child 0.13 0.33
Firstborn childb 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.48
Second born childb 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49
Third born child or higher birth orderb 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Mother’s highest educational attainment:
Secondary school certificate or less 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50
Intermediate school qualification 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48
High school 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20
Technical college or university degree 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Mother’s employment during childhood:
Number of years part-time employed 4.76 5.31 4.83 5.23
Number of years full-time employed 5.90 6.35 5.23 6.10
Number of individuals 5828 3325
Notes: Figures shown are sample means computed in individual last survey year for which individuals
are observed. The sibling sample is constrained to the observations used in the sibling-fixed effects
approach, i.e. two siblings must be observed in the same year. aOnly for non-missing values in the
dependent variables in individual last survey year. bComputed for children with siblings only.
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21 percent of our respondents (18 percent of the sibling sample) lived in a
non-intact family at some point during childhood; 15 (12) percent experienced the
divorce of their parents and 9 (6) percent were born outside marriage. The dummy
variables parents divorced and born outside marriage are not mutually exclusive.
As a consequence, 3 (0) percent of respondents were born outside marriage and
experienced the subsequent marriage and divorce of their mothers. The average age
of adult children is 24 (25) years and both samples are balanced with respect to
gender. Maternal educational attainment is rather low compared to contemporary
standards, with 46 (45) percent of all mothers having completed lower secondary
school at best and 34 (35) percent intermediate secondary school. Mothers were on
average 27 (26) years old when they gave birth to their child. Maternal employment
during childhood averages 4.76 (4.83) years in part-time and 5.90 (5.23) years in
full-time work.
2.5 The Effect of Family Non-Intactness during
Childhood on Adult Civic Engagement
We start our empirical analysis by estimating cross-sectional models to under-
stand the overall relationship between family non-intactness during childhood and
children’s civic engagement later in life. Thereafter, we present sibling difference
regressions which rest on weaker identifying assumptions for estimating the effect of
family non-intactness on adult civic engagement. These models are meant to elimi-
nate family-specific characteristics (e.g., parenting style, parents’ political and social
values, neighborhood environment) that are assumed to be the same across siblings.
In a third step, we run a number of robustness tests including a bias assessment and
examine differences by gender, residential area, and mother’s education.
2.5.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Selection on Observables
Empirical model We start our empirical investigation by estimating pooled cross-
sectional regressions of the form
(2.5) OUTCOMEijt = β0 + β1NONINTACTNESSij + β2xijt + eijt,
where OUTCOMEijt is one of our five dependent variables described above for
adult child i from mother j at time t. For the binary outcome variables, we estimate
non-linear probit models. For the continuous index variable, we estimate ordinary
least-squares regressions. The key variable NONINTACTNESSij denotes the
various childhood family structure measures for adult child i from mother j. The
vector xijt includes all other control variables. Consistent and unbiased estimation
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of our key coefficient β1 requires that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with
the error term eijt, obviously a very strong assumption which is unlikely to hold in
the present context. Throughout the analysis, we compute standard errors that are
robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity, as there are multiple observations of
civic outcomes per individual over time.
Baseline results Table 2.2 reports the results from the pooled cross-sectional
regressions. For convenience, we only report the estimates of our key explanatory
variables. Panel A reports the estimates for the dichotomous explanatory variable
whether adult children ever lived in a non-intact family during childhood. Panel
B reports the estimated effects for the explanatory variables parents divorced and
born outside marriage. The results in Table 2.2, Panel A, point to a negative and
statistically significant relationship between growing up in a non-intact family and
the majority of civic engagement outcomes. The point estimate in panel A, column 1
suggests that young adults who have lived in a non-intact family show a 10.4 percent
of a standard deviation lower civic engagement (significant at the 1 percent level).
This is a sizable effect, as it implies a 10.4 percent of a standard deviation decline
in each of the index components, on average. Moreover, respondents who have ever
lived in a non-intact family during childhood are 4 percentage points less likely to
identify with a democratic party; 3 percentage points less likely to participate in a
citizen’s group, political parties or the local government; and 9 percentage points less
likely to engage in volunteer work. These marginal effects are all precisely estimated
and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, these are sizeable
effects given that 30 percent of young adults report attachment to a democratic
party, 33 percent volunteer in clubs or social services, and 7 percent are active in
citizen’s groups or political parties. The only point estimate that is not precisely
estimated in Panel A is the one for the outcome political interest.15
Disentangling the two sources of non-intactness in Panel B reveals that a
considerable portion of the negative associations between family non-intactness and
the majority of outcomes are driven by offsprings of divorced parents. The civic en-
gagement index is negatively associated with both growing up with divorced parents
and being born outside marriage. We see a decline of 11.7 percent of a standard
deviation for adults with divorced parents (1 percent significance) and a decline of
6.2 percent of a standard deviation for respondents born outside marriage (5 percent
significance). However, the estimates cannot be distinguished statistically from one
another, as indicated by the p-value of a Chow test for equality of coefficients at the
15We also estimated relationships between growing up in a non-intact family and another
outcome of interest, the intention to vote. The corresponding survey question was asked only in
2005 and 2009, which leaves us with a very small sample. Although we found negative associations
of family non-intactness with the intention to vote in the cross-sectional estimates, we decided not
to report them in the paper, because we cannot verify the results in sibling difference estimations.
Results can be found in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2: Childhood family structure and civic engagement
(Cross-sectional estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Ever lived in a non-intact family -0.104** -0.013 -0.041** -0.027** -0.088**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013)
Panel B
Parents divorced -0.117** -0.019 -0.031+ -0.030** -0.102**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.013)
Born outside marriage -0.062* -0.005 -0.049* -0.012 -0.041*
(0.030) (0.019) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.14 0.56 0.51 0.07 0.01
Person-year observations 18503 42913 40947 19738 19754
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column. Figures are marginal
effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the mean of all covariates. Panel
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as there are multiple
observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s highest educational
attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only child, birth order dummy variables, the number
of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables, survey
years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about political interest and
party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational
involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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bottom of the table. The marginal effects in columns 2-5 all point to a negative
relationship between having experienced parental divorce or being born outside
marriage and the civic engagement measures. Note, however, that only half of them
are statistically significant. The results of the Chow tests for equality of coefficients
suggest that the estimated coefficients for the two different non-intactness measures
are only statistically different from each other for organizational involvement (p-
value: 0.07) and individual voluntarism (p-value: 0.01). The test statistic reveals
that the correlations with divorced parents is larger in magnitude (more negative)
than with being born outside marriage.
Ordered probit estimates Three outcome measures—political interest, orga-
nizational involvement and individual voluntarism—are ordinal measures with four
parameter values each in the original data. Next, we apply ordered probit estimation
to use the full information contained in the data. This enables us to investigate
the conditional incidence in each category between young adults from intact and
non-intact families. The results are informative, as they give an idea about the
nature of differences in civic engagement and whether changes occur in highly or
marginally involved groups. Table 2.3 reports the marginal effects from ordered
probit regressions. For the outcome political interest, we now find a statistically
significant association with family non-intactness. Most notably, having experienced
family non-intactness during childhood is associated with a 2.1 percentage points
increase in not being interested in politics at all (5 percent significance) and a 1.6
percentage points decline in having much interest in politics (5 percent significance).
The marginal effects for the outcomes organizational involvement and individual
voluntarism are all precisely estimated and confirm the results in Table 2.2.
Duration of family non-intactness As laid out in the theory section, non-
cooperative behavior between parents as a result of a dysfunctional relationship can
decrease their children’s civic engagement as young adults. The theory also reveals
that the longer a period of childhood is spent in a non-intact family, the more severe
the effects on social capital.
Table 2.4 reports the results for our explanatory variables, which measure the
number of years young adults lived in a non-intact family. All estimates in Panel
A of Table 2.4 point to a negative association between the number of years spent
in a non-intact family and the civic engagement measures later in life. With the
exception of the marginal effect for the outcome political interest, the point estimates
are precisely estimated. For example, the result for the civic engagement index
suggests that each additional year spent in a non-intact family is associated with a
0.8 percent decrease in standard deviations of civic engagement. Having spent half
the childhood in a non-intact family would therefore imply a 6.4 percent decrease.
The marginal effects indicate that each additional year spent in a non-intact family
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Table 2.3: Ordered probit results
(Cross-sectional estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Political Organizational Individual
interest involvement voluntarism
Answer category:
Not at all 0.021*
(0.010)
Not much 0.001+
(0.001)
Much -0.016*
(0.007)
Very much -0.006*
(0.003)
Person-year observations 42923
Answer category:
Never 0.030** 0.084**
(0.007) (0.013)
Less frequently -0.023** -0.026**
(0.005) (0.004)
Every month -0.005** -0.018**
(0.001) (0.003)
Every week -0.003** -0.040**
(0.001) (0.006)
Person-year observations 19738 19754
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome
listed in that column. Figures are marginal effects from ordered probit regressions
evaluated at the outcome categories. The figures are to be interpreted as the differ-
ence in probability that the treated individuals (treatment: family non-intactness)
respond in that category compared to the non-treated. Panel robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification
numbers, as there are multiple observations per person over time. Other explana-
tory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s highest educational
attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only
child, birth order dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and
full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables,
survey years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a
constant. The information about political interest is derived from questions asked
in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational in-
volvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions
asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001,
2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
level.
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during childhood is associated with a 0.4 percentage point smaller probability of
party identification (5 percent significance), a 0.2 percentage point lower probability
of active involvement in a citizen’s or political group (1 percent significance) and a
0.9 percentage point lower probability of volunteering (1 percent significance).
Table 2.4, Panel B, shows the results for distinct sources of family non-intactness.
Although all correlation coefficients are negative for both explanatory variables,
only four of the ten estimates are precisely estimated. For instance, each additional
year with divorced parents is associated with a 1.2 percentage points reduction in
standard deviations of civic engagement (1 percent significance). According to the
Chow test, this effect is significantly different from the estimated coefficient on the
number of years having lived with parents outside marriage. Overall, the results in
Table 2.4 are in line with our hypothesis that adult civic engagement decreases with
the duration spent in a non-intact family during childhood.
2.5.2 Sibling Difference Analysis: Selection on Unobserv-
ables
Empirical model Our cross-sectional results cannot be readily interpreted as
causal. The major threat to causal identification in our setting is omitted variable
bias or selection bias. Reverse causality is arguably not the main concern for identi-
fication. Our outcomes are behavioral measures of adults, and these are not likely to
cause family dissolution during childhood. Furthermore, we controlled for selection
on observable characteristics in our pooled cross-sectional estimations to exclude the
main sources of selection bias. However, unobservable factors may still confound
the estimates. Parents who are likely to divorce may have different unobserved
preferences, values and abilities than parents who are unlikely to divorce. These
unobserved characteristics may in turn affect civic engagement of their offspring
later in life, confounding the negative correlation in our cross-sectional estimates.
We address this issue with sibling difference estimation (mother fixed-effects) of the
form
OUTCOMEijt =β0 + β1NONINTACTNESSij + β2xijt + ηjt + eijt,(2.6)
where ηjt, an unobserved effect for siblings, is added to equation (1) in order
to eliminate time-invariant unobserved background characteristics from mother j.
Sibling difference estimation eliminates all observed and unobserved time-constant
mother-specific factors which are assumed to be the same for siblings and which
might be associated with both family non-intactness and children’s civic engagement
later in life. Hence, the unobserved mother-specific error term ηjt cancels out
from our sibling difference regressions. The identifying assumption for unbiased
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Table 2.4: Duration of family non-intactness and civic engagement
(Cross-sectional estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Duration of family non-intactness -0.008** -0.001 -0.004* -0.002** -0.009**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel B
Duration: parents divorced -0.012** -0.001 -0.004+ -0.004** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Duration: born outside marriage -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.03 0.99 0.88 0.07 0.00
Person-year observations 18503 42913 40947 19738 19754
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column. Figures are marginal
effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the mean of all covariates. Panel
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as there are multiple
observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s highest educational
attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only child, birth order dummy variables, the number
of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables, survey
years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about political interest and
party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational
involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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sibling difference estimators is uncorrelatedness of sibling differences in family non-
intactness with sibling differences in unobserved individual characteristics.16 This is
a much weaker identifying assumption than imposed by the cross-sectional estimator
which needs family non-intactness and unobserved mother-specific factors to be
uncorrelated. We estimate sibling differences in the same observational year t, and
use mother level clustering for estimating standard errors to account for correlations
across siblings.
Other concerns for causal identification in sibling difference estimations are
inevitable age and birth order differences between siblings. Among children born
outside marriage, the affected child is always older and of lower birth order than
the compared and unaffected child. When estimating the effects of growing up with
divorced parents, the affected sibling is usually younger, and of higher birth order
than the unaffected child. Therefore, we add age and birth order fixed effects to the
sibling difference estimation that are likely to eliminate confounding variations from
these sources.
It is important to keep in mind that sibling difference estimates are identified
through adult siblings with differing family non-intactness during childhood years.
Hence, the sibling difference estimates may deviate from cross-sectional estimates
and require a different interpretation. First, sibling difference estimates are based on
a sibling sample, and only children are excluded from the sample. Second, sibling
differences occur only in particular situations. The individual affected by family
non-intactness during childhood is compared to a sibling who did not grow up in a
non-intact family. As they have the same mother, both siblings experience the event
of a non-intact family, but at different times in their lives. For instance, the younger
sibling might experience the divorce of his parents during childhood, at a point in
time when the older sibling was already an adult and had already moved out on her
own. If we assume that non-intactness has a negative effect on civic engagement,
even if it occurs when children are adults and no longer live at home, our estimates
can be regarded as lower bounds.
Sample description Identification of sibling difference estimation hinges on within-
sibling variation in family non-intactness during childhood and within-sibling vari-
ation in civic engagement. Table 2.5 summarizes the number of sibling pairs per
year with differences in both family non-intactness and civic outcome measures. We
can draw on over 1,000 sibling differences in family non-intactness when analyzing
political interest and party identification. This number drops just below 500 for the
outcomes organizational involvement and individual voluntarism. Within-sibling
differences in outcomes generally occur more often than differences in family non-
intactness. Table 2.5 also reports the number of observations when splitting the
16Recent studies using a similar estimation method are Ermisch and Francesconi (2012),
Currie et al. (2010) and Francesconi et al. (2010). Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) provide a
detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the sibling difference approach.
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sample by (i) gender; (ii) mother’s education and (iii) residential area. Note that,
for the majority of subsamples, we still have a comfortable number of differences in
family non-intactness, but in some cases the differences used for identification fall
below 200. Interpretation of results based on relatively small samples will be made
with caution.
Baseline results Sibling difference estimates of the effect of family non-intactness
on civic engagement are presented in Table 2.6. In the first column of Panel A, effects
on the civic engagement index are negative and statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level. Growing up in a non-intact family reduces civic engagement by 15.7 per-
cent in standard deviations. In Table 2.7 we report cross-sectional estimates within
the same sample as in the sibling difference estimation.17 We see that the effects of
the sibling difference estimation do not differ from the corresponding cross-sectional
point estimates. For the component outcome measures in the sibling difference
analysis, family non-intactness during childhood decreases the occurrence of political
interest by 9.4 percentage points, decreases identification with a democratic party by
7.7 percentage points, and decreases individual voluntarism by 8.1 percentage points.
These marginal effects are precisely estimated and statistically significant at the 5
percent level. We also find a negative effect in the magnitude of 2.8 percentage points
on organizational involvement, but we cannot statistically distinguish it from zero.
In sum, the sibling differences results support our findings from the cross-sectional
estimations. Therefore, the negative relationship between family non-intactness and
adult children’s civic engagement are unlikely to be entirely driven by unobserved
heterogeneity.18 Regarding the magnitude of effects on the component measures, the
sibling difference estimates compared to cross-sectional estimates are slightly larger
for political interest and party identification, but slightly smaller for organizational
involvement and individual voluntarism. As these differences vanish when estimating
the effect on the index of civic engagement, unobserved mother characteristics seem
not to be very influential. We conclude that there is not much negative selection
of low civic engagement families into non-intactness. However, the cross-sectional
results in the siblings sample are larger than the cross-sectional results in the full
sample which points to a somewhat stronger effect of family non-intactness in
families with more than one child.
Turning to the separate effects of the two sources of family non-intactness,
divorced parents and born outside marriage, reveals a similar picture. Effects of
divorced parents on the civic engagement index are minus 17.1 percent in standard
deviations (5 percent significance) and minus 13.3 percent in standard deviations for
17Note that due to the larger set of control variables in the cross-sectional estimate, we loose
some observations.
18Conditional logit marginal effects for the components assuming fixed effects of zero are shown
in Table B.2. Effects show the same negative sign but are less precisely measured.
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Table 2.5: Means of civic engagement measures and within-siblings variation
Political interest Party identification Organizational involvement Individual voluntarism
Number of sibling pairs Number of sibling pairs Number of sibling pairs Number of sibling pairs
with differences in: with differences in: with differences in: with differences in:
Family Family Family Family
Mean structurea Outcomeb Mean structurea Outcomeb Mean structurea Outcomeb Mean structurea Outcomeb
All 0.25 1027 3574 0.35 948 3330 0.08 481 654 0.33 480 1762
By genderc
Women 0.17 239 708 0.32 220 759 0.07 114 136 0.31 114 434
Men 0.32 310 1080 0.38 300 975 0.09 152 198 0.36 151 518
By mothers education
Less than high
0.23 832 2822 0.34 777 2732 0.07 393 532 0.33 392 1466
school degree
High school or
0.31 165 740 0.40 158 590 0.08 83 122 0.36 83 292
university degree
By residential area:
Rural 0.20 249 768 0.30 241 792 0.09 117 164 0.38 118 463
Urban 0.26 529 1586 0.20 506 1420 0.07 253 265 0.30 252 711
Notes:
a The number of sibling pairs with differences in the experience of family structure during childhood, e.g. one sibling grew up in a non-intact family and the
other sibling in an intact family. b The number of sibling pairs with differences in the political outcome measure. c Both siblings of the same sex.
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Table 2.6: Family non-intactness and civic engagement
(Sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Ever lived in a non-intact family -0.157** -0.094** -0.077* -0.028 -0.081*
(0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.018) (0.040)
Panel B
Parents divorced -0.171* -0.048 -0.069 -0.040+ -0.101+
(0.082) (0.051) (0.052) (0.022) (0.058)
Born outside marriage -0.133* -0.126** -0.066 -0.018 -0.037
(0.056) (0.043) (0.042) (0.021) (0.047)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.70 0.25 0.96 0.48 0.40
Person-year observations 8892 20613 19679 9445 9448
Number of sibling-year pairs 4423 9751 9663 4478 4479
Birth order FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column. Results are sibling-
difference estimates at same survey time. Estimates from linear fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on mother’s identification number, as there are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other explana-
tory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at the child’s birth, birth order dummy variables, the number of
years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, and a constant. The information about
political interest and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively.
For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years
1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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Table 2.7: Family non-intactness and civic engagement
(Cross-sectional estimates in sibling sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Ever lived in a non-intact family -0.157** -0.052** -0.067** -0.038** -0.121**
(0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.007) (0.019)
Panel B
Parents divorced -0.150** -0.036+ -0.037 -0.044** -0.134**
(0.029) (0.021) (0.025) (0.007) (0.020)
Born outside marriage -0.134** -0.074** -0.102** -0.014 -0.060+
(0.040) (0.023) (0.032) (0.013) (0.032)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.74 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.05
Person-year observations 8,873 20,560 19,612 9,409 9,425
Notes: Results from the same sample as in for the sibling difference approach. Observations with missing information in cross-
sectional control variables are dropped. Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that
column. Figures are marginal effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the mean of
all covariates. Panel robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as
there are multiple observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s
highest educational attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only child, birth order dummy
variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy
variables, survey years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about
political interest and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively.
For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years
1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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children born outside marriage (5 percent significance).19 The estimated effects on
the component outcome measures are all negative, but only three point estimates
are precisely estimated. The sibling difference estimates are again close to the cross-
sectional estimates in Table 2.7. The effect of divorced parents on civic engagement is
slightly larger in the sibling difference estimation (-0.171) than in the cross-sectional
estimation (-0.150), but overall differences are moderate.
Duration of family non-intactness We show estimates of the sibling difference
model with duration of family non-intactness as explanatory variable in Table 2.8.
In Panel A, we find a negative effect of each additional year in a non-intact family
on civic engagement of 2.4 percent in standard deviations (5 percent significance).
According to this point estimate, having had spent half of childhood (8 years) in a
non-intact family decreases civic engagement by 19.2 percent. For the component
measures, we find negative significant effects of the duration of family non-intactness
on party identification (1 percent significance). The estimated effects on political
interest, political participation and civic engagement are all negative, but imprecisely
estimated. Compared to the cross-sectional estimates in Table 2.9 within the same
sample the sibling difference estimates are somewhat larger in magnitude. In the
cross-sectional estimation the association of civic engagement and duration of family
non-intactness is only minus 1.3 percent. Thus, mother specific factors seem to play
a larger role here.
When turning to Panel B and distinguishing the sources of family non-intactness,
the experience of parental divorce shows a slightly larger negative effect of 2.7
percent in standard deviations on the civic engagement index (5 percent significance)
than being born outside marriage. The estimated coefficient of minus 1.9 for the
explanatory variable born outside marriage is not precisely estimated, and not sta-
tistically distinguishable from the estimated effect on the variable parents divorced.
Moreover, we find significant negative effects of growing up with divorced parents
on adult children’s party identification and organizational involvement (5 percent
significance). Being born outside marriage is estimated to have negative significant
effects on political interest (1 percent significance) and party identification (5 percent
significance). By and large, the results for family non-intactness duration resemble
the effects found for the occurrence of non-intactness. Furthermore, the estimates
are consistent with our theory.
Sibling differences—Robustness Comparison of siblings who both experienced
a very similar family background during childhood may raise some concerns. On
the one hand, it is a prerequisite for our identification strategy to have very similar
backgrounds of compared siblings. This is essential to exclude family omitted
19Note that these two point estimates are not different from each other at conventional
significance levels.
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Table 2.8: Duration of family non-intactness and civic engagement
(Sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Duration of family non-intactness -0.024* -0.011 -0.026** -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
Panel B
Duration: parents divorced -0.027* 0.004 -0.024* -0.007* -0.010
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011)
Duration: born outside marriage -0.019 -0.039** -0.024* 0.004 0.008
(0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.015)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.71 0.00 0.98 0.14 0.34
Person-year observations 8892 20613 19679 9445 9448
Number of sibling-year pairs 4423 9751 9663 4478 4479
Birth order FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column. Results are sibling-
difference estimates at same survey time. Estimates from linear fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on mother’s identification number, as there are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other explana-
tory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at the child’s birth, birth order dummy variables, the number of
years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, and a constant. The information about
political interest and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively.
For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years
1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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Table 2.9: Duration of family non-intactness and civic engagement
(Cross-sectional estimates in sibling sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Duration of family non-intactness -0.013** -0.006* -0.007* -0.002+ -0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Panel B
Duration: parents divorced -0.015** -0.003 -0.003 -0.006** -0.020**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Duration: born outside marriage -0.011* -0.013** -0.015** 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00
Person-year observations 8,873 20,560 19,612 9,409 9,425
Notes: Results from the same sample as in for the sibling difference approach. Observations with missing information in cross-
sectional control variables are dropped. Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that
column. Figures are marginal effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the mean of
all covariates. Panel robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as
there are multiple observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s
highest educational attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only child, birth order dummy
variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy
variables, survey years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about
political interest and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively.
For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years
1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
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variable bias. On the other hand, if siblings are born within a very small time span,
small differences in age between the siblings will likely bias our results downwards,
because both siblings will be affected almost identically. This might result in under-
estimating the effect of family non-intactness. As a robustness check, we estimate
the intergenerational effects for a smaller sample of siblings who are born more than
two years apart. In fact, the estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude and more
precisely estimated than the sibling difference estimates in Table 2.6. The results
from this exercise support our main finding that growing up in a non-intact family
seems to have negative and long-lasting influences on children’s civic engagement.
Results can be found in the Appendix in Table B.6.
2.5.3 Assessing Omitted Variable Bias
In the cross-sectional estimations we dealt with bias from observable characteristics,
in the sibling difference estimations we took care of unobservable mother-specific
characteristics. Yet, bias from unobserved time-varying or individual heterogeneity
could still be a threat to identification if it confounds the estimates. Here, we
ought to assess whether omitted variable bias is a serious threat to our results. We
take up on an approach from Bellows and Miguel (2009) to quantify how strong
the covariance of unobserved factors with the variable of interest would have to be
relative to the covariance of control variables with the variable of interest in order to
explain away the entire estimated effect.20 The intuition is that our controls capture
many sources of selection into family non-intactness and that it is unlikely that we
omit factors which are correlated many times stronger than that. We explore the
importance of omitted variable bias for both cross-sectional and sibling differences
results, both in the siblings sample. We denote omitted factors as q˜ = η + ν, with
q˜ being omitted factors in cross-sectional estimation and ν being omitted factors in
sibling differences estimation after accounting for mother fixed-effects η. Derivation
of the estimators and underlying assumptions are explained in detail in the appendix.
In the first row of Table 2.10, we see that the covariance between family non-
intactness and unobservable factors (Cov(N, q˜)) has to be 3.489 times as strong as
the covariance between family non-intactness and the observed control variables in
order to explain away our cross-sectional estimate for civic engagement. Although it
is arbitrary to compare absolute numbers across different setups, Bellows and Miguel
(2009) argue that factors above three or above five would be sufficient to believe that
bias cannot be fully confounding. In the second row of Table 2.10, we see that the
factor for the sibling difference estimate is 3.532. It means that the covariance of
between family non-intactness and unobserved individual and time-varying factors
(Cov(N, ν)) must be 3.532 times as strong as the covariance between family non-
intactness and observable controls including mother fixed-effects to explain away
20A related approach by Altonji et al. (2005) assumes that the selection on observables is the
same as the selection on unobservables in order to estimate the bias.
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Table 2.10: Bias assessment of estimates
(Sibling sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A:
Non-Intactness
Cross-sectional: Cov(N,q˜)
Cov(N,X′β)
3.489 5.487 2.258 n.a. 5.806
Sibling differences: Cov(N,ν)
Cov(N,X′β+η)
3.532 n.a. 13.726 2.491 1.527
Panel B:
Divorce
Cross-sectional: Cov(N,q˜)
Cov(N,X′β)
3.297 1.568 1.175 n.a. 9.626
Sibling differences: Cov(N,ν)
Cov(N,X′β+η)
7.039 15.637 n.a. 6.093 2.524
Born outside marriage
Cross-sectional: Cov(N,q˜)
Cov(N,X′β)
2.475 n.a. 3.367 2.638 1.219
Sibling differences: Cov(N,ν)
Cov(N,X′β+η)
2.474 n.a. 1.298 n.a. 0.610
Notes: The factors denote how many times larger the covariance between the variable of interest and unobserved factors would
have to be to explain away the entire effect compared to the covariance of the variable of interest and observed controls. N.a.
denotes that the bias is not confounding, i.e. that it operates in the opposite direction as the estimated effect. All estimates
are undertaken in the siblings sample as OLS estimations. Control variables in the cross-sectional estimations are years of age
dummy variables, sex, mother’s highest educational attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is
an only child, birth order dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the
respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables, survey years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples,
and a constant. Control variables in the sibling differences estimations are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at
the child’s birth, birth order dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during
the respondent’s childhood, and a constant.
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the entire sibling differences estimate for civic engagement. Unobserved factors left
in the sibling difference estimation and in the cross-sectional estimation are thus
unlikely to explain the entire effect of family non-intactness on civic engagement.
Turning to Panel B and divorce as the explanatory variable, we find a factor of
3.297 for the cross-sectional estimate on civic engagement. For the sibling difference
estimate we find a larger factor of 7.039. Confounding variation to explain away the
entire effect of divorce during childhood on civic engagement is therefore very un-
likely in the sibling difference estimation. By excluding unobserved mother-specific
factors, we gain confidence in the unbiasedness of the estimates.
For effects of born outside marriage the cross-sectional factor is only 2.475, the
sibling difference factor is 2.474. With these comparatively low factors we cannot
be as confident that the results are not driven by unobserved factors.
We can conclude for the civic engagement index results that the sibling differ-
ence estimates are a serious improvement compared to the cross-sectional estimates.
Among the sibling difference estimates the most robust and therefore trustworthy
estimates seem to be those for divorce during childhood. The bias assessment
supports the view to understand the estimates as causal effects.
Turning to the disaggregated components of civic engagement in columns (2)
to (5) in Table 2.10, we see rather mixed results. The most credible results according
to the bias factors are again the estimates of divorce during childhood from sibling
difference estimations. In some instances, when the suggested bias works in the
opposite direction than the estimated effect, we do not report the non-interpretable
factor.
2.5.4 Effect Heterogeneity
We have seen substantial effects of family non-intactness on civic engagement later
in life. These effects may not be universally relevant for different groups of the
population, and effect heterogeneity may arise for a variety of reasons. For instance,
when thinking about the effect of family non-intactness during childhood on civic
engagement, we have in mind certain modes of nurturing that might have adverse
consequences for children’s development. In the majority of families, non-intactness
implies an absent father, and daughters and sons might therefore be affected differ-
ently by growing up in a non-intact family.21 In pooled cross-sectional regressions,
we did not find clear heterogeneous effects of non-intactness by gender. However,
in the sibling difference estimations, we found negative and statistically significant
effects for men only, and the magnitude of the effects of growing up in a non-intact
family was larger for men than for women in most regressions.
21Note that we cannot actually distinguish effects of missing fathers and missing mothers as
there are too few observed lone fathers.
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Nurturing capacity or the effectiveness of parenting may as well produce het-
erogeneous effects of family non-intactness. In the case of missing fathers, mothers
with higher capacity should be more able to compensate for the potential loss of
paternal involvement in their children’s development. On the other hand, highly
educated women are likely to be married to highly educated men, and the absence
of highly educated fathers might be more deleterious for children. We therefore
distinguish between adult children with highly educated mothers (completed upper
secondary school or university degree), and those with lower educated mothers.
Overall, the results did not point to substantial differences in the effects of family
non-intactness by mother’s education.
Putnam (2000) notes that social connectedness among inhabitants of densely
populated urban areas is weaker than in smaller communities. This sense of con-
nectedness and familiarity in everyday interactions makes it more rewarding to be
engaged in public life and activities. The vastly different prospects for civic engage-
ment between rural and urban residential areas may also produce heterogeneous
effects of family non-intactness. However, distinguishing between individuals who
grew up in urban and rural areas did not point to heterogeneous effects.22
In sum, the effect of family non-intactness on civic engagement later in life is
not restricted to either males or females, children of low or highly educated mothers,
or rural or urban residential areas. We find some indication of more severe effects for
boys and slightly weaker effects for girls. Due to the low precision of some estimates,
there remains some uncertainty about the nature of heterogeneities. However, the
overall phenomenon of adverse effects of non-intact families during childhood on
civic engagement seems to be strikingly universal.23
2.6 Final Remarks
With the nuclear family gradually declining as the dominant social unit in con-
temporary society, effects of family non-intactness are non-negligible. Democracies
depend on an active and informed community: waning civic engagement should
therefore be taken seriously. In this research paper, we find robust evidence of a
causal link of growing up in a non-intact family on civic disengagement later in life.
It is especially disturbing that this effect does not seem to be restricted to certain
groups defined by socio-demographic measures but rather constitutes a universal
phenomenon. The question remains whether these are lasting disruptions or rather
short-term consequences of broader social changes and adjustments to more diverse
ways of life. Future research should therefore find ways to disentangle the effects
22We also examined another potential source of heterogeneity: the age of the child at the time
of parents’ divorce. Again, our results did not point to important heterogeneous effects.
23Results can be seen in the appendix in Tables B.3, B.4 and B.5
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of family non-intactness regarding the channel of emotional stress and stigma or
acceptance.
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Appendix B
B.1 Supplementary Material on how to Approximate the
Importance of Omitted Variable Bias
We ought to assess how strong the relation to omitted variables would have to
be to explain away our estimates of interest from the cross-section and the sibling
difference. We follow the approach in Bellows and Miguel (2009) and extend it to
the inclusion of fixed effects.
Abstaining from person and time indices, our model can be characterized by
(2.7) Y = αN + γq + ǫ,
where Y is the outcome, N is family non-intactness, α is the estimate of interest and
q is an unobserved index of characteristics. The unobserved index is a determinant
of selection into non-intactness and, if left out of the estimation as in
(2.8) Y = αN + ǫ,
leads to standard omitted variable bias in OLS estimates with no control variables
as in
(2.9) plim αˆOLS,no = α0 + γ
Cov(N, q)
V ar(N)
.
Then we observe control variables X that are related to the selection index q
as in
(2.10) q = X ′β + q˜,
with q˜ being the unobserved component of q. Further assume that controls X are
only related to non-intactness N through q, which implies that the control variables
are exogenous and that the unobserved components are uncorrelated with controls
X. We also assume that the impact of the selection on observable factors is equal
to the impact of selection on unobservable factors. Now, we estimate the equation
including controls
(2.11) Y = αN +X ′β + ǫ.
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The new probability limit of the estimate of interest then is
(2.12) plim αˆOLS,con = α0 + γ
Cov(N, q˜)
V ar(N)
.
By taking the difference of the two estimates we get an the identifiable expres-
sion
(2.13) αˆOLS,no − αˆOLS,con = γ
Cov(N,X ′β)
V ar(N)
.
The included controls X do not perfectly resemble the selection index q. Un-
observed heterogeneity in q˜ can still induce bias in the estimate of interest. Without
being able to compute bias by unobservables, we would like to assess how strong
the covariance between N and q˜ must be to explain away the entire effect found for
the estimate of interest after controlling for X. We can express this covariance as a
fraction of covariance between N and the control variables. The effect is explained
away if α0 = 0. Assuming this yields
(2.14)
αˆOLS,con
αˆOLS,no − αˆOLS,con
=
Cov(N, q˜)
Cov(N,X ′β)
.
This fraction of estimates from different regressions then denotes how strong
the covariance between family non-intactness and unobserved factors q˜ relative to the
covariance of family non-intactness N and the control variables has to be to explain
away the entire effect. The larger this fraction is, the more unlikely it is that unob-
served factors are fully confounding our estimate. This is the Bellows and Miguel
(2009) result and we extend it to fixed-effects in the following.
Assume now that unobserved factors q˜ are the sum of mother (or sibling pair)
fixed-effects and other unobserved factors that are individual-specific, such that
(2.15) q = X ′β + q˜ = X ′β + η + ν,
with η being the mother fixed-effect and ν other unobserved factors. The fixed-effects
model is denoted by
(2.16) Y = αN +X ′β + η + ν.
We cannot get consistent estimates of η due to the incidental parameter prob-
lem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). As a thought experiment, assume for now that we
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can get consistent estimates. Then, we would get an estimate of interest according
to
(2.17) plim αˆOLS,η,con = α0 + γ
Cov(N, ν)
V ar(N)
.
The difference to a simple estimate without control variables is given by
αˆOLS,no − αˆOLS,η,con = γ
Cov(N,X ′β) + Cov(N, η) + Cov(N, ν)
V ar(N)
− γ
Cov(N, ν)
V ar(N)
= γ
Cov(N,X ′β) + Cov(N, η)
V ar(N)
.
(2.18)
If we again assume α0 = 0, we get the following expression
(2.19)
αˆOLS,η,con
αˆOLS,no − αˆOLS,η,con
=
Cov(N, ν)
Cov(N,X ′β) + Cov(N, η)
.
This fraction tells us how large the covariance between family non-intactness
and individual specific unobserved factors has to be relative to the covariance be-
tween family non-intactness and observable controls including mother fixed-effects.
As Borghans et al. (2008) show in an appendix, bias in sibling difference
models with siblings i and j has to be evaluated by characterizing the estimation
equation as
(2.20) Yi − Yj = α(Ni −Nj) + (X
′
i −X
′
j)β + (η − η) + (νi − νj).
We can assume that V ar(Ni) = V ar(Nj), Cov(Ni, νj) = Cov(Nj, νi) and
Cov(Ni, νi) = Cov(Nj, νj). The estimate of interest then has the following property
(2.21)
plim αˆSD,η,con = α0 + γ
Cov(Ni −Nj, (νi − νj))
V ar(Ni −Nj)
= α0 + γ
Cov(Ni, νi)− Cov(Ni, νj)
V ar(Ni)− Cov(Ni, Nj)
.
By assuming that
(2.22)
Cov(Ni, νj)
Cov(Ni, Nj)
=
Cov(Ni, νi)
V ar(Ni)
.
we get as an approximation the known expression for
(2.23)
αˆSD,η,con
αˆOLS,no − αˆSD,η,con
=
Cov(N, ν)
Cov(N,X ′β) + Cov(N, η)
=
αˆOLS,η,con
αˆOLS,no − αˆOLS,η,con
.
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B.2 Supplementary Tables
B. 77
Table B.1: Childhood family structure and voting intention
(Cross-sectional and sibling difference estimates)
Dependent variable: Voting intention
Regression model: Cross-section Sibling difference
Panel A
Ever lived in a non-intact family -0.072** 0.041
(0.022) (0.066)
Panel B
Parents divorced -0.074** 0.094
(0.025) (0.090)
Born outside marriage -0.060+ 0.009
(0.031) (0.077)
Person-year observations 5006 2648
Number of sibling-year pairs 1313
Birth order FE Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression of vot-
ing intention. Cross-section figures are marginal effects from probit regressions
evaluated at the mean of all covariates. Panel robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as
there are multiple observations per person over time. Sibling difference figures
are sibling difference estimates at same survey time from linear fixed-effects
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
on mother’s identification number. Other explanatory variables according to
the other cross-sectional and sibling difference estimation approaches. The in-
formation about voting intention is asked in survey years 2005 and 2009. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
78 CHAPTER2: Political Socialization in Flux?
Table B.2: Conditional logit
(Sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Political Party Organizational Individual
interest identification involvement voluntarism
Marginal Effects, assuming
fixed effect of zero (Ever
lived in a non-intact family)
Average -0.037 -0.074 -0.066 -0.120+
(0.056) (0.054) (0.111) (0.066)
Male
18 years old -0.100 -0.053 -0.011 -0.126*
(0.096) (0.052) (0.022) (0.063)
23 years old -0.100 -0.060 -0.015 -0.125*
(0.084) (0.053) (0.031) (0.061)
28 years old -0.083 -0.071 -0.017 -0.114+
(0.080) (0.056) (0.036) (0.068)
Female
18 years old -0.050 -0.061 -0.009 -0.126*
(0.080) (0.056) (0.019) (0.061)
23 years old -0.049 -0.068 -0.013 -0.122+
(0.066) (0.056) (0.028) (0.063)
28 years old -0.038 -0.078 -0.014 -0.105
(0.051) (0.055) (0.032) (0.071)
Person-year observations 6910 6407 1246 3419
Number of sibling-year pairs 3129 2916 552 1531
Birth order FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that
column. Sibling difference estimates at same survey time. Estimates from conditional logit models.
Conditional logit can only estimate for the subsample of changers in the outcome variable, which re-
duces sample size. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on mother’s
identification number, as there are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other explanatory variables
are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at the child’s birth, birth order dummy variables,
the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s child-
hood, and a constant. The information about political interest and party identification is derived from
questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involve-
ment and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years
1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
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Table B.3: Heterogeneity analysis
(Cross-sectional estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A: By gender
Women -0.129** -0.012 -0.058** -0.033** -0.079**
(0.025) (0.014) (0.019) (0.005) (0.016)
N 9117 21352 20211 9704 9811
Men -0.083** -0.013 -0.022 -0.016+ -0.096**
-0.028 (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019)
N 9386 21563 20736 9893 9935
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.44 0.87 0.15 0.01 0.71
Panel B: By mother’s education
Less than high -0.117** -0.013 -0.039* -0.027** -0.101**
school degree (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014)
N 15274 35523 33863 16326 16341
High school or -0.055 -0.018 -0.045 -0.025* -0.037
university degree (0.041) (0.033) (0.032) (0.012) (0.029)
N 3229 7381 7070 3365 3412
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.30 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.03
Panel C: By residential area
Rural -0.133** -0.002 -0.044+ -0.035** -0.133**
(0.035) (0.022) (0.026) (0.010) (0.028)
N 4595 10648 10260 4746 4899
Urban -0.072** -0.017 -0.032+ -0.016* -0.048**
(0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007) (0.016)
N 9328 21126 20457 9812 9841
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.15 0.67 0.66 0.17 0.02
Notes: Each estimate represents a regression result for the outcome listed in that column on ever lived in
a non-intact family. Rows denote different samples. Figures are marginal effects from OLS [(1)] or probit
[(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the mean of all covariates. Panel robust standard
errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as there are multiple
observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s
highest educational attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth, whether the respondent is an only child,
birth order dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the
respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables, survey years dummy variables, east Germany, indicators of
SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about political interest and party identification is derived from
questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involvement and
individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1) Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients between the two samples can be distinguished
statistically in a chow test. Equality of coefficients, not marginal effects, means that the effect would be of equal
size had the two sample populations equal characteristics.
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Table B.4: Heterogeneity analysis
(Sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A: By gender
Women -0.034 -0.074 0.022 -0.021 0.001
(0.082) (0.060) (0.084) (0.033) (0.077)
N 4378 10230 9704 4685 4685
Men -0.293** -0.070 -0.153** -0.054+ -0.202*
(0.091) (0.052) (0.052) (0.028) (0.080)
N 4514 10383 9975 4760 4763
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.03 0.96 0.08 0.44 0.07
Panel B: By mother’s education
Less than high -0.134* -0.068+ -0.060 -0.026 -0.065
school degree (0.056) (0.039) (0.042) (0.021) (0.045)
N 7348 17120 16298 7822 7825
High school or -0.319+ -0.270* -0.174+ -0.058 -0.166
university degree (0.194) (0.128) (0.102) (0.050) (0.134)
N 1525 3442 3334 1601 1601
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.54 0.47
Panel C: By residential area
Rural -0.173 -0.080 -0.112 -0.037 -0.114
(0.108) (0.074) (0.074) (0.037) (0.085)
N 2245 5234 5027 2380 2387
Urban -0.088 -0.040 -0.062 -0.024 -0.068
(0.077) (0.052) (0.065) (0.025) (0.061)
N 4143 9375 9121 4338 4333
Equality of coefficients
(p-value)1) 0.55 0.75 0.63 0.76 0.66
Notes: Each estimate represents a regression result for the outcome listed in that column on ever lived in
a non-intact family. Rows denote different samples. Results are sibling difference estimates at same survey
time. Estimates from linear fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered on mother’s identification number, as there are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other
explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at the child’s birth, birth order
dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s
childhood, and a constant. The information about political interest and party identification is derived from
questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involvement and
individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1% level.
1) Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the estimates for family non-intactness differ between the groups
in a regression of a fully interacted model. We report p-values of the interactions with the variable of interest.
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Table B.5: Heterogeneity—Age at parents’ divorce
(Cross-sectional and sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A: Cross-sectional estimates
Parents divorced at ages:
0-5 years -0.133** -0.027 -0.035 -0.025** -0.111**
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.009) (0.021)
6-10 years -0.102** -0.006 -0.022 -0.029** -0.102**
(0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.008) (0.021)
11-16 years -0.065* -0.005 -0.010 -0.022** -0.073**
(0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.007) (0.020)
Person-year
observations 18503 42913 40947 19738 19754
Panel B: Sibling difference estimates
Parents divorced at ages:
0-5 years -0.178* -0.001 -0.102+ -0.033+ -0.035
(0.090) (0.053) (0.056) (0.019) (0.064)
6-10 years -0.154+ -0.026 -0.076 -0.042+ -0.076
(0.086) (0.070) (0.066) (0.024) (0.075)
11-16 years -0.138 -0.042 -0.010 -0.040 -0.135*
(0.087) (0.057) (0.063) (0.025) (0.062)
Person-year
observations 8873 20562 19632 9423 9426
Number of
sibling-year pairs 4417 9739 9649 4473 4474
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column.
In Panel A, figures are marginal effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects
are evaluated at the mean of all covariates. Panel robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered on individuals’ identification numbers, as there are multiple observations per person over time. In
Panel B, results are sibling difference estimates at same survey time. Estimates from linear fixed-effects models.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on mother’s identification number, as there
are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other explanatory variables according to the other cross-sectional
and sibling difference estimations. The information about political interest and party identification is derived
from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involvement
and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985, 1986,
1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1% level.
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Table B.6: Robustness—Siblings more than two years apart
(Sibling difference estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Panel A
Ever lived in a non-intact family -0.200** -0.092* -0.131** -0.033+ -0.102*
(0.060) (0.042) (0.034) (0.020) (0.044)
Panel B
Parents divorced -0.236** -0.054 -0.123* -0.058* -0.140*
(0.086) (0.060) (0.053) (0.026) (0.057)
Born outside marriage -0.153* -0.138** -0.113** -0.010 -0.028
(0.070) (0.049) (0.037) (0.023) (0.057)
Equality of coefficients (p-value)1) 0.45 0.29 0.88 0.18 0.17
Person-year observations 5708 13233 12676 6039 6042
Number of sibling-year pairs 2702 5984 5941 2729 2729
Birth order FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column. Results are sibling
difference estimates at same survey time. Estimates from linear fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on mother’s identification number, as there are multiple observations for sibling pairs. Other
explanatory variables are years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s age at the child’s birth, birth order dummy variables,
the number of years of maternal part-time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, and a constant. The
information about political interest and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and
1984-2009, respectively. For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions
asked in the survey years 1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
1)Test for equality of coefficients tests whether the coefficients for parents divorced and born outside marriage from the same
regression can be distinguished statistically in a chow test. We report p-values for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.
B. 83
Table B.7: Baseline full estimation table
(Cross-sectional estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
Index of civic Political Party Organizational Individual
engagement interest identification involvement voluntarism
Female -0.196** -0.164** -0.071** -0.026** -0.060**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
Mother’s highest educational attainment
Intermediate school 0.150** 0.117** 0.077** 0.009** 0.050**
(0.020) (0.033) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013)
High School 0.222** 0.127** 0.122** 0.032* 0.015**
(0.048) (0.033) (0.033) (0.019) (0.035)
Technical college or 0.314** 0.214** 0.205** 0.042** 0.106**
university degree (0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019)
Mother’s age at birth 0.008** 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Only child -0.044 -0.004 -0.028 -0.007 -0.050**
(0.028) (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.018)
Birth order
Second child -0.087** -0.050** -0.044** -0.000 -0.022
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013)
Third child -0.122** -0.062** -0.072** 0.004 -0.041*
(0.030) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019)
East Germany 0.006 0.035 0.048 -0.050* -0.006
(0.073) (0.046) (0.054) (0.020) (0.054)
Mother’s employment during childhood years
Number of years 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
part-time employed (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of years -0.003* -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004**
full-time employed (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Ever lived in a 0.104** -0.013 -0.041** -0.027** -0.088**
non-intact family (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013)
Person-year obs. 18503 42913 40947 19738 19754
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a regression for the outcome listed in that column.
Figures are marginal effects from OLS [(1)] or probit [(2),(3),(4),(5)] regressions. Probit effects are evaluated at the
mean of all covariates. Panel robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on individuals’
identification numbers, as there are multiple observations per person over time. Other explanatory variables are
years of age dummy variables, sex, mother’s highest educational attainment, mother’s age at the child’s birth,
whether the respondent is an only child, birth order dummy variables, the number of years of maternal part-
time and full-time employment during the respondent’s childhood, regional dummy variables, survey years dummy
variables, east Germany, indicators of SOEP-samples, and a constant. The information about political interest
and party identification is derived from questions asked in the survey years 1985-2009 and 1984-2009, respectively.
For organizational involvement and individual voluntarism, we use information derived from questions asked in the
survey years 1985, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. + significant at 10%; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% level.
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Chapter 3
Labeling Effects – How Child
Benefits Affect Consumption and
Savings
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3.1 Introduction
A basic principle from microeconomics says: income is treated as fungible. Fungi-
bility of income implies that type and source of income do not affect its use. Put
differently, there cannot be compositional effects of income on expenditure. However,
this may not always be the case. Indeed, a recent body of work has found contra-
dictory evidence of labeling effects. For example, Abeler and Marklein (2010) show
that non-distortionary beverage vouchers increase beverage consumption simply due
to the attached label. This means that how much individuals spend on particular
goods can be influenced by changing the characteristics of income without changing
its amount. It is easy to see the potential benefit for welfare programs and other
government interventions. Labeling cash payments is virtually costless and could
be used to encourage a desirable use of resources. Countries struggling with low
private savings rates may label parts of the income or tax benefits as savings cash
before applying administratively costly measures. On the other hand, unwittingly
labeled payments may distort decisions in an undesirable manner.
A natural candidate for labeling are family policies. In many countries, promi-
nent family assistance measures wear labels related to children (e.g., Child Tax
Credit (CTC) in the United States, Child Benefit (CB) and Children’s Tax Credit
(CTC) in the United Kingdom, and Child Benefits (Kindergeld) in Germany).
One thing these programs have in common is the intention to mitigate financial
constraints of families and prevent child poverty. A labeling effect would shift
consumption disproportionately towards child goods on top of the pure budgetary
effect.
In this paper, we exploit a policy reform to estimate how labeling of child
benefits affects child-related consumption and savings. Between 1978 and 1983
German child benefits were expanded for third children and to some extend for
second children but remained constant for first children. This allows us to define a
control group of families with one child and apply difference-in-differences estimation
methods. Thus, we can eliminate confounding variation over time that is common
to all families. The rationale of the estimation is that child benefits should be
used just as any other income if there was no labeling effect. Therefore, after we
control for total disposable income, the treatment is a change in the composition
of income with child benefits taking a larger fraction. Only if labeling effects exist,
there should be a reaction in consumption patterns. In the German Income and
Expenditure Survey (EVS), we identify one assignable child good and two assignable
adult goods in repeated household cross-sections. We also argue that a specific form
of building loan contracts can be considered as child-specific savings. We can confirm
the plausibility of this assumption based on robustness tests with tenant status and
flat size. Potentially, savings are a more important means of child well-being in the
long-run compared to contemporaneous consumption. To our knowledge, savings
have not been investigated in studies of labeling effects until now.
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In the empirical analysis, we find positive effects of the child benefits reform
on the child good toys. However, these effects are not robust to the inclusion of
important control variables and thus we find no labeling effect on toys. There is
no robust evidence of a labeling effect on adult good consumption either. Yet,
there is a robust labeling effect of child benefits on child-specific savings. With
a treatment of about 1,000 DEM (500 EUR) per year, the probability to hold
a building loan contract increases by 4 percentage points and the average value
of building loan savings increases by 13 percent due to a labeling effect of child
benefits. With respect to the heterogeneity of the effect it turns out that the
result for savings is largely driven by better-off households. The results are robust
to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Additional tests with placebo
expenditure confirm the validity of our estimation methods. The effects seem not to
be confounded by intra-household bargaining either, which we test with a particular
payment scheme for civil servants. Our difference-in-differences estimation relies
heavily on the common trend assumption and the control of household income. We
carefully investigate the credibility of the underlying assumptions by including age
and income controls as well as applying an alternative relative trend assumption
using a difference-in-relative-differences estimation. It seems that the estimated
effects are causal, although we can never rule out completely that the treatment
and the control group differ systematically over time in expenditure behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss the labeling
effects literature in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe the empirical approach
and continue with a description of the data in Section 3.4. We report results and
various robustness checks in Section 3.5. We conclude the analysis in Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature on Labeling Effects
The theory of labeling effects has its roots in insights from behavioral economics
posited to explain anomalies in observed decision outcomes. According to standard
microeconomic theory, rational individuals spend their income according to utility
maximization irrespective of the income’s sources. There are no compositional
effects of income sources on expenditure decisions as income is assumed to be
fungible, i.e., all marginal propensities to consume out of different income sources
are the same. This framework often fails to correctly predict actual behavior as
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Thaler (1980) show in their seminal papers
on prospect theory and bounded rationality. A model explaining behavior more
accurately is the mental accounts framework by Thaler (1990). The idea is that
individuals categorize their income depending on the type and reserve it for special
purposes. Transferred to our research question, we may call this a labeling effects
framework. It implies that, for example, the labeled child benefits are spend mostly
on child goods, whereas other income is distributed to all expenditure. Formally,
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the marginal propensity to consume child goods out of child benefits is larger than
the marginal propensity to consume child goods out of any other income.
Existing empirical literature on labeling effects of child benefits is scarce and
somewhat inconclusive. The usual procedure in this literature is to estimate marginal
propensities to consume assignable goods out of child benefits in comparison to reg-
ular income, where assignable goods are mutually exclusively consumed by children
or parents. There is some evidence of positive labeling effects of child benefits on
consumption of children’s clothes in Dutch data (Kooreman, 2000), although no
such effect is found in the United Kingdom, where even an unexpected positive
effect on adult clothing is found (Blow et al., 2012). Alcohol and tobacco, which
are assignable to parents, are found to be positively affected by child benefits in one
study (Blow et al., 2012), but not in another (Edmonds, 2002). Overall expenditure
on clothing (Edmonds, 2002), and food (Edmonds, 2002; Blow et al., 2012) is found
to be unaffected by labeling.
Evidence in the literature is broadly concerned with the same subject matter,
but these studies differ substantially in methodology. Kooreman (2000) evaluates
the labeling effect of Dutch child benefits by using repeated cross-sections and
one change in child benefits between over and under 6 year olds over time to
identify marginal propensities to consume child goods. His approach relies on the
identifying assumption that consumption for younger children stays proportional to
consumption for older children over time. In contrast, Edmonds (2002) identifies the
effect of means-tested Slovenian child benefits by income variation in the previous
year. The assumption of no direct effect of previous income on contemporary
consumption is crucial to this study. Also, Edmonds (2002) does not use assignable
clothing as a dependent variable, but overall clothing expenditure, which is less
suitable in studying labeling effects as the composition of expenditures could be
altered in favor of children’s clothes. Blow et al. (2012) draws on unanticipated
benefit changes by using inflation- (anticipated) and reform-driven (unanticipated)
variation in child benefits over time. They interpret their finding as children being
insured against income shocks so that unanticipated income gains do not need to be
invested in children’s welfare. The UK Child Benefit was given to the mother, which
makes it difficult to distinguish the child benefit labeling effect from a distributional
effect,1 but the authors overcome this problem by validating their results for lone
parents, where there cannot be distributional effects. Lyssiotou (2009) shows some
positive effects of Cypriote child benefits on child goods in a difference-in-differences
framework only if the mother receives the payments, which means that the effect
cannot be distinguished between a labeling and a distributional preference-driven
effect.
1Lundberg et al. (1997) shows that targeting child benefits to the mother leads to higher
expenditure for children’s clothes due to the mother’s increased bargaining power.
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The literature on labeling effects of child benefits relies mostly on variation
over time and thus needs strong assumptions about spending patterns over time to
establish causality. Furthermore, evidence is limited to few assignable consumption
goods.2 We ought to fill that void using difference-in-differences techniques with a
control group and investigating behavioral consequences for savings as well.
3.3 Empirical Approach
One means of analyzing child benefit effects on consumption is to compare estimated
marginal propensities to consume out of child benefits with that out of other income.
This kind of estimation can often be cumbersome, as changes in benefits most often
increase over time. Then, independent changes over time in the dependent variable
can be confounding in estimations. And consumption patterns can easily change over
time. Moreover, omitted variable bias problems are present if families’ unobserved
characteristics change over time, which in turn influences their expenditure pattern.
To overcome these endogeneity problems, we employ a difference-in-differences (DiD)
model by exploiting a series of child benefit reforms.3 See Lyssiotou (2009) for a
similar approach. Child benefits increased for three-child families while child benefits
for one-child families remained unchanged between 1978 and 1983, as shown in
Figure 3.1. Therefore, we choose three-child families as the treatment group and one-
child families as the control group. This enables us to eliminate all common changes
of the treatment and the control group over time. The increase in child benefits
for three-child families amounts to about 30 percent while for two-child families
the increase is rather modest and is completely absent for one-child families. We
discard two-child families in our baseline approach as the increase in their benefits
is a rather modest treatment, but it disqualifies them as a control group. Yet,
we apply two-child families as a treatment group in the robustness analysis. A
detailed description of child benefits according to the rank of the child can be seen
in Table 3.1.
2In a more general manner, Abeler and Marklein (2010) show in a field and a laboratory
experiment, in which they randomly allocate non-distortionary vouchers, that labeling effects
influence consumption decisions.
3The lump-sum child benefits in Germany are not means tested, paid each month and are
available to every family with dependent children at least until 16 years. There are other family
benefits that may affect family expenditure and behavior. One of the biggest is child allowances
in the income tax system. In the period in question, however, these do not affect the analysis.
Child allowances were not present during the period under study, although they were reintroduced
in 1983 at a very moderate level. This does not affect our results, as allowances become effective
after tax return at the end of a year. As to the institutional details of child benefits and their
reform, the increase was unanticipated. Announcement of the reform that introduced our first
treatment in 1979 was made in the Law Gazette on November 18, 1978, meaning that only very
few pre-reform observations could be affected by early announcement.
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Figure 3.1: The policy reform – Child benefits
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Notes: The figure depicts monthly child benefits for the first, second and third child. The full bar denotes
child benefits of a family with three children. The marked bars denote the pre- and post-reform periods.
Table 3.1: Monthly child benefits per child in Deutsche Mark (DEM)
In effect
from... ...to 1st child 2nd child 3rd child 4th child 5th child
01-01-75 31-12-77 50 70 120 120 120
01-01-78 31-12-78 50 80 150 150 150
01-01-79 30-06-79 50 80 200 200 200
01-07-79 31-01-81 50 100 200 200 200
01-02-81 31-12-81 50 120 240 240 240
01-01-82 30-06-90 50 100 220 240 240
Notes: Child benefits per month per child in DEM in Germany in the respective period. Child
benefits are paid in cash for all children until the age of 16 and for older children if they are still
in school.
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Formally, the treatment effect in the DiD model is a combination of two
differences. The first difference is the difference in the dependent variable within
the groups before and after the treatment. Then, we take the difference in first
differences between the treatment group and the control group. This eliminates all
sources of unobserved trends and simultaneous events, or unobserved time-variant
effects on expenditures, that are common to both family types. The identifying
assumption, then, is that no group-specific effects on the outcome variable occur
simultaneously with the increase in benefits, i.e., all unobserved changes are valid
for both family types and there is no self-selection into treatment.
We use the regression form of the DiD estimator
(3.1) Yst = α0 + α1Treateds + α2Postt + δTreateds × Postt +Xstβ + ǫst,
on expenditure outcomes Yst in family s and period t, where Treated is the treatment
group indicator, which is unity for the treatment group and zero for the control
group, Post is an indicator for the post-reform period (1983), and the second
difference is depicted by the interaction of Treated and Post. δ is the estimate
of the treatment effect and can be interpreted as an average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). The model yields estimates of a constant (α0), the baseline difference
between treatment and control group (α1), the common trend over time (α2), and
for the vector of control variables Xst (β). ǫ is an i.i.d. error term.
The DiD approach is based on two crucial assumptions. First, the common
trend assumption between treatment and control group means that both follow
the same trend over time in the absence of a treatment. The implicit assumption
is that they both would experience the same absolute change in the dependent
variable. However, inherent differences between the treatment and the control group
may make an assumption of equal relative changes in percent of the dependent
variable just as plausible. As a robustness check, we use an alternative relative trend
assumption to check the validity of the common trend assumption. This difference-
in-relative-differences model is developed later in the paper. Furthermore, the larger
families in the treatment group may react differently to income increases due to
economies of scale, which is captured by the baseline difference for the treatment and
the control group. Yet, the ATT interpretation of the treatment effect is unaltered
by possible economies of scale for the treatment group.
Second, the DiD approach assumes no self-selection into treatment. Take-up
is not a concern as applying for child benefits is a one-time effort without explicit
costs. However, increases in child benefits could cause a rise in fertility. If families
expand to three-child families because of the increase in child benefits, they would
change the composition of the groups and violate the standard DiD assumption.4
4We perform an unreported robustness check by excluding families with children under four
years of age to exclude the possibility of self-selection into treatment.
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Moreover, there is some ambiguity in the data regarding assignment to the
treatment group. We observe whether a household has one, two, three, or more
children, but this may not include all the children of the family or even all who
are eligible for child benefits. Basically all children up to the age of 16 years are
eligible. There are some exceptions though, e.g., older children who are still in school
remain eligible unless they earn above a certain income threshold. We alleviate this
problem to some extent by excluding from our sample households with children
over 16 years. There could still be some error in assignment, however, if one child
has moved out but is still eligible. As we only observe children who currently
live in the household, we would count too few children per family. If we assign a
one-child-family to the control group that actually has another eligible child living
outside the household, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) would
be violated. We cannot fully exclude this possibility as we do not observe individuals
outside the household. The assignment error would lead to a downward bias of
the estimates if the control group erroneously contained treated families. Wrong
assignment due to an unobserved fourth child would yield an upward bias, but is
less likely because of the low prevalence of four-child families.
Now we turn to the control variables. Our DiD framework eliminates con-
founding variation that is common to both one-child and three-child families. Only
changes over time that affect the groups differently and occur at the same time
as the benefit change will cause problems in this framework. One possible reason
could be changes in the age composition of children in the two groups. Rapidly
changing fertility rates in the early 1970s likely yield changes in children’s age in
the cross-sections of 1978 and 1983. And, possibly, families with three children
experience different changes to age compositions from one-child families. Moreover,
the effect on the outcome could be different between the groups. Therefore, we
ought to control for age composition in the family. We use indicator variables for
the age of the oldest child to account for different age compositions post reform (16
years as the omitted category). Moreover, we allow for differential effects of child
age in the treatment and the control group by interacting age indicators with the
treatment group indicator. This might especially be relevant if younger children
could reuse some of the goods purchased for the first child. Focusing on the oldest
children is straightforward in the sense that first-time purchases have the largest
impact on consumption patterns.
The main reason for income control variables is that results from the difference-
in-differences model cannot be readily interpreted as labeling effects. Child benefit
changes induce direct income effects on expenditure, meaning that household income
is not an exogenous variable. Hence, controlling for income excludes this channel
from the reform effect. We use full household income, including child benefits, as
a control variable because we need the full disposable income to be held constant.
Only then, we can interpret the result as a pure labeling effect, as the remaining
treatment is only a change in the income composition. Moreover, regular income
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could increase differently between the two groups and induce confounding variation.
The effects of income on expenditure could also be different for treatment and control
group. Therefore, we interact income with the treatment group indicator variable
to account for possible differential income effects between the treatment and the
control group.
Other variables correlated with the outcomes could vary between pre- and
post-reform periods. Therefore, we include some more background characteristics
of the two groups that could violate identifying assumptions. We include age of the
parents, as consumption patterns could vary over the life. As female labor force
participation changed substantially during the period under study, we also include
an indicator for the number of earners to account for intra-household allocations.
An expenditure variable for durable goods controls for expensive purchases that
could affect remaining consumption. Furthermore, we control for income squared
and indicator variables for the federal state, as well for the urbanization level based
on 9 categories. An indicator variable for tenant status is included to account for
non-monetary wealth. Despite all careful handling of the DiD assumptions, we
can never fully exclude that unobserved time-variant group specific heterogeneity
confounds the results.
3.4 Data
For the empirical analysis we employ the German Income and Expenditure Survey
(EVS)5 of 1978 and 1983 as repeated cross-sections. The EVS is a representative
survey of currently about 60,000 households that is conducted every five years,
starting in 1978.6 The data include a complete set of expenditure variables at the
household level by various groups of goods and a set of income variables. Detailed
expenditure is measured over four weeks and less detailed expenditure and income
information is collected over the whole year.
To make inferences about labeling effects we need to identify child-specific ex-
penditures. We use assignable goods to draw conclusions about the intra-household
welfare effect of consumption for individual members of the family. A good is
assignable to children if it is to some degree of greater value to children in the
household than it is to adults and vice versa. In our analysis, assignable child
goods are toys, which are mostly of value to children. Our toy variable is defined
as yearly expenditures for toys. Furthermore, we use building loan contracts as a
savings measure and argue that it is assignable to children. A peculiarity in German
savings allows us to assign building loan contracts to children. These building loan
contracts serve the primary purpose of financing construction or buying real estate.
They usually have a maturity of more than five years and act as a savings account
5Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
6An earlier survey conducted in 1973 has not been digitized and is unavailable.
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during the contract period. When terminated, the contract provides the saver with
automatic access to low interest building loans at the contract institution. As such,
it is a device parents can use to make their children better off in the future when
they leave parental home and establish their own families. If the saver does not wish
to purchase real estate, the savings including interest can just be withdrawn and
used for any purpose. Although we cannot observe whose name is written on the
contracts, we assume that most of them are assignable to the saver’s children for
the following reasons. First, couples with children are unlikely to save for real estate
after their children are born as their most pressing need for space usually occurs
when their family is expanding. Second, by anecdotal evidence it is very common to
save for one’s children via a building loan contract in Germany and, indeed, major
providers offer special building loan contracts for this very purpose. Third, we run
some checks on changes in flat size and renting behavior to avoid wrong assignment
to children. According to these tests, adults do not use these building loans for
own consumption of real estate. Corresponding variables in our regressions are an
indicator variable for building loan contracts and a continuous variable for their
accumulated value.7
As assignable adult goods we use luxury goods and clothing. Luxury goods
include jewelry, leather goods, and watches.8 Information on clothes expenditure is
only available distinguished by gender. Hence, we can only assign female clothes to
the mother if all children and thus all other household members are male. Then,
female clothes are adult goods. Accordingly, male clothes are assigned to the father
if all children are female.
In the robustness check subsection we use various non-assignable consumption
expenditures and savings to test the validity of our approach. These include general
savings accounts, life insurance, luxury foodstuffs, restaurant meals, and flat size in
square meters.9
Means of the dependent variables are reported in Table 3.2 for one- and three-
child-families, which are the control and treatment group, respectively. We have
11,385 family-year observations in the control group and 3,125 family-year obser-
vations in the treatment group. The sample is representative for West Germany
before reunification; all monetary values are yearly figures, denoted in then used
7During the analyzed period, a government program intended to encourage building loans
savings was instituted. Under this program, 17 percent was added to the money deposited by
eligible savers in building loan contracts. In 1982, the fraction was reduced to 14 percent. This
program is not an obstacle to our identification if it affected both the treatment and the control
group equally. Eligibility criteria for building loan savings subsidies based on income limits and
the size of premiums for children were not affected by the reform.
8Variables were differently coded in 1978 and 1983 and therefore include slightly different leather
products in 1983.
9We excluded food from the list due to inexplicable totals for items categorized as food in the
data. Due to great variability in the data between the two periods, we suspect that there were
changes in the methods of collecting data.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics – Means by family size and period
Family size: 1 child 1 child 3 children 3 children
Pre-reform (1978) Post-reform (1983) Pre-reform (1978) Post-reform (1983)
Dependent variables
Toys 21.90 21.55 29.40 35.09
Building loan (1/0) 0.59 0.65 0.64 0.76
Building loan savings 11,784.85 11,974.42 11,113.37 13,561.44
Luxury goods 195.97 225.70 182.41 170.94
Father’s clothes 912.37 758.37 771.62 650.73
Mother’s clothes 1539.01 1189.01 1512.59 1038.97
General savings (1/0) 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95
General savings value 14,892.05 10,925.90 14,461.36 9,964.97
Life insurance (1/0) 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.88
Life insurance deposit 1642.21 2061.01 2142.96 2564.41
Luxury foodstuffs 187.88 169.19 179.08 167.07
Restaurant meals 216.65 180.85 199.47 160.75
Square meters 92.64 97.72 115.45 123.03
Control variables
Age father 38.54 37.90 40.01 38.66
Age mother 35.37 34.82 36.81 35.39
Average child age 8.01 7.43 9.53 8.07
Household net income 63,865.66 64,232.69 72,059.79 74,059.67
Number of earners 1.58 1.63 1.43 1.40
Durable goods 9,168.10 7,813.30 9,164.30 8,033.44
Tenant status (1/0) 0.60 0.54 0.39 0.32
N 5911 5474 1734 1391
Notes: Figures are sample means within the treatment and the control group in each period. All monetary
variables are corrected for consumer price index with base year 1995. Indicator variables are denoted by (1/0).
Included are all non-categorial control variables and average child age.
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Deutsche Mark (DEM), which had a nominal exchange rate of 1.95583 to 1 Euro,
and are deflated by CPI with base year 1995. Most of the expenditure variables
show time trends in the control group which makes it important to use a difference-
in-differences strategy to account for unobserved changes over time.
From the group means over time, we can already see how the difference-
in-differences results without control variables turn out to be. Expenditures for
toys are virtually constant in the control group from the pre- to the post-reform
period, whereas they increase in the treatment group from 29.40 DEM to 35.09
DEM, suggesting a treatment effect of about 6 DEM. Prevalence of building loan
contracts increases in the control group from 59 to 65 percent, whereas it increases
from 64 to 76 percent in the treatment group, suggesting a treatment effect of
about 6 percentage points. Values of building loan contracts increase from 11,785
DEM to 11,974 DEM in the control group, but from 11,113 DEM to 13,561 DEM
in the treatment group, suggesting a treatment effect of more than 2,200 DEM.
Expenditures for adult luxury goods increase in the control group from 196 DEM
to 226 DEM, while they decrease in the treatment group from 182 DEM to 170
DEM, suggesting a negative treatment effect of about 42 DEM. Expenditures for
the father’s clothes (identified only for subgroup with female children) decrease from
912 DEM to 758 DEM in the control group and from 771 DEM to 650 DEM in the
treatment group. This yields a small treatment effect of 33 DEM. Expenditures
for the mother’s clothes (identified only for subgroup with male children) decrease
from 1,539 DEM to 1,189 DEM in the control group and from 1,513 DEM to 1,039
DEM in the treatment group. This yields a negative treatment effect of about
120 DEM. In the more sophisticated regression analysis in the following section,
we also analyze the statistical significance of the treatment effects and can control
for a number of additional variables. As a robustness check, we will also discuss
results for non-assignable expenditure that is included in the table for the sake of
completeness.
We see in Table 3.2 from the means of control variables that the differences
between the treatment and control group and differences over time are modest. Age
of the fathers averages at 38 to 40 years, age of the mothers at 35 to 37 years. Average
child age is a bit larger in the treatment group, however, we use dummy variables
as described earlier in the analysis. Household net income increases in the control
group from 63,866 DEM to 64,233 DEM, whereas it increases from 72,060 DEM to
74,060 DEM in the treatment group, which makes clear that income controls are
important in the analysis. The number of earners increases slightly in the control
group and decreases slightly in the treatment group. Expenditures for durable goods
decrease from about 9,168 DEM to 7,813 DEM in the control group and from 9,164
DEM to 8,033 DEM in the treatment group. Tenant status, indicating renting of
accommodation, declines from 60 to 54 percent in the control group and from 39
to 32 percent in the treatment group. Overall, the comparable figures suggests
3.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 97
that the control group is suitable and that compositional changes within groups are
moderate.
3.5 Estimation Results
In this section, we investigate whether child benefits affect consumption and savings
through a labeling effect. To repeat the rationale of our approach, a labeling effect
means that the marginal propensity to consume particular goods out of child benefits
is different from the marginal propensity to consume out of regular income. The
child label attached to the benefit is expected to increase child-specific consumption
as it induces a moral obligation for parents to spend that money in the best interest
of their child, which may take the form of either immediate consumption expenditure
on the child’s behalf or investment in a long-term savings account, i.e., a building
loan contract.
In the following sections, we report the results of the DiD estimations. We
begin with baseline results with three- and one-child families as treatment and
control group and then continue with a heterogeneous treatment effect analysis.
We finish by conducting a number of robustness checks to investigate the validity
of various underlying assumptions.
3.5.1 Baseline Estimation Results
Table 3.3 shows the results of a DiD estimation without control variables for different
consumption expenditures and savings. Results are from OLS regressions and can
be interpreted as marginal effects. We use robust standard errors to account for
heteroscedasticity. The DiD coefficient for the Treated×Post term is the treatment
effect. We also report the treatment effect as a percentage change in the last row of
the table. The percentage change is calculated as the treatment effect over the sum of
the pre-reform period value of the dependent variable and the counterfactual change
from the control group. Estimations for parents’ clothes use fewer observations
because we can only distinguish male and female clothing expenditures. Thus,
father’s clothes are measured only for households in which all other members are
female and vice versa for mother’s clothes.
Expenditure on toys in the treatment group increases by 6.04 DEM per year
compared to the control group of one-child families. This is a substantial increase of
21 percent in expenditure on toys. According to the post-reform indicator estimate,
expenditures do not increase significantly purely due to the passage of time, i.e.,
consumption in the control group in 1983 is similar to consumption in 1978. The
baseline difference between the groups is substantial. Treatment group families
consume 7.50 DEM per year more than the control group.
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Table 3.3: Baseline DiD regression
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× 6.035** 0.065*** 2,258.495*** -41.196 33.103 -123.613
Post (2.834) (0.019) (821.704) (31.097) (62.445) (116.542)
Treated 7.502*** 0.046*** -671.479 -13.564 -140.743*** -26.428
(1.837) (0.013) (556.947) (28.314) (42.882) (99.844)
Post -0.346 0.055*** 189.573 29.729*** -153.994*** -349.998***
(1.019) (0.009) (385.896) (11.433) (19.226) (29.618)
Additional controls No No No No No No
Observations 14510 14510 14509 14510 5970 6290
R-squared 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.024
Treat. eff. in % 21%** 9%*** 20%*** -19% 5% -11%
Notes: The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for
each year of age of the oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls
include full household income including child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables
are age of the parents, household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the
amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the
federal states. Results are estimates from OLS regressions, Treated × Post denotes the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference
model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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In the savings equations we find positive and significant effects of the child
benefit reform: the probability of having a building loan contract increases by 6.5
percentage points due to the reform and the value of these contracts increases by
2,258 DEM. This corresponds to an increase in the propensity to save via a building
loan contract by 9 percent and an increase in the value of 20 percent. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation emphasizes the significance of this result. Summing up the
additional child benefits compared to the base year 1978 for four consecutive years
yields nominally 1,144 DEM for the second child and 4,420 DEM for the third child.
Of the additional child benefits due to the reform, corrected for CPI, about one third
on average is saved in building loans. The baseline difference between treatment and
control group, denoted by the coefficient for Treated, is plus 4.6 percentage points
in probability of having a building loan account. There is no statistically significant
difference in the value of building loan contracts.
Our assignable adult goods are luxury goods, father’s clothes, and mother’s
clothes. Treatment effect estimates on luxury goods and clothes expenditures by
fathers and mothers show high standard errors and are not statistically significant.
The effect on mother’s clothes is large and negative and on father’s clothes positive
but small. Thus, the increase in child benefits does not translate into significant
changes in adult expenditures according to our estimates.
Results with all additional covariates including the crucial income controls
are reported in Table 3.4. Results from this regression are more reliable, as the
income controls eliminate the direct income effect of the child benefits reform. The
treatment effect on the child good toys decreases substantially to 2.29 DEM and
becomes statistically insignificant. Although the point estimate is still positive, we
cannot conclude that there are labeling effects of child benefits on toys.
Our previous results for savings, however, are robust to the inclusion of control
variables. We continue to find positive and significant effects on building loan
savings. Both estimates are considerably smaller, but the overall picture is per-
sistent. Prevalence of building loan contracts increases by 4.1 percentage points,
significant at the five percent level. This corresponds to an increase of 6 percent in
the probability of saving. The value of building loans increases by 1.428 DEM due
to the reform, significant at the ten percent level. This corresponds to an increase
in the average value of 13 percent. In sum, we find robust labeling effects of child
benefits on child-specific savings, but not on consumption. As before, none of the
adult goods is significantly affected.10
10The results largely hold when excluding all families with children under the age of four that
could have self-selected into the treatment group as a response to the higher child benefits for
higher-order children. This possible selection bias is overcome if we consider only families that
could not have reacted to the reform with increased fertility. Assuming a one year conception and
gestation lag, a child as a result of the reform would be born at the earliest in the beginning of
1980 and would be three years old in our post-reform period 1983. The coefficients for savings are
similar, but the standard errors increase and the results become insignificant in the specification
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Table 3.4: Baseline DiD regression with full set of controls
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× 2.299 0.041** 1,428.106* -57.260 42.722 -142.504
Post (2.659) (0.018) (791.161) (35.534) (58.640) (110.043)
Treated -8.841 -0.039 -1,577.507 -104.618 114.354 -505.332*
(2.659) (0.018) (791.161) (35.534) (140.349) (273.726)
Post -1.321 0.062*** 171.849 45.887*** -133.665*** -311.242***
(1.152) (0.009) (402.973) (13.963) (19.592) (30.072)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14510 14510 14509 14510 5970 6290
R-squared 0.046 0.142 0.113 0.052 0.163 0.198
Treat. eff. in % 8% 6%** 13%* -27% 7% -12%
Notes: The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for
each year of age of the oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls
include full household income including child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables
are age of the parents, household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the
amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the
federal states. Results are estimates from OLS regressions, Treated × Post denotes the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference
model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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3.5.2 Income Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects
A goal of child benefits is child poverty avoidance and, hence, effect heterogeneity
with respect to family income is particularly relevant. We investigate income hetero-
geneity of the treatment effect by splitting the groups in above- and below-median
income families. The treatment effect interaction (of the treatment group indicator
with the post-reform indicator) is again interacted with a low-income indicator to
reflect heterogeneity. Table 3.5 shows the results of a triple interaction with the
indicator variable lowincome, which is set to unity for families with below-median
income and zero otherwise. The treatment effect for low income families is then the
sum of the triple interaction and the treatment effect interaction Treated × Post.
The treatment effect for high income families is Treated× Post, because the triple
interaction equals zero for high income households.
Results in Table 3.5 with the full set of control variables depict the treatment
effect for high income households in the first row and for low income households
in the second row. The treatment effect on toys is again positive but not statis-
tically significant for both groups. No significant effect is found for adult goods
either. Compared to the baseline result, the treatment effect on the probability of
having a building loan contract increases to 6.0 percentage points for high income
households. The estimate is highly statistically significant. On the contrary, for
low income households we find a smaller effect of 1.2 percentage points which is
not statistically significant. Furthermore, we find the same pattern for the value of
building loan savings. For high income households we find a significant treatment
effect of 2,017 DEM, whereas for low income household the estimate is 443 DEM and
not significant. Although the treatment effects between high and low income families
are not statistically significantly different from each other, we may conclude that
the labeling effect on savings is only present for above-median households. Saving
for the future expense of a home is surely beneficial for children and could make
it much easier for them to embark on a career away from parental home. Housing
is also believed to be a prerequisite, or at least an important factor, for starting
a family. But as this effect is absent for below-median income families, one of the
goals of providing child benefits, that is, reducing child poverty, seems not to be
fostered by a labeling effect.
3.5.3 Robustness and Specification Checks
To validate our findings and test crucial assumptions of the DiD approach, we run
a number of robustness and specification checks. We begin with estimations on
non-assignable consumption and then use alternative treatment group specifications
to test the suitability of our model. Furthermore, we allow for relative trends in
with control variables, possibly due to the smaller sample size. Result tables are omitted here and
available upon request.
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Table 3.5: DiD–Income heterogeneity
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treatment effect for 1.701 0.060*** 2,017.062* -68.541 127.339 -200.250
high income householdsa) (3.843) (0.022) (1,198.800) (50.881) (82.733) (167.190)
Treatment effect for 3.283 0.012 443.6 -18.85 -67.08 58.00
income households [p-val]b) [0.397] [0.697] [0.596] [0.297] [0.380] [0.551]
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14510 14510 14509 14510 5970 6290
R-squared 0.046 0.143 0.114 0.053 0.164 0.202
Notes:
a) These are results from an interacted model. The treatment effect Treated × Post is interacted with the indicator variable for low
income households. The treatment effect for high income households depicted here is the base effect of the standard interaction Treated×Post.
b) These are results from an interacted model. The treatment effect Treated × Post is interacted with the indicator variable for low income
households. The treatment effect for low income households depicted here is the base effect of the standard interaction Treated × Post plus
the interacted effect with the low income household indicator variable. In [] we report p-values of the hypothesis test of a zero treatment effect
for low income households.
The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for each year of age
of the oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls include full household
income including child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables are age of the parents,
household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the amount spent on durable
goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the federal states. Results are
estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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a difference-in-relative-differences estimation. Finally, we discuss the possibility of
distributional confounders and make an attempt to test for it.
Non-assignable expenditure We cannot conduct usual placebo tests, which are
used to confirm the common trend assumption in non-treated periods, as we cannot
observe the data in earlier periods. However, we can estimate our model for con-
sumption and purchase of certain household public goods that are not particularly
adult or child specific. There should not be a strong response in these outcomes
if our assumptions of common trends are true. As we assume that non-assignable
consumption should not react to the child benefit label, we basically test whether
our model is prone to biases from different trends for the treatment and the control
group. Yet, it is hard to find any consumption that is surely non-assignable at all.
Some of the variables we use are capable of increasing family’s welfare and are also
of interest to policy makers. We investigate two different savings accounts, general
savings at banks and life insurance, which most likely serve as income smoothing
instruments or insurance for the partner against income default. We use luxury
foodstuffs as an additional consumption measure, which could be interpreted as adult
assignable or as a proxy for food quality. Moreover, we observe food consumption
out of the house, which is generally not assignable to adults or children.
To test whether the results for building loan contract savings are indeed
assignable to children, we consider housing arrangements as dependent variables.
First, we use the probability of renting a flat or a house in contrast to owning it as
the dependent variable, depicted by Tenant(1/0). If there is an effect on the tenant
status, our building loan equations could be biased. We would expect the contracts
to be terminated if someone buys or builds real estate. Second, we use the size of
the flat in square meters as a dependent variable for the same reason. Moreover,
flat size is an indicator of well-being for the whole family.
Table 3.6 reports the results for alternative dependent variables. Savings which
are not attributable to a specific child-related purpose, such as general savings at
banks or life insurance, are not affected by the reform. All treatment effect esti-
mates from both estimations without and with control variables are not statistically
significant. Neither the probability of having an account nor the value of savings or
deposits show a reaction to the treatment. If anything the coefficients are negative.
Thus, the treatment group does not disproportionately increase savings in general.
Our results for building loans as a child-specific savings rate are therefore not
explained by an uncontrolled trend towards higher savings. Estimates of a labeling
effect on child-specific savings seem reliable. Turning to placebo consumption,
luxury foodstuffs and meals out of the house are not significantly affected according
to Table 3.6.
The probability of renting a house or flat is not affected either. Although,
for the size of the home there seems to be a small positive change in the first row,
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Table 3.6: Non-assignable expenditure
General General Life insurance Life insurance Luxury foodstuffs Restaurant meals Tenant (1/0) Flat size
savings (1/0) savings value (1/0) deposit (m2)
no covariates
Treated× -0.005 -530.241 0.013 2.644 6.688 -2.922 -0.011 2.498*
Post (0.009) (679.297) (0.014) (125.534) (6.204) (10.012) (0.020) (1.480)
Additional controls No No No No No No No No
Treat. eff. in % -1% -5% 2% 0% 4% -2% -3% 2%*
full model
Treated× -0.010 -760.315 0.010 -125.817 5.388 -8.450 0.005 0.026
Post (0.009) (675.492) (0.014) (125.660) (6.333) (10.130) (0.017) (1.304)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treat. eff. in % -1% -7% 1% -5% 3% -5% 2% 0%
Notes: General savings (1/0) equals one if the household has a general savings account at a bank and is zero otherwise. General savings value measures
the accumulated value of these accounts. Life insurance (1/0) equals one if a household member has a life insurance and is zero otherwise. Life insurance
deposits measure the amount that is paid in during a year. Luxury foodstuffs and restaurant meals denote expenditure for the two. Tenant (1/0) equals
one if the household rents accommodation and is zero otherwise. Flat size is the size of the accommodation in square meters. The set of additional control
variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for each year of age of the oldest child and each age indicator is
interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls include full household income including child benefits and is interacted with the
treatment group indicator. Additional control variables are age of the parents, household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for
the regional urbanization level, the amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator
variables for the federal states. The renting indicator is excluded if tenant status is the dependent variable. Results are estimates from OLS regressions,
Treated× Post denotes the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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but it is not robust to the inclusion of control variables. If building loans were not
primarily savings for children, we would expect many of them to be terminated and
invested in housing in these families. That effect does not seem to play a role, which
supports our assumption that building loans are child-specific.
Alternative treatment group specifications The overall validity of a regres-
sion model can be checked by placebo tests that assume the same identification
although there is no treatment. As noted earlier, we cannot undertake placebo
tests in the usual manner by choosing a different point in time with the same
treatment and control group. As a second alternative, we instead run a regression
using one-child families as the treatment group and childless couples as the control
group. The treatment group receives a placebo as there was no change in child
benefits for one-child families. If we find significant effects here, there might be
other unobservable factors explaining our results.
The results on toys and child-specific savings with the placebo treatment group
are not significant and thus confirm the suitability of our model and our control
group. This setting may not be an ideal case for toys if the control group is childless,
but it should be informative for savings. The placebo results for adult goods show
positive effects on luxury goods and negative effects on adult clothes. This seems to
be a compositional change in spending that occurs in families. Results for the adult
goods should therefore be interpreted with caution. As we do not find labeling effect
on adult goods in our baseline specification, it does not affect the interpretation of
the main findings. A table containing these results can be found in the Appendix
in Table C.1.
As another check of the validity of our results, we run tests using two-child
families instead of three-child families as the treatment group. As expected, results
point in the same direction as previously found for child-specific savings but are
smaller than for three-child families, which is plausible as these families received
a smaller treatment than the three-child families. The results are set out in the
Appendix in Table C.2.
Difference-in-relative-differences estimation approach The DiD approach
estimates deviations from the control group trend in levels. This approach eliminates
two sources of confounding variation—a common trend that occurs in the absence of
a treatment and a common shift in the outcome variable that occurs simultaneously
with the treatment. However, the effect on relative deviations might be the more
suitable choice if there is reason to believe that a proportional common change
for both groups coincides. For example, this could be the case in the event of
relative price changes in the dependent variable different from overall inflation. If
treatment and control group have different levels of consumption, a proportional
measure such as price would have a proportional effect on the outcome instead of
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a constant difference. More generally, imagine a member of the control group buys
one piece and a treatment group member buys two pieces prior to the treatment.
What is the correct counterfactual if the control group individual buys two pieces
post treatment? The unobserved shift we want to eliminate could be that people
just buy one more piece, which makes the counterfactual three pieces, or that people
double their purchases, which makes the counterfactual four pieces. A DiD model
in relative terms, a difference-in-relative-differences (DiRD) model, which captures
the relative changes in the outcome variable, will capture this latter kind of change.
Figure 3.2: Hypothetical counterfactuals of DiD and DiRD models
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Treatment Control Counterfactual
Treatment effect > 0
(a) DiD
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Treatment Control Counterfactual
Treatment effect < 0
(b) DiRD
Notes: Treatment denotes the treatment group and control denotes the control group. Time is on the horizontal
axis, with a hypothetical treatment at 0. The outcome is on the vertical axis. The counterfactual for the treatment
group in absence of a treatment in panel (a) is computed according to an absolute difference assumption, whereas
the counterfactual in panel (b) is computed according to a relative trend assumption.
In the DiRD model, the common trend assumption is altered. The counter-
factual case—the dependent variable’s change in the treatment group without the
treatment—is no longer an equal absolute change compared to the control group
but an equal relative change in the dependent variable. This means that common
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trends are weighted by the observed level in the base year or, put differently, are
re-scaled such that the base-year level is the same across groups.11 In the standard
DiD approach, we assume that for the counterfactual a one unit change in the
dependent variable of the control group must equal a one unit change in that
variable for the treatment group. In contrast, in the DiRD, a one percent change
in the control group’s dependent variable must equal a one percent change in the
treatment group’s dependent variable for the counterfactual case. In extreme cases,
this altered assumption can even switch the sign of the treatment effect, as depicted
in Figure 3.2.
With simple modifications to the original DiD model we can estimate devia-
tions in relative terms from the control group with
(3.2)
α2 + δ
α0 + α1
−
α2
α0
.
See the Appendix for the derivation. To our knowledge, Gregg et al. (2009) is the
only study that uses a comparable alteration of the trend assumption.
The results for the monetary dependent variables from the DiD estimation
without covariates also hold for a DiRD estimation, as can be seen in Table 3.7.
The effects show the same sign and are statistically significant for toys and child
assignable savings as in the baseline estimation without covariates. Toy expenditure
and building loan savings increase by about 20 percent if we assume a common
relative trend. None of the adult expenditures is significantly affected. Unobserved
relative price changes and related reasons thus do not seem to be threats to our
identification. Hence, the common trend assumption in the DiD appears to be
valid. At the very least, these results mean that the assumption of a common
absolute trend would not change the sign and significance of our results if the real
trend was relative.
Distributional confounders A frequent concern in all studies of child benefits
of this kind is that they could alternatively be explained by bargaining power shifts.
This means that instead of simply imposing a label on some part of a household’s
income, child benefits change relative income within a couple and thus the bargaining
power. As Lundberg et al. (1997) show, directing child benefits to mothers changes
bargaining power within households and leads to higher consumption of children’s
11A related approach is taken by Athey and Imbens (2006) in the scale-independent
changes-in-changes (CIC) model. They generalize the DiD model by allowing for arbitrarily
different distributions of unobservables Ui across groups, which enter an index function h(Ui, Ti)
that describes the outcome Yi with T as a time indicator. As such, all differences between the
distributions across groups are attributed to different distributions of unobservables. The CIC
model, by exploiting the whole distribution of the outcomes and not only the first moments, in
contrast to the standard DiD model, is invariant to the scaling of the outcome as long as the
transformation is strictly monotonic.
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Table 3.7: Difference-in-relative-differences regression results
Toys Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× 0.209* 0.204** -0.214 0.012 -0.086
Post [3.79] [6.64] [1.75] [0.03] [2.01]
Additional controls No No No No No
Observations 14510 14509 14510 5970 6290
Notes: Treated × Post denotes the treatment effect from a difference-in-relative-differences model obtained in
OLS regressions. F-statistic of non-linear hypothesis test (coeff=0) in []. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1% level. p<0.1.
and female clothing. This distributional effect is not present per se in the German
benefit system, as, in contrast to the United Kingdom, child benefits were not
necessarily directed to mothers. Although, there are caveats with our approach.
In a static framework, child benefits are family income and do not affect relative
income as a distribution factor within a couple. The spouse not receiving the benefit
should be fully compensated through cash transfers by the benefit recipient if they
are free to choose who receives the benefit. No partner could credibly exclude the
other from receiving child benefit. In a dynamic framework, one could argue that the
decision about the recipient of child benefits in the past is not augmented in the face
of a reform. Contracts about compensation are incomplete such that unexpected
changes in benefits do in turn alter bargaining power. Assuming that women have
a higher preference for child well-being, as in Lundberg et al. (1997), a fraction of
mothers receiving the benefits other than 0.5 would induce bias. Most likely fathers
as the families’ main earners are also more often the recipients of child benefits, and
then our estimates would be downward biased or in favor of the father’s preferences.
Moreover, in a divorce-threat model, in which outside options shape bargaining
power, the mother as the likely custodial parent after a divorce would also be the
recipient of child benefits and thus gain bargaining power due to the reform. Induced
bias would then be towards the mother’s preferences. Ultimately, we cannot fully
exclude the possibility of distributional consequences of the child benefit reform,
but we would argue that these are much less severe than in the case of the British
wallet-to-purse reform studied in Lundberg et al. (1997).
In practice, it might even be enough that one parent receives child benefits to
her bank account to induce some sort of bargaining power shift. The recipient of child
benefits is unobservable in our data, but we have information about respondents’
occupations. By administrative rules civil servants are required to receive child
benefits from their employer, which we exploit to investigate distributional effects.
If the father is a civil servant, we can be sure that in those families a higher fraction
of fathers receives child benefits than in the average family, in which at least some
fraction of mothers are recipients. In Table 3.8 we show results of interactions of an
indicator variable for the father being a civil servant with our baseline DiD approach.
If bargaining effects are mostly driving our results we should see a significantly
different result for families with a father who is a civil servant and gains bargaining
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Table 3.8: DiD–Distributional effects for civil servants
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× 1.619 0.035* 1,027.030 -66.454 35.192 -97.793
Post (3.029) (0.021) (825.905) (42.257) (69.528) (123.139)
Treated× 3.501 0.018 1,595.911 44.298 85.217 -161.685
Post× CivilServant (6.730) (0.039) (2,223.250) (59.555) (127.769) (234.876)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment effect for 5.120 0.053 2623 -22.16 120.4 -259.5
civil servants households [p-value] [0.391] [0.113] [0.205] [0.606] [0.266] [0.210]
Observations 14510 14510 14509 14510 5970 6290
R-squared 0.046 0.143 0.114 0.053 0.164 0.202
Notes: Results are from an interacted model with an indicator variable equal to one if the father is a civil servant. The treatment effect Treated×Post
is interacted with the indicator variable. This triple interaction shows whether expenditure in families with male civil servants reacts differently from
the others. The treatment effect for families with male civil servants is shown in the bottom of the table and comprises the base effect of the standard
interaction Treated× Post plus the interacted effect with the civil servant indicator variable. In [] we report p-values of the hypothesis test of a zero
treatment effect for low income households.
The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for each year of age of the
oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls include full household income including
child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables are age of the parents, household net income squared,
the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator
variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the federal states. Results are estimates from OLS regressions, Treated×Post denotes
the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1% level.
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power due to the reform. The treatment effects for the non-civil-servant families
have the same sign as in the regular DiD setting but are a bit smaller. This is in line
with the income heterogeneity we found, because civil servants are mostly among the
above-median income families. However, only the effect on holding a building loan
contract is statistically significant. The treatment effect on the value of building loan
savings loses significance compared to the baseline result. None of the interactions
with civil servant fathers significantly differs from the treatment effect found above.
Based on the earlier research, we would expect a negative effect on child goods if
the mother loses influence in the decision making. Hence, there is no indication that
an increase in bargaining power for this particular group due to receiving the child
benefits is confounding the treatment effect attributed to labeling. This is far from
an ideal test of bargaining hypotheses. Yet, we have some indication that labeling
is a substantial contributor in our approach.
3.6 Conclusion
We exploit a child benefit reform in Germany that substantially increased the
amount of the transfer received by three-child families, but left the benefits for
one-child families unchanged. Using data from German Income and Expenditure
Surveys and applying a difference-in-differences approach, we confirm the existence
of a labeling effect that favors child expenditures out of child benefit income. In
particular, we find strong effects of child benefit labels on savings for children and
weaker evidence for short-term consumption which is not robust to the inclusion of
control variables. Instead of short-lived goods, which may be in sufficient supply for
the families, parents invest in their children via long-term savings.
The literature has been rather inconclusive on the labeling effects of child
benefits. Especially, evidence exploiting reforms is scarce and, thus, there are few
reliable estimates of labeling effects. This paper contributes estimates that exploit a
child benefit reform. Furthermore, results are less flawed by effects of intra-household
distributions than some of the earlier evidence. This paper also introduces a new
object of study to the literature: effects on child-assignable savings. The result
is particularly interesting as long-term investments in children could be seen as
favorable over short-term consumption from a welfare perspective. However, our
result casts some doubt on the intended purposes of child benefits, as the effect on
savings is largely driven by better-off households.
Finally, for policy makers, labeling effects are an important field of study. Even
if the effects of labeling are small, it is a very cost-effective measure and can be easily
applied to, e.g., existing welfare programs.
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Table C.1: Placebo treatment–One-child families as treatment group,
childless couples as control group
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× -0.112 -0.001 -289.8 33.883** -34.802* -62.823*
Post (1.125) (0.010) (418.1) (16.383) (20.389) (33.485)
Treated 4.115** 0.086*** -4,166.2*** 87.469** -104.814** -24.742
(1.602) (0.018) (1,099.8) (41.879) (43.322) (72.286)
Post -0.222 0.058*** 677.5*** 6.996 -108.929*** -274.606***
(0.554) (0.006) (238.9) (12.425) (10.701) (21.518)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34895 34895 34892 34895 29074 29331
R-squared 0.031 0.247 0.135 0.075 0.161 0.168
Treat. eff. in % 0% 0% -3% 16%** -6%* -5%*
Notes: The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for
each year of age of the oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls
include full household income including child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables
are age of the parents, household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the
amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the
federal states. Results are estimates from OLS regressions, Treated × Post denotes the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference
model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table C.2: Alternative treatment group—Two-child families as treatment group,
one-child families as control group
Toys Building loan (1/0) Building loan savings Luxury goods Father’s clothes Mother’s clothes
Treated× -1.640 0.017 1,166.2** -3.002 10.969 1.751
Post (1.608) (0.012) (554.3) (14.527) (30.111) (48.972)
Treated -1.199 -0.005 -4,295.2** 8.864 -72.510 -280.543*
(3.120) (0.029) (1,722.8) (44.825) (78.675) (162.469)
Post -1.120 0.056*** 1.8 37.077*** -137.656*** -313.704***
(1.103) (0.009) (394.9) (12.493) (19.068) (29.510)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23857 23857 23857 23857 8505 9002
R-squared 0.042 0.132 0.102 0.067 0.170 0.197
Treat. eff. in % -6% 2% 10%* -1% 2% 0%
Notes: The set of additional control variables comprises the following variables. Age composition controls are indicator variables for
each year of age of the oldest child and each age indicator is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Household income controls
include full household income including child benefits and is interacted with the treatment group indicator. Additional control variables
are age of the parents, household net income squared, the number of earners, indicator variables for the regional urbanization level, the
amount spent on durable goods in the particular year, an indicator variable for renting accommodation, and indicator variables for the
federal states. Results are estimates from OLS regressions, Treated × Post denotes the treatment effect in a difference-in-difference
model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% level.
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C.2 Derivation of DiRD Estimator
The difference-in-relative-differences estimator is derived as follows, notation as in
Angrist and Pischke (2009).
The control group’s relative trend is described by
(3.3)
E[Yist|s = C, t = 1983]− E[Yist|s = C, t = 1978]
E[Yist|s = C, t = 1978]
,
which can be written in terms of standard regressors, such that
(3.4)
(γC + λ1983 + δ(0))− (γC + λ1978)
γC + λ1978
.
This reduces to
(3.5)
λ1983 − λ1978
γC + λ1978
.
The same exercise for the treatment group yields the following three equations.
(3.6)
E[Yist|s = T, t = 1983]− E[Yist|s = T, t = 1978]
E[Yist|s = T, t = 1978]
,
and
(3.7)
(γT + λ1983 + δ(1))− (γT + λ1978)
γT + λ1978
,
and
(3.8)
λ1983 − λ1978 + δ
γT + λ1978
.
The population DiRD then is
(3.9)
λ1983 − λ1978 + δ
γT + λ1978
−
λ1983 − λ1978
γC + λ1978
.
When we use the standard population DiD regression
(3.10) Yist = α+ γs + λt + δDst + ǫst
the regressors express
α =γC + λ1978
γ =γT − γC
λ =λ1983 − λ1978.
(3.11)
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Using the regressors’ notation, we can simplify the population DiRD equation
as
(3.12)
λ+ δ
γT + α− γC
−
λ
α
and equally so as
(3.13)
λ+ δ
α+ γ
−
λ
α
.
In the notation of our DiD model in equation 3.1, the DiRD estimator is represented
by
(3.14)
α2 + δ
α0 + α1
−
α2
α0
.
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Chapter 4
Does Expanding Public Child Care
Encourage Fertility? County-Level
Evidence from Germany1
1Joint with Stefan Bauernschuster and Helmut Rainer
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4.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, most European countries have entered uncharted demo-
graphic territory characterized by below-replacement fertility. At present, demog-
raphers even argue that some countries are locked in a “low fertility trap”. The
notion of a low fertility trap (see, e.g., McDonald, 2008; Lutz et al., 2006) captures
the idea that once the fertility level of a country falls below 1.5 births per woman
and stays there for a while, it can lead to self-enforcing mechanisms that are difficult
to reverse.2 The anticipated economic consequences for countries in the low fertility
trap are manifold, from a decline in the working-age share of the population to a
slowdown of economic growth to financial difficulties in health care and pensions
systems (Bloom et al., 2010).3 With the growing realization that sustained low
fertility has serious ramifications, governments in affected countries have started to
take policy measures that enhance the private choice to have children. Chief among
these have been efforts to expand child care availability. However, there is almost
no previous experience of fertility-relevant policy making in the context of very low
fertility rates (McDonald, 2007). As a result, it is still open for debate whether such
efforts are an effective way to increase fertility rates where these rates are considered
to be too low.
In this paper we evaluate the impact on fertility of a German policy initiative
from the mid-2000s, which led to a large scale expansion of child care slots for
children under the age of three in West Germany. One of the explicitly stated
goals of the initiative was to increase fertility rates by making children less costly
in terms of income and career opportunities (Rindfuss et al., 2010). Ever since the
1970s, Germany has been among the twenty countries with the lowest fertility rates
worldwide (Population Reference Bureau, 2007). Its population reached a maximum
shortly after the turn of the millennium and has started to decline thereafter as
a result of sustained very low fertility rates (Dorbritz, 2008). In both political
and academic debates, these demographics have been associated with a lack of
progressive family policies. Especially the availability of child care for young children
was severely restricted in West Germany up until very recently. For example, in a
survey conducted in 2005, 35 percent of West German mothers with under three year
olds stated a demand for a child care slot (Bien et al., 2007), while only roughly 5
child care slots per 100 children in this age group were available.4 Prompted by this
2One such mechanism is behavioral: if very low fertility is sustained for a long period of time,
preferences can begin to shift away from childbearing, and a reversal of low fertility becomes more
difficult (Rindfuss et al., 2004).
3Currently, there are 28 countries with total fertility rates below 1.5, and the government of
each of these countries considers this level of fertility too low (United Nations, 2003).
4A recent study by Wrohlich (2008) calculates that more than 50 percent of West German
mothers with children aged 0-3 were queuing for a child care slot in the mid-2000s, suggesting that
the excess demand for child care was even more severe. In East Germany, by contrast, child care
coverage for children aged 0-3 were around 40 percent already in 2006.
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severe rationing of public child care, the German government implemented a set
of comprehensive public child care reforms during the period 2005-2008, with the
explicit intention to increase fertility levels. Specific objectives were to: (i) increase
the child care coverage rate for under three year olds to 35 percent by 2013, and (ii)
establish the legal right to a child care slot for all preschool children aged one and
above by 2013. On aggregate, the policy initiative led to a substantial expansion of
child care slots for young children across West Germany’s 326 counties. However,
since the responsibility to create additional child care slots lay with municipalities,
the counties differ distinctly in the extend to which child care coverage increased.
The county-level differences that have emerged during the expansion of public child
care in West Germany offer a natural way to evaluate its impact on fertility.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we estimate a difference-in-differences
model which compares the county-level birth rate (i.e., births per 1,000 women) in
West Germany before and after the child care reforms, between counties where
child care coverage expanded a lot (i.e., the treatment group) and counties with
little increase in child care coverage (i.e., the control group). In order to verify
that the key identifying assumption of this approach—i.e., the “common trend”
assumption—is plausible, we run placebo treatment difference-in-differences esti-
mations in pre-treatment years. Second, we analyze a more flexible county-fixed
effects model of the birth rate which allows for time-invariant heterogeneity between
counties and controls for common shocks through the inclusion of year dummy
variables. In order to become confident that the results from the fixed-effects model
are valid, we perform a battery of sensitivity checks. For example, we provide
evidence that our results are not confounded by selective migration of potential
mothers to counties with high child care availability.
Our results are interesting. We find consistent and robust evidence of a positive
effect of public child care expansion on fertility. To be concrete, our estimates
suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in public child care coverage increases the
number of births per 1,000 women by 1.4, or roughly 3.2 percent of the baseline birth
rate. Under the strict assumption of linearity, this result has a striking implication:
moving from having child care slots available for 5 percent of children under three
years old to having slots available for 35 percent will lead the average woman to
have roughly 0.13 more children. This, in turn, suggests that the policy initiative
under study may help Germany escape the “low fertility trap”.5 Closer examination
of the data reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity in the fertility effects of
public child care expansion across different age groups. Indeed, compared to the
mean effect, the effect on the number of births is virtually doubled for 30 to 34 year
old women. Given that the identification proposed here is quite clean and robust to
5The total fertility rate of Germany was around 1.4 in 2010. Our estimates suggest the following
counterfactual: if Germany’s child care coverage rate for under three year olds had reached the
2013-target of 35 percent already in 2009 (instead of an actual 14.3 percent), the fertility level
would have been 1.49 instead of 1.4.
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several robustness checks, it is reasonable to argue that what we have found here
is important for the public debate on family policies and low fertility in Western
Europe. In particular, our analysis provides some first causal evidence suggesting
that low fertility may be reversed as policy makers start to facilitate the combination
of motherhood and labor force participation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a
review of the related literature. Section 4.3 gives the background policy context
for the analysis by describing the development of public child care in Germany.
Section 4.4 outlines the empirical strategy, while Section 4.5 describes the data.
Section 4.6 presents the results on the impact of expanding publicly-financed child-
care on fertility. Section 4.7 checks the sensitivity of our findings and Section 4.8
discusses these results and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
We build on an impressive amount of research that examines the consequences of
policy efforts to improve the availability and affordability of public child care. These
studies can be divided into two broad types. The first examines the effects of child
care policy innovations on maternal employment. The picture that emerges from this
literature in general is that of positive effects from the introduction or expansion of
affordable child care on the labor supply of mothers—particularly sole mothers (e.g.,
Gelbach, 2002; Blau and Tekin, 2007; Baker et al., 2008; Lefebvre and Merrigan,
2008; Cascio, 2009). One notable exception is the study by Havnes and Mogstad
(2011), which exploits the introduction of universal child care in Norway in the
late 1970s and finds no positive causal relationship between public child care and
maternal employment. Despite this, the total available evidence supports the widely
held perception that the availability of public child care assists families in reconciling
work with family life.
The second type of study examines the link between child care and child
development. Several lines of evidence emerge from these studies. First, there exist
studies offering both negative (e.g., NICHD – Early Child Care Research Network,
2003a; Baker et al., 2008), neutral (e.g., Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2002) and positive
(NICHD – Early Child Care Research Network, 2004; Havnes and Mogstad, 2012)
effects on the developmental outcomes of young children of the amount of time spent
in child care. Second, there appears to be a positive relationship between child care
quality and child development
(e.g., Field, 1991; NICHD – Early Child Care Research Network, 2003b). Finally,
while the amount of time spent in child care contributes independently to child
development, the impact of family background characteristics is generally stronger.
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Much less can be said for our knowledge of the impact of public child care on
fertility. From a theoretical perspective, the link between child care and fertility
is clear. As child care becomes available, mothers are able to return to work
sooner after childbirth. This, in turn, reduces the opportunity cost of having
children—e.g., forgone wages or loss of skill development while out of the labor
force—and so increases fertility (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973; Ermisch,
2003). However, this theoretical prediction receives weak empirical support and
the evidence is ambiguous at best – see, for example, Mason and Kuhlthau (1992);
Kravdal (1996); Del Boca (2002); Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003). What distinguishes
our work from these studies is that we exploit a set of policy innovations which led
to a large scale expansion of child care slots for young children within a short period
of time.
To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two other studies that use
policy reforms to assess the impact of child care on fertility. Rindfuss et al. (2010)
examine a policy reform from the mid-1970s in Norway, which led to a substantial
expansion of public child care. Simulations based on estimates from a municipality-
level fixed effects model suggest that moving from having no child care slots available
for preschool children to having slots available for 60 percent of preschool children
leads the average woman to have 0.5 more children. Mo¨rk et al. (2010) exploit the
exogenous variation in user fees caused by a Swedish childcare reform to identify the
causal effect of childcare costs on fertility. The results suggest that the reduction
in child care costs increased the number of first and higher order births, but only
seemed to affect the timing of second births.
Both of the aforementioned studies are conducted within the Scandinavian
context, which is highly unrepresentative of many other developed countries demo-
graphically. As a consequence, the wider applicability of the results is unclear. By
contrast, the context of our study is Germany – a country already struggling with
the ramifications of sustained low fertility. Thus, our results speak more directly to
the policy debate as to whether or not low fertility can be reversed through changes
in public policy that allow women to combine employment and motherhood.
4.3 Background and Context
The German child care system is characterized by a marked East-West-divide.
Throughout the history of the former German Democratic Republic, the East Ger-
man government strongly supported the use of institutional daycare for children of
all ages. Apart from ideological purposes, the government’s primary aim was to
guarantee the compatibility of motherhood and female employment. The East Ger-
man child care system survived the German reunification, with more than one-half of
all East German children under the age of three attending a child care center in the
mid-1990s. At the turn of the millennium, parents in East Germany demanded fewer
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child care slots for children under three than were potentially available (Hank et al.,
2001). The picture today still is that there is no shortage of child care slots for
children under three in East Germany.
The situation was much different in West Germany, where social policies
supported private care by mothers over universal childcare for preschool children
until after reunification (Moeller, 1993). In the late 1990s, the German government
enacted legislation that grants children aged three to six the right to a place in
kindergarten, which ultimately led to full provision of public child care for that
age group in West Germany. However, it was not until the mid-2000s that the
development of institutionalized child care for children under three came to the
political fore. Before 2005, less than 5 child care slots per 100 children under the
age of three were available in West Germany. Thereafter the availability of child
care slots for children in this age group started to expand rapidly. The expansion
was brought about by three major policy initiatives:
• In 2005, the government made the legal commitment (“Tagesbetreuungsaus-
baugesetz”) to create 230,000 additional child care slots for under three year
old children by 2010 in West Germany. The specific aim was a child care
coverage rate of 17 percent by 2010 in West Germany.
• In 2007, a summit (called “Krippengipfel”) of the three federal levels—i.e.,
federal state, “La¨nder”, local authorities—agreed upon increasing the child
care coverage rate for under three year olds to 35 percent by 2013.
• In 2008, the law to promote children (“Kinderfo¨rderungsgesetz”) established
the legal claim to a child care slot for all preschool children age one and above
by 2013.
In the run-up to the law to promote children, the three federal levels agreed
that every level bears one third of the expansion costs in order to share the burden.
These initiatives led to a major expansion of child care slots for young children.
Figure 4.1 provides a map which illustrates the child care coverage rate for West
Germany’s 326 counties in 2002 and 2009, respectively. In each year, the child care
coverage rate is defined as the percentage of under three-year-old children in child
care centers. In principle, this measure reflects use rather than availability. However,
throughout the period we examine, the demand for child care slots for under three
year olds far exceeded the supply (Bien et al., 2007; Wrohlich, 2008). Thus, the child
care coverage rate captures both availability and use. In 2002, we observe that the
child care coverage rate was consistently below 5 percent across virtually all West
German counties. In succeeding years, the child care coverage rate rose sharply, i.e.,
it more than quintupled to reach an average of 15 percent in 2009. However, it is
also evident from the map that the counties differ distinctly in terms of changes in
child care coverage. Indeed, the percentage point increases in child care coverage
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Figure 4.1: Public child care coverage in West German counties in 2002 and 2009
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Notes: The left panel shows child care coverage in West German counties in 2002, the right panel shows child care
coverage in West German counties in 2009.
from 2002 to 2009 varied from a minimum of 3 percentage points to a maximum of
27 percentage points. Both identification strategies proposed in this study exploit
these pronounced temporal and spatial variations in child care coverage after 2002.
Apart from the child care expansion under consideration, we are not aware of any
other major policy changes that could cause a problem for our estimation.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify the effect of public child care on fertility, we start with a simple
difference-in-differences approach which exploits the expansion of public child care
during the last decade. In particular, we order the German counties by the absolute
size of the increase in the public child care coverage rate from 2002 to 2009. Then,
we define those counties whose increase in public child care coverage was above the
median as the treatment group, while those counties whose increase was below the
median constitute the control group. Further, we use the year 2002 as the pre-
treatment year and the year 2009 as the post-treatment year in our basic two-period
difference-in-differences model. There are two reasons for choosing the year 2002
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as the pre-treatment year: First, since public child care was not a major political
issue until the year 2005, the year 2002 is certainly a year which is unaffected by
any political decisions fostering the expansion of public child care. Second, the year
2002 is the last year where administrative data on public child care coverage on the
county level is available before public child care actually became a political issue in
2005.
We can express our simple two-period difference-in-differences strategy that
identifies the treatment effect δ in the following way:
{E(yct+1 | Dc = 1, Tt = 1)− E(yct+1 | Dc = 1, Tt = 0)}
−{E(yct+1 | Dc = 0, Tt = 1)− E(yct+1 | Dc = 0, Tt = 0)} = δ
(4.1)
where yct+1 is the number of births by 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 living in county
c in year t + 1. The outcome variable is measured in the year t + 1 because there
are at least 10 months from the decision to have a child to the actual birth. Dc
is the treatment group indicator for county c, which is unity for counties of the
treatment group, i.e., for those counties with above median increase in public child
care coverage, and zero for counties of the control group. Tt = 0 is the post-treatment
year indicator, which is unity for all observations in the post-treatment year 2009,
and zero for all observations in the pre-treatment year 2002.
This difference-in-differences model can be rewritten in regression form:
(4.2) yct+1 = α+ βDc + γTt + δDcTt + ǫct
In this regression, the treatment effect δ is identified by the coefficient on the
interaction of the treatment group indicator D and the post-treatment indicator
T , while α captures the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 in the
control group in the pre-treatment year 2002, β captures the difference of the
treatment group from the control group in the pre-treatment year 2002, and γ gives
the difference between the post- and the pre-treatment year for the control group.
A vector of covariates X can be introduced into the model in a straightforward
way. The key identifying assumption for this difference-in-differences model is that
treatment and control group follow the same time trend in absence of the treatment.
We will test whether this crucial common-trend assumption is plausible by looking
at the trends of treatment and control group in pre-treatment periods.
The main specification in this paper, however, is a more generalized fixed-
effects framework that allows for unobserved time-invariant differences between
counties. The respective regression equation can be written in the following way:
(4.3) yct+1 = ηc + µt +X
′
ctλ+ ρdct + ζct
where ηc is a county fixed effect for county c, µt is a year fixed effect for year t,
and X ′ct is a vector of covariates of county c that vary over time t. The variable dct
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represents the public child care coverage rate of county c in year t. Accordingly, ρ
captures the causal effect of public child care coverage on fertility. As before, yct+1
is our outcome variable measuring the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15
to 44 living in county c in year t + 1. Later, we will also use the number of births
per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 in t + 2 as well as the arithmetic mean of births
per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 in t + 1 and t + 2 as outcome variables in order
to more flexibly address timing issues. Note that in this fixed-effects specification,
identification comes from within-county variation in public child care coverage over
time. Consequently, the key identifying assumption of this fixed-effects framework
is that there are no unobserved characteristics of a county that vary over time and
are correlated with the variable of interest d and the outcome variable.
4.5 Data on Child Care Coverage and Fertility
In our analysis we use official data from German Statistics Office (Statistisches Bun-
desamt) and Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) aggregated
on the county level (Landkreise). We use a balanced panel of all 326 West-German
counties from 1998 to 2010. A detailed description of the data and variable defini-
tions can be found in the data appendix.
Child care data for children less than three years old is available for 1998,
2002, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.6 We define our variable of interest, child care
coverage, as child care slots over the population of children less than three years
old. Table 4.1 shows that child care coverage averages 7.8 percent over the whole
period of observation. It varies widely from 0 to 41.6 percent. We can see in Table
4.2 that child care coverage was very low in 1998 and 2002. The average over the
326 counties was 1.7 respectively 2.3 percent. The rise is already evident in 2006,
when child care coverage reached 7.4 percent. In the following years it rose steadily
to on average 14.3 percent in 2009.
Our dependent variable births per 1,000 women is calculated as the sum of
births over 1,000 women in reproductive age, i.e., between 15 and 44 years. In Table
4.1 we show two specifications from our regression analysis measured in period t+1
respectively t+2. Births per 1,000 women in t+1 average at 44.163, with a standard
deviation of 3.979. Figures range from 29.890 in the lowest fertility county-year
observation to the highest figure of 65.440. For births per 1,000 women in t + 2,
figures are comparable in size and variation, but by forwarding we lose one wave of
data corresponding to 326 observations.
We also employ a number of control variables in the estimations. Population
density is defined as full population divided by surface area in square kilometers.
Counties differ much in population density ranging from 40 to over 4,000 people per
6Data for 2010 is not used, as our dependent variable is forwarded at least one year.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Child care coverage 1956 0.078 0.063 0.000 0.416
Births per 1,000 women (t+1) 1956 44.163 3.979 29.890 65.440
Births per 1,000 women (t+2) 1630 44.292 3.904 29.207 62.887
Population density 1956 575.626 712.438 40.720 4286.211
Employment rate (m) 1956 0.604 0.060 0.406 0.737
GDP per capita 1956 28.030 10.797 11.238 86.079
Population fraction 15-19 1956 0.057 0.006 0.039 0.073
Population fraction 20-24 1956 0.057 0.008 0.040 0.118
Population fraction 25-29 1956 0.059 0.011 0.039 0.105
Population fraction 30-34 1956 0.064 0.014 0.042 0.112
Population fraction 35-39 1956 0.076 0.009 0.050 0.106
Population fraction 40-44 1956 0.083 0.007 0.062 0.101
Population fraction 44+ 1956 0.454 0.035 0.332 0.553
Female in-migrants 18-29 (t+1) 1630 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.049
Female in-migrants 18-49 (t+1) 1630 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.096
Female out-migrants 18-29 (t+1) 1630 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.047
Female out-migrants 18-49 (t+1) 1630 0.014 0.005 0.006 0.095
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
minimum, and maximum) on the county level aggregated over all waves used in the estimations. In
particular, for the variables child care coverage, population density, employment rate (male) GDP per
capita as well as for all population fraction variables, the figures show aggregated values over the years
1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Accordingly, all variables measured in (t+1) are aggregated
over the years 1999, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, whereas all variables measured in (t+2) are
aggregated over the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2010.
square kilometer. On average 576 people live per square kilometer. Male employ-
ment rate is defined as all male employees subject to social insurance contribution at
place of residence divided by male working age population, with working age being
20 to 64 years. Male employment rate averages at 60.4 percent with a standard
deviation of 0.06. GDP per capita is defined as GDP in 1,000 Euro divided by the
full population and averages 28,030 Euro per capita. Further controls are population
fractions of certain age groups in 5-year intervals from 15 to over 44. They are defined
as the population in the specific age group over the full population. Descriptive
statistics show that younger cohorts are smaller than older cohorts. While 15 to 19
year old people represent on average 5.7 percent of the population, people from 40
to 44 years represent on average 8.3 percent of the population.
In later robustness checks, we use in- and out-migrant flows in t + 1 divided
by the full population as dependent variables. We do not have information from
wave 1998 which reduces the sample size by 326 observations. For the sake of
completeness, we also report descriptive statistics for migrant flows in Table 4.1.
4.6 Results
We start with a simple graph that shows the increase in public child care coverage
for the group of West German counties with above median increase in the period
from 2002 until 2009 (treatment group) as well as for the group of West German
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Table 4.2: Child care coverage over time
Child care coverage
Year N Mean S.D. Min Max
1998 326 0.017 0.026 0.000 0.322
2002 326 0.023 0.029 0.000 0.355
2006 326 0.074 0.042 0.010 0.378
2007 326 0.095 0.047 0.022 0.398
2008 326 0.118 0.050 0.033 0.405
2009 326 0.143 0.052 0.037 0.416
2010 326 0.172 0.055 0.071 0.421
Notes: The figures show mean child care coverage
rates across West German counties as well as stan-
dard deviations, minimum, and maximum values.
All information is provided for the years 1998, 2002,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.
counties with below median increase in the period from 2002 until 2009 (control
group). As we can see from the upper left panel (i) of Figure 4.2, public child
care coverage was at a low level of not even 2 percent for both groups of counties
in 1998. From 1998 to 2002, we observe hardly any dynamics. By 2006, child care
coverage had increased from a mere 2 percent to 5 percent in the control group and 9
percent in the treatment group. By 2010, public child care coverage was 21 percent
in treatment counties and 14 percent in control counties. Thus, while treatment
and control counties started out from the same low level of child care coverage in
2002, trends have diverged since then and the difference in the coverage rate has
increased to more than 7 percentage points in 2010. The upper right panel (ii) of
Figure 4.2 graphically depicts this increase in the difference between treatment and
control counties.
Turning to the lower left panel (iii) of Figure 4.2, we see that, for both groups
of counties, the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 generally decreased
from 1998 (49.1; 50.9) until 2006 (41.0; 42.7) whereas there is a slight upward
movement from 2006 until 2010 (43.3; 44.5). Over the whole period of observation,
the treatment group counties show lower numbers of births than the control group
counties. However, the difference between treatment and control group becomes
smaller over time as the treatment group slowly approaches the control group level.
Normalizing the difference in births per 1,000 women in 1999 to zero, the lower
right panel (iv) of Figure 4.2 depicts the dynamics of this difference over time. This
difference does not systematically change from 1998 until 2004. In the following
years, the number of births in the treatment group gradually increases as compared
to the number of births in the control group. By 2010, the number of births has
increased by 0.86 births more in the treatment group than the number of births
in the control group. Thus, taken together, these graphs are compatible with the
hypothesis that public child care coverage increases fertility.
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Figure 4.2: Child care and fertility in treatment and control group
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Notes: The figures show averages of the treatment group (D=1) and the control group (D=0) and the difference
between the treatment and the control group ((D=1)-(D=0)) over time. The figure in the upper left panel (i) depicts
child care coverage, the figure in the upper right panel (ii) depicts the difference between the treatment and the
control group in child care coverage. The figure in the lower left panel (iii) depicts births per 1,000 women, the
figure in the lower right panel (iv) depicts the difference between the treatment and the control group in births per
1,000 women.
Difference-in-differences regression results In a next step, we bring these
graphs to a multivariate difference-in-differences framework using the year 2002
as the pre-treatment year and the year 2009 as the post-treatment year, while
measuring the outcome variable in the year t + 1. In column 1 of Table 4.3, we
see that counties of the treatment group had on average 2.073 births per 1,000
women less than counties of the control group in 2003. Further, the coefficient on
the post-treatment dummy shows that the number of births per 1,000 women in
the control group decreased by 0.280 from 2003 to 2010. Most importantly, the
coefficient on the interaction term depicts the positive treatment effect observed in
Figure 4.2. Compared to the control group, the number of births per 1,000 women
in the treatment group increased by 0.845 births more from 2003 to 2010. This
effect turns out to be statistically different at the 1 percent level. Including regional
control variables such as population density, male employment rate, and GDP per
capita in column 2 of Table 4.3 does not affect this result. Taking into consideration
that the treatment, i.e., the difference in the increase of child care coverage between
treatment and control group between 2002 and 2009, corresponds to 6.8 percentage
points, the difference-in-differences estimate of 0.815 suggest that a 10 percentage
point increase in public child care coverage increases the number of births per 1,000
women by 1.2 births or by 2.8 percent.
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Table 4.3: Difference-in-differences and placebo difference-in-differences estimates
Births per 1,000 women (t+1) Births per 1,000 women (t+1)
Placebo treatment in 2002
Treatment group x Post-treatment 0.845*** 0.815** 0.018 -0.094
(0.310) (0.323) (0.296) (0.287)
Treatment group -2.073*** -2.106*** -2.091*** -2.009***
(0.366) (0.346) (0.453) (0.392)
Post-treatment -0.280 -0.638*** -4.956*** -5.245***
(0.221) (0.242) (0.183) (0.193)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 652 652 652 652
R2 0.066 0.180 0.344 0.487
Notes: The table shows results of difference-in-differences estimations where the treatment group consists of all counties
with above median increase in child care coverage rates from 2002 until 2009. The control group consists of counties with
below median increase in child care coverage rates from 2002 until 2009. In columns (1) and (2), the baseline period is
the year 2002 whereas the post-treatment period is the year 2009. In columns (3) and (4), the baseline period is the year
1998 whereas the placebo post-treatment period is the year 2002. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) include the
county’s population density, GDP per capita as well as the male employment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level; * 10 percent
significance level.
The key identifying assumption of our difference-in-differences approach is that
the trends in the outcome variable are the same for treatment and control group in
absence of the treatment. In order to provide evidence for the plausibility of this
assumption, we run placebo treatment difference-in-differences estimations in the
pre-treatment years. In particular, we use the year 1998 as the pre-treatment year
and the year 2002 as the placebo post-treatment year. Column 3 of Table 4.3 shows
that we do not find any deviance from the common trend in this pre-treatment
period. Including our regional control variables in column 4 of Table 4.3 does not
affect this result. Thus, this placebo treatment exercise supports the validity of the
key identifying assumption of our difference-in-differences approach, namely that
treatment and control group follow the same trend in absence of the treatment.
Fixed-effects regression results Now, we turn to our more generalized county
fixed-effects model which allows for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between
counties. Apart from county and year fixed effects, we control for a county’s
population density, male employment rate and GDP per capita in all the following
regressions. In column 1 of Table 4.4, we see that public child care coverage positively
affects births per 1,000 women in the following year. The coefficient suggests that
introducing full provision of public child care increases the number of births per
1,000 women by 14.049. Accordingly, a 10 percentage point increase in child care
coverage leads to an increase in births per 1,000 women of 1.40. Although being
slightly larger, the estimate compares fairly well to the earlier result (1.2) if we take
into account the different estimation setup. Moreover, the fixed-effect treatment
effect is precisely estimated and turns out significantly different from zero at the 1
percent level.
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Table 4.4: Fixed-effects estimates
Births per 1,000 women Births per 1,000 women Births per 1,000 women
(t+1) (t+2) [(t+1)+(t+2)]/2
Child care coverage 14.049*** 15.893*** 16.776***
(2.858) (3.068) (2.769)
Population density 0.004 0.007** 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Employment rate (m) -39.458*** -31.733*** -36.536***
(7.207) (6.569) (6.526)
GDP per capita 0.246*** 0.234*** 0.254***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.041)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 1,956 1,630 1,630
F-statistic 187.82 205.70 244.49
Notes: The table shows the results of county fixed-effects estimations. The outcome variable births per 1,000 women aged
15 to 44 is forwarded by one period in column (1), and forwarded by two periods in column (2); the outcome variable
in column (3) is the arithmetic mean of the outcome variables from columns (1) and (2). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the county level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level; *
10 percent significance level.
Note that public child care coverage is measured at the 31st of March of
the respective year while the number of births per 1,000 women covers the period
from 1st of January until 31st of December of the respective year. Accordingly,
forwarding our outcome variable by one year means that we allow fertility reactions
to increases in public child care coverage within a county from 9 to 21 months after
public child care coverage is observed. Yet, individuals might not be immediately
aware of increases in public child care coverage. Further, even if individuals are
aware, they might not react immediately to changes in public child care provision.
Moreover, even if they do, women might not be successful in getting pregnant within
a short period. For these reasons, we might wish to allow for some more time to
observe reactions to increases in public child care coverage. In column 2 of Table
4.4, we forward the dependent variable births per 1,000 women by yet another year.
In column 3 of Table 4.4, we combine the one and two year forwarding into an
arithmetic mean of births per 1,000 women. Thus, we observe fertility reactions
from 9 to 33 months after public child care coverage is observed. The estimates in
columns 2 and 3 slightly increase as compared to column 1 while the precision of
the estimates is basically unaffected. Thus, this exercise, which more flexibly deals
with timing of fertility issues, confirms our result of a positive and highly significant
effect of public child care coverage on fertility.
Turning to the coefficients of the covariates, we observe that GDP is associated
with a higher number of births, suggesting that fertility is higher in economic
upswings than in downswings. Yet, the association of fertility and male employment
is of the opposite sign. This may well be due to a delayed employment adjustment
in the rather rigid German labor market or due to nonlinear associations between
economic cycles and fertility. Increases in population density are positively associ-
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ated with the number of births per 1,000 women although this association is only
statistically significant in the specification of column 2 of Table 4.4.
Child care provision may not be an equally important determinant of fertility
decisions over the life-cycle. Obviously it should be more essential for women with
strong labor market aspirations. Timing of education, marriage and fecundity may
also play their roles in fertility decisions. To analyze heterogeneity in the response
to public child care coverage, we split the dependent variable, number of births per
1,000 women, in six different dependent variables. Each of them captures fertility
effects for a specific age-group, starting with 15 to 19 year old women up to 40 to
44 year old women.
Table 4.5 presents county fixed-effects results for these six outcome variables.
We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of public child care provision on
the number of births over different age groups. The effect is largest for women
aged 30 to 34, with a statistically highly significant coefficient of 33.068. Thus, the
effect is virtually doubled for this age group compared to the average effect. Maybe
surprisingly, we do not find any effects for women aged 25 to 29 with the coefficient
being even negative but close to zero. The effects for women in age groups 20 to 24
and 35 to 39 are somewhat smaller than for the 30 to 34 year olds; however, they are
still economically and statistically highly significant. For very young women aged
15 to 19, the effect is still smaller (6.587). For 40 to 44 year old women, we do not
find any effect, which is less surprising given the generally low fertility around that
age. Taken together, we find some evidence of an above average effect of child care
on number of births per 1,000 women in medium age groups (with the exception of
mothers aged 25 to 29), whereas we find a below average effect for women in rather
old and rather young reproductive age.
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In our fixed-effects regressions, we can control for time-invariant heterogeneity be-
tween counties. Identification of fertility effects comes from within-county variation
in public child care coverage over time. Effects from our fixed-effects models might be
confounded by variables which change over time within a county and are correlated
with both public child care provision and fertility decisions at the same time. To
minimize this problem from the start, we control for population density, GDP per
capita as well as the male employment rate in all our regressions. Another natural
candidate which could potentially constitute a confounding factor is a county’s age
composition. On the one hand, one might think of a county’s age composition as
being rather stable over time. To the extent that this is true, age composition would
be captured by the county fixed effect. For the rest of this section, however, we focus
on the case where we think of age composition as being a time-varying construct
which could constitute a potential confounding factor. If the number of women in
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Table 4.5: Fixed-effects estimates: Effect heterogeneity across age groups
Births per Births per Births per Births per Births per Births per
1,000 women 1,000 women 1,000 women 1,000 women 1,000 women 1,000 women
aged 15-19 (t+1) aged 20-24 (t+1) aged 25-29 (t+1) aged 30-34 (t+1) aged 35-39 (t+1) aged 40-44 (t+1)
Child care coverage 6.587*** 14.384** -2.047 33.068*** 15.767*** 1.948
(2.399) (5.922) (7.428) (7.084) (5.092) (1.609)
Population density -0.009*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.003 0.048*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002)
Employment rate (m) 3.551 -7.900 -46.456*** -35.270** -45.097*** -11.365***
(4.918) (12.341) (15.605) (15.981) (11.513) (3.361)
GDP per capita -0.066* -0.105 -0.024 0.350*** 0.448*** 0.093***
(0.038) (0.085) (0.102) (0.098) (0.071) (0.025)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956
F-statistic 73.34 272.03 64.01 63.23 216.71 115.63
Notes: The table shows the results of county fixed-effects estimations. The outcome variables are age group-specific fertility rates, i.e., the number of births per
1,000 women aged 15-19 (column 1), 20-24 (column 2), 25-29 (column 3), 30-34 (column 4), 35-39 (column 5), and 40-44 respectively (column 6). All outcome
variable are forwarded by one period. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5
percent significance level; * 10 percent significance level.
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child-bearing age increases over time, this could push local authorities to increase
child care coverage while, at the same time, the number of births might increase.
Therefore, changes in a county’s age composition clearly deserve a more in-depth
analysis.
Table 4.6: Fixed-effects estimates using age structure controls
Births per Births per Births per
1,000 women 1,000 women 1,000 women
(t+1) (t+2) ((t+1)+(t+2))/2
Child care coverage 9.553*** 10.172*** 10.751***
(2.322) (2.620) (2.187)
Population density -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Employment rate (m) 1.455 2.313 0.997
(6.008) (6.029) (5.545)
GDP per capita 0.042 0.052 0.053*
(0.034) (0.036) (0.031)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age structure controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1,956 1,630 1,630
F-statistic 196.19 178.61 260.30
Notes: The table shows the results of county fixed-effects estimations. The outcome
variable births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 is forwarded by one period in column
(1), and forwarded by two periods in column (2); the outcome variable in column (3) is
the arithmetic mean of the outcome variables from columns (1) and (2). Age structure
controls include the ratio of 15-19 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 20-24
year olds in the total population, the ratio of 25-29 year olds in the total population, the
ratio of 30-34 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 35-39 year olds in the total
population, the ratio of 40-44 year olds in the total population, and the ratio of over 44
year olds in the total population. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county
level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance
level; * 10 percent significance level.
Note that, to a certain extent, our outcome variable already accounts for a
county’s change in age composition. This is because our dependent variable does not
merely count the number of births in a given year but relates them to the number
of women in reproductive age living in this county in this given year. Thus, the
denominator of our outcome variable makes sure that our results are not confounded
by mere size effects. However, one might argue that there might be changes in the
composition within the group of women in reproductive age, which could confound
our results. Imagine the overall number of women in reproductive age does not
change but the number of 30 to 34 year old women gains relative size as compared
to the number of 40 to 44 year old women. This might well push local politicians
towards providing more public child care spaces and similarly lead to more births
per 1,000 women in child-bearing age. But again, we have already dealt with this
potential problem by splitting our outcome variable in six outcome variables each
capturing a specific age subgroup of women in child-bearing age (see Table 4.5).
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As an alternative strategy to deal with this problem, we use our basic outcome
variable, i.e., the number of births per 1,000 women of reproductive age, and
extensively control for a county’s age structure in our county-fixed-effects model.
In particular, we introduce the fraction of 15-19 year olds, 20-24 year olds, 25-29
year olds, 30-34 year olds, 35-39 year olds, 40-44 year olds, and over 44 year olds
in the population as covariates.7 Table 4.6 presents the results of this extended
fixed-effects framework. Again, we use births per 1,000 women in reproductive age
in t+1 (column 1), t+2 (column 2) as well as the arithmetic mean over both periods
(column 3) as alternative outcome variables. Across all three outcome variables, the
fixed-effects estimates confirm the positive and highly significant effect of public
child care provision on fertility. Taking the coefficient from column 3 as an example,
a 10 percentage point increase in public child care coverage increases the number of
births per 1,000 women by 1.2. Thus, the effects found in this extended fixed-effects
specification are somewhat smaller than the effects found in the basic fixed-effects
specification from Table 4.4. Yet, also note that they are virtually identical to the
results yielded by our difference-in-differences specification from Table 4.3.
Table 4.7: Fixed-effects estimates on the effects of public child care expansion on
in-migration
Female in-migrants Female in-migrants Female in-migrants Female in-migrants
18-29 18-49 18-29 18-49
(t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1)
Child care coverage -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Population density 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment rate (m) -0.013** -0.011 0.011 0.020
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
GDP per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age structure controls No No Yes Yes
N 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630
F-statistic 8.75 7.06 14.59 14.66
Notes: The table shows the results of county fixed-effects estimations. The outcome variable in columns (1) and (3) is the number
of female in-migrants aged 18-29 divided by the total population while the outcome variable in columns (2) and (4) is the number
of female in-migrants aged 18-49 divided by the total population. Age structure controls in columns (2) and (4) include the ratio
of 15-19 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 20-24 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 25-29 year olds in the
total population, the ratio of 30-34 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 35-39 year olds in the total population, the ratio
of 40-44 year olds in the total population, and the ratio of over 44 year olds in the total population. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the county level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level; * 10 percent
significance level.
Although we control for an extensive set of age structure variables in our
county-fixed effects framework and use the number of women in reproductive age as
a denominator of our outcome variable, one remaining problem might be selective
7Computing these population ratios for the subgroup of females only does not change our results.
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migration. Suppose couples or women who are pregnant or plan to have a child
systematically move to counties that increase public child care coverage. This kind
of selective migration of to-be-mothers would confound our estimates.8 If an increase
in public child care coverage can indeed redirect migration flows, this should show up
in higher gross in-migration flows in counties that increase public child care coverage.
In order to test whether this is the case, we run our fixed-effects regressions using the
ratio of female in-migrants aged 18 to 29 in t+1 on the total population in t as the
outcome variable (column 1 of Table 4.7). As an alternative outcome variable, we
use the ratio of female in-migrants aged 18 to 49 in t+1 on the total population in t
as the outcome variable (column 2 of Table 4.7). We do not find any effects of public
child care coverage on in-migration of women of reproductive age. Introducing our
extensive age composition controls in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.7 does not affect
this result.
Table 4.8: Fixed-effects estimates on the effects of public child care expansion on
out-migration
Female out-migrants Female out-migrants Female out-migrants Female out-migrants
18-29 18-49 18-29 18-49
(t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1)
Child care coverage -0.002 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Population density 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment rate (m) -0.009** -0.007 0.008 0.014
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013)
GDP per capita 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age structure controls No No Yes Yes
N 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630
F-statistic 42.55 31.09 44.95 23.50
Notes: The table shows the results of county fixed-effects estimations. The outcome variable in columns (1) and (3) is the number of
female out-migrants aged 18-29 divided by the total population while the outcome variable in columns (2) and (4) is the number of
female out-migrants aged 18-49 divided by the total population. Age structure controls in columns (2) and (4) include the ratio of
15-19 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 20-24 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 25-29 year olds in the total
population, the ratio of 30-34 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 35-39 year olds in the total population, the ratio of 40-44
year olds in the total population, and the ratio of over 44 year olds in the total population. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
county level and given in parentheses. *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 percent significance level; * 10 percent significance level.
Table 4.8 repeats the same exercise for out-migrants. Again, we do not find
any effects of public child coverage on migration flows. In further regressions, we use
the absolute numbers instead of the ratios of female in-migrants and out-migrants
as our outcome variables. Also in these specifications, no indications for effects of
public child care on in-migration emerge. There are some tentatively negative effects
8However, also note that movements of couples or single mothers with a baby would not
confound our results since our outcome variable does not measure the number of under three
year olds but the actual number of births.
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of public child care coverage on out-migration. Detailed results are available from
the authors upon request. Thus, taken together, we conclude that we do not find any
evidence that our results might be driven by selective in-migration of to-be-mothers.9
4.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present new empirical evidence for positive effects of public child
care supply on fertility. Our results fill a void in the literature: Most of the existing
evidence uses data from Scandinavian medium- to high-fertility countries, whereas
the subject of our study, Germany, classifies as a low-fertility country. For policy
makers it seems to be of particular importance to draw on research results that can
show a path to escape the low fertility trap. We can confirm that the encouraging
evidence from earlier studies is transferable to low-fertility countries like Germany.
Our evidence is based on two methods that exploit a rapid increase in public
child care for under three year olds with wide regional variation at the county level.
First, we apply a difference-in-differences method that compares a treatment group
of counties with above-median child care expansion to a control group of counties
with below-median child care expansion. Second, we use a fixed-effects estimator
to control for county-specific fertility rates. Results from both specifications show
that child care expansion has a significant positive effect on fertility. In particular,
our results suggest that an increase in child care coverage for under three year olds
from 5 percent to 35 percent can increase fertility rates by roughly 0.13 children per
woman. In other words, a 10 percentage point increase in child care coverage leads
to an increase in births per 1,000 women of 3.2 percent. This is a substantial effect
of a family policy that serves multiple purposes and, for example, also has positive
effects on female labor supply.
There are some interesting aspects we cannot address in this study. It seems
worthwhile for future research to analyze the fertility effects in greater detail. In
particular, the question arises whether the fertility effect is realized at the intensive
or extensive margin (higher-order births). Moreover, we could not address certainly
interesting issues of timing of births. Furthermore, one might want to know more
about heterogeneity of the effect with respect to educational attainment. These
aspects could not be tackled in this paper due to a lack of comprehensive micro
data. Also, we might wonder, whether there is a level of child care provision above
which fertility effects disappear.
9We also estimated our basic fixed-effects models on the level of 75 more aggregated regions
(Raumordnungsregionen) instead of counties using the number of births per 1,000 women of
reproductive age as the outcome variable. The intuition is that selective migration due to increases
in public child care coverage is less likely between these larger regions than between counties.
These fixed-effects models yield effects very similar to the county fixed-effects models. Results are
available on request.
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Appendix D
D.1 Data Appendix
County level data from the German Statistics Office is provided in per year per item
files. We identify counties by official id numbers and conduct a county level panel
from 1997 to 2010. During this investigation period, reforms in geographic local
government competency and in data aggregation rules altered county identifiers
in some instances. In order to get a fully balanced panel, we made necessary
changes that produced time-stable units of observations. Hannover, Aachen and
Saarbruecken are merged to city-urban regions, whereas in earlier waves each consists
of two separate counties. We use the merged definition throughout all waves and
add up values if necessary. Our basic data is from German Statistics Office, whereas
the employment related data is from the Federal Employment Agency and matched
using county-year identifiers.
Our variables have different underlying measurement concepts. Child care
slots, population and employment are record date measures, reported on 1st March
(child care from 2006 onwards), 31st December (population, child care before 2006)
resp. 30th June (employment). Births, GDP and in- and out-migrants are yearly
sums. Births per 1,000 women are defined as the sum of births within the year
divided by population as of 31st December. As child care from 2006 onwards is
evaluated on 1st March and population on 31st December, we divide it by one year
lagged population. Child care in 1998 and 2002 is measured on 31st December and
is therefore divided by population in the same year.
Child care figures are conducted from two different data collections by the
German Statistics Office. From 2006 onwards we observe occupied child care slots,
whereas in 1998 and 2002 we observe available child care slots. As there was
clearly excess demand for child care, we can credibly assume both measures to
be comparable. If anything, too large values for 1998 and 2002 would lead to a
downward bias in our estimation.
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